PREM

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1967 MIDDLE EAST

1619

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
C(67)88	29.5.67
CC(67)35th conclusions, minute 2	1.6.67
CC(67)33rd. conclusions, minute 1	30.5.67

I have no objection: I take it LP + Chief Whip have cut.
Htw

PRIME MINISTER

Lord Longford telephoned to say that Lord Shepherd had been approached by Lord Avon and the Marquess of Salisbury with the suggestion that the Lords debate on the Middle East should take place on Thursday.

Lord Longford and Lord Shepherd favour this proposal but do not want to go firm without your approval. Lord Avon apparently intends to speak!

P. LE C.

May 29, 1967

Phoned to Chequers 29/5.

PRIME MINISTER

Lord Longford telephoned to say that Lord Shepherd had been approached by Lord Avon and the Marquess of Salisbury with the suggestion that the Lords Debate on the Middle East should take place on Thursday. Lord Longford and Lord Shepherd favoured this proposal but did not want to go firm without your approval.

Lord Avon apparently intends to speak!

P. LE C.

May 29, 1967

Prime Minister had no objection - now did Lord President or Chief Whip. Michael Palliser informed Lord Longford that no objection to Thursday.

R.J.D. 29/5

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1132 29 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1132 OF 29 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2346: MIDDLE EAST.

WE THINK IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DISMISS THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT ALLOW A RESOLUTION TO PASS IN THE COUNCIL ASSERTING THE RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE IN THE GULF OF AQABA AGAINST U.A.R. OBJECTION (NOR WOULD I EXPECT SUFFICIENT POSITIVE VOTES FOR IT). RATHER THAN RISK PUTTING OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF APPEARING TO ACT AGAINST A UNITED NATIONS CONCLUSION I SUGGEST THAT IT COULD PROVE ADVANTAGEOUS TO US TO CLAIM THAT WE DO NOT REQUIRE COUNCIL AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH OUR RIGHTS, WHICH WE HAVE IN ANY CASE ENJOYED UNINTERRUPTED FOR TEN YEARS: IT SHOULD BE FOR THE U.A.R. TO OBTAIN COUNCIL AUTHORITY IF THEY WISHED TO INTERRUPT THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE, JUST AS WE SOUGHT AUTHORITY BEFORE INTERCEPTING SHIPPING ON THE HIGH SEAS EN ROUTE TO BEIRA.

2. THUS, WHILE I ACCEPT THAT YOU MAY NOT WISH TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESENTING A RESOLUTION FOR PRESENTATIONAL REASONS, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD NOT PASS, I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE RULE OUT THE ISRAELI IDEA AND SHOULD LEAVE OUR HANDS UNFETTERED UNTIL WE SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV NO. 93.

LORD CARADON SENT 1721Z 29 MAY 1967
RECD 1721Z 29 MAY 1967

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CMR

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EN CLAIR
PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1138 29 MAY
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1138 OF 29 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM GOLDBERG'S (U.S.) STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY :-

QUOTE.

''WE BELIEVE FROM THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE AREA OF AQABA, ''FOREGOING BELLIGERENCE'' MUST MEAN FOREGOING ANY BLOCKADE OF THE GULF OF AQABA DURING THE BREATHING SPELL REQUESTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND PERMITTING FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE OF ALL NATIONS AND ALL FLAGS THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN TO CONTINUE AS IT HAS DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS. THIS WOULD ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION DELIBERATELY, AND FREE OF THE THREAT OF ''DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES'' WHICH, AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAYS IN HIS REPORT, ''COULD ENSUE FROM RESTRICTING INNOCENT PASSAGE OF SHIPS IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN.''

UNQUOTE.

FO PASS TEL AVIV NO. 94.
LORD CARADON

SENT 1154Z 30 MAY 1967
RECD 1154Z 30 MAY 1967

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION]

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CYPHER/CAT A

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PRIORITY ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 639 29 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.639 of 29 May.
Repeated for information to Washington.

My telegram No,637: Middle East.

Secretary-General of Turkish M.F.A. had to go to Istanbul, so I saw First Deputy Secretary-General Eldem this morning 29 May. He said that on the particular question of Straits of Tiran the Turkish Government did not wish to take up any attitude at present, On the general question, as I have seen, they had issued a more or less neutral statement (my telegram No.638) but he did not think they would issue any further statement now on the Straits. They were studying the question, and their attitude might of course change at some future time, but at present they did not feel able to come down on either side. Moreover, they considered that any statement which in any way supported Israel might encourage her to take action on her own.

2. I made it clear to Mr. Eldem that I was not instructed at present to urge the Turkish Government to make a statement, but only to ascertain their views. I hoped however that the Turkish Government would in their study take into account the views expressed by a number of countries in 1957 and mentioned briefly the statements referred to in your Guidance 120. I added that it might be helprul at some future time for those countries who attached importance to the rule of law to make clear what their views on this question were.

3. Mr. Eldem said that the Turkish Government considered that the whole matter must now be discussed in the United Nations, and they hoped that some solution would emerge there. He repeated that they did not want to encourage Israel to any precipitate action. I said that no one wanted that, but it seemed to me that for the time being at least the Israelis were being restrained, and one must not forget that they might despair if no one was prepared to do anything, and despair could also be a bad counsellor. If in the future that point were reached, then the balance might swing in favour of saying something, though of course one could not now foretell what. Mr. Eldem agreed.

4. He added, that, speaking purely personally, he could not be very hopeful of anything useful emerging from the United Nations. I took this opportunity to give him the gist of your discussions on this,subject with the Russians (paragraph 4 of your Guidance 121). He commented that it was a question of how long Israel could be expected to hold off. I said that the Straits of Tiran was not the only danger point: Nasser seemed to be in a belligerent mood, and an incident on one of the frontiers could start the war. He agreed, but said even if nothing much emerged from the United Nations we should get some indication of how different countries were thinking.

5. Obviously the Turks will be very reluctant even to come off the fence on any issue connected with the crisis, though if they could be convinced that some action by them would really help to avert a war they might be persuaded to join with others in taking it.

F.O. pass Washington 46,

Sir R. Allen

Sent 1405 29 May 1967
Recd. 1636Z 29 May 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE PARIS
TEL NO. 521
SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 29 MAY 67

MY TEL. NO. 518 : MIDDLE EAST.

THE MINISTER SAW LEBEL, DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY THIS EVENING. LEBEL CONFIRMED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD REJECTED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS. THEY HAD MADE NO COUNTER-PROPOSAL AND THE TERMS OF THE THEIR REPLY, WHILE COURTEOUS, HAD RULED OUT FOUR-POWER TALKS NOT ONLY IN NEW YORK BUT ANYWHERE ELSE AS WELL. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO STOP A SHOOTING WAR BREAKING OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. LEBEL THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS HAD PROBABLY FELT UNABLE TO JOIN IN FOUR-POWER TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS BECAUSE OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, HE MENTIONED THAT SOME ARAB STATES HAD NOT BEEN KEEN ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL BECAUSE IT SMACKED OF DICTATION BY THE GREAT POWERS. I EXPECT THIS FACTOR ALSO WEIGHED WITH THE RUSSIANS.

2. THE MINISTER ASKED WHAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT THE NEXT STEP TOWARDS REDUCING TENSION SHOULD BE. LEBEL SAID MORE TIME WAS NEEDED BEFORE A FRESH INITAITIVE HAD A CHANCE. AT PRESENT THEY WOULD WAIT AND SEE HOW THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WENT. HE THOUGHT FRANCE WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO VOTE FOR THE HOLDING RESOLUTION WHICH THEY HAD SEEN AND WHICH CALLED ON PARTIES QUOTE TO FOREGO BELLIGERANCE UNQUOTE. BUT THEY WOULD REVIEW THEIR POSITION IF ANY AMENDMENTS WERE PROPOSED WHICH SEEMED TO BIAS THE RESOLUTION EITHER WAY. IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A FURTHER REFERENCE TO M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, NOW IN ROME, BEFORE THE FRENCH VOTE WAS CAST.

/3. THE

SECRET

S E C R E T

PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 521 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

3. THE MINISTER ASKED IF THE FRENCH WOULD VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS VETOED IT. LEBEL SAID THEY MIGHT, IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE REASONS THE RUSSIANS GAVE FOR THEIR VETO. THE FRENCH WERE TRYING TO FIND OUT THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE BUT HAD NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN DOING SO.

4. OTHER POINTS MADE BY LEBEL WERE:
I) THE FRENCH DID NOT WANT TO REPEAT THEIR 1957 STATEMENT ABOUT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE TIRAN STRAITS, BUT THEY WOULD NOT ENDORSE THE EGYPTIAN POSITION EITHER:
II) THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS CONTINGENCY PLANNING WAS, HE THOUGHT, ENTIRELY NEGATIVE:
III) THEY WERE STILL THINKING OF A COMPROMISE THAT WOULD ALLOW OIL SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA, BUT THEY WERE MAKING NO PROPOSALS YET:
IV) HE HAD JUST SEEN MR. PACHACHI, THE IRAQI MINISTER, AT ORLY AIRPORT EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK. PACHACHI HAD BACKED THE EGYPTIANS BUT SPOKEN MODERATELY. HE HAD MADE NO THREATS ABOUT NATIONALISING WESTERN OIL.

5. YOUR TEL NO. 1552 ARRIVED WHILE THE MINISTER WAS AT THE QUAI. WE SHALL PURSUE THIS TO-MORROW, BUT I DO NOT THINK WE SHALL DISCOVER MUCH UNLESS,PERHAPS, WE REVEAL THAT A MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM MR. KOSYGIN. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TOLD THE FRENCH ON 28 MAY THAT ANOTHER HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGE (HE DID NOT MENTION KOSYGIN) HAD ARRIVED STRESSING THE RUSSIAN DESIRE TO AVOID A CONFLICT, BUT HE GOT NO UNDERLINE NEXT THREE WORDS QUID PRO QUO.

SIR P REILLY

SENT 2055Z 29 MAY 1967
RECD 2055Z 29 MAY 1967

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BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO 1551 29 MAY 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 1551 OF 29 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS CAIRO AMMAN AND BEIRUT.

THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED YESTERDAY EVENING TO INFORM US OF THE SOVIET REPLY TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR POWER MEETING. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW HAD RECEIVED THE REPLY FROM A VICE-MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHOSE NAME MONSIEUR ANDRE COULD NOT REMEMBER. IT WAS TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT:

''ISRAEL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT CRISIS BY REASON OF HER AGGRESSION AGAINST SYRIA. HER ACTION HAD BEEN CONDONED BY CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE UNITED STATES. THE VICE MINISTER REFERRED TO THE SOVIET DECLARATION OF 23 MAY AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE STILL CERTAINLY INTERESTED IN PRESERVING PEACE. THEY HAD MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL. THEY WERE ALSO MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH EGYPT, SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB STATES. THEY HAD STUDIED WORLD REACTION TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. ARAB REACTIONS HAD BEEN UNFAVOURABLE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE PROPOSED MEETING COULD BEAR NO FRUIT. THE SOVIETS WOULD MOREOVER FIND IT DIFFICULT TO HAVE A FORMAL MEETING WITH PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN CONDONING ISRAEL''.

SOSFA SENT 1822Z 29 MAY

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 1552

(EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 1552 OF 29 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1811: MIDDLE EAST.

WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD SAY NOTHING TO THE FRENCH ABOUT KOSYGIN'S MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE REPLIES. NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHAT COMMUNICATIONS THE RUSSIANS HAVE SENT TO THE FRENCH, AND IN WHAT TERMS, SO THAT WE CAN COMPARE THEM WITH THE MESSAGES TO OURSELVES.
2. THE FRENCH MINISTER YESTERDAY INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE RUSSIANS WHICH IN EFFECT REJECTED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1551). YOU SHOULD THANK THE QUAI D'ORSAY FOR THIS INFORMATION. THIS MIGHT PROVIDE YOU WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENQUIRE WHETHER THIS IS THE ONLY MESSAGE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE SENT, OR WHETHER THE FRENCH HAVE ALSO RECEIVED SOMETHING ON THE LINES OF THE MESSAGES SENT TO THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES.
3. GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING YOU CAN DISCOVER WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE EXISTENCE OF THE TEXTS OF THE MESSAGES THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS HAVE HAD FROM THE RUSSIANS.

SOSFA SENT 1815/29 MAY

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MR. THOMSON
P.U.S. MR MURRAY
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MR. GREENHILL
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Telegraphed to Cheques 29/5 2

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D.I.S. M.O.D.
D.O.C. M.O.D.
SECY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
SIR B TREND CABINET OFFICE

(27)

1

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE CANBERRA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 861 DATED 29 MAY

SECRET

ADDRESSED COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 861 OF 29 MAY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON, WELLINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

Tkr'd Canberra Tel No 861 of 29 May

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1160.

MIDDLE EAST.

WE HAVE SPOKEN ACCORDINGLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT AND DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

2. PLIMSOLL TOLD ME TODAY THAT ISRAELI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD JUST INFORMED HIM THAT NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO JOIN WITH OTHERS TO SECURE GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TEHERAN. TIRAN. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD ASKED WHAT ATTITUDE OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE. IN REPLY PLIMSOLL HAD REFERRED THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO MR. HASLUCK'S STATEMENT (MY TELEGRAM NO. 853). HE HAD SAID THE ATTITUDE OF THE AUSTRALIAN WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT PLANS TO THIS EFFECT WERE PROPOSED, AND HE COULD NOT GIVE ANY REPLY IN THE ABSTRACT.

3. IN TELLING ME THIS PLIMSOLL ADDED THAT, ALTHOUGH NOT A MARITIME NATION, AUSTRALIA WAS DEEPLY INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION AS AN IMPORTANT USER OF SHIPPING. IN FACT IT IS CLEAR THAT MINISTERS HERE HAVE NOT YET GONE FURTHER THAN MR. HASLUCK'S STATEMENT IN THEIR CONSIDER-

NOT YET GONE FURTHER THAN MR. HASLUCK'S STATEMENT IN THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM. PARLIAMENT IS IN RECESS AND MOST SENIOR MINISTERS ARE ABSENT FROM CANBERRA. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF OUR REPRESENTATIONS, PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT HAVE PUT IN HAND A STUDY WHICH WILL FORMULATE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINISTERS. FIRST REACTION OF PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT SUGGESTS THAT AUSTRALIANS ARE ESPECIALLY WORRIED ABOUT OIL SUPPLIES; AND THAT ALTHOUGH IN THE END THEY WILL NO DOUBT STAND UP AND BE COUNTED WITH US IF THEY HAVE TO, THEY WILL NEED TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE OCCASION IS ONE WHICH HAS BEEN FORCED UPON THE WESTERN POWERS AND NOT A CASE OF THE WESTERN POWERS LOOKING FOR TROUBLE.

C O PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON 51 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 20.

SIR C JOHNSTON

SENT 290830Z

RECD 290840Z

Top copy with R.D

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1141 29 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1141 OF 29 MAY REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS OTTAWA COPENHAGEN
TEL AVIV CAIRO DAMASCUS AMMAN
MYTEL NO 1128:
MIDDLE EAST.

IT LOOKS AS IF WE ARE IN FOR A LONG WRANGLE IN THE COUNCIL NOW THAT SYRIA AND JORDAN HAVE ASKED TO JOIN THE DEBATE. I DOUBT IF WE SHALL SEE ANY RESULT UNTIL LATER IN THE WEEK (WHEN TABOR (DENMARK) WILL BE PRESIDENT).

2...THE CHANCES OF THE HOLDING RESOLUTION AS AT PRESENT DRAFTED (MYTEL 1122) ARE NOW MUCH LESS. WE MIGHT POSSIBLY RECOVER THE VOTES FOR IT IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO, BUT TODAY THE LATIN AMERICANS SEEMED MORE DOUBTFUL, NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE OF ITS CONTENT BUT BECAUSE THEY DOUBT IF IT HAS SUFFICIENTLY WIDE SUPPORT. ETHIOPIA AND NIGERIA TALKED TODAY OF THE DESIRABILITY OF GETTING A UNANIMOUS VOTE AND THEY WERE BOGGLING AT THE REFERENCE TO FOREGOING BELIGERENCE. EVEN TABOR (DENMARK) TOLD ME AS WE FINISHED THIS EVENING THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT TO GET THE RESOLUTION AS DRAFTED PASSED IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO AT LEAST. THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A MOVE TO WATER IT DOWN BY OMITTING REFERENCE TO FOREGOING BELIGERENCE AND THIS WOULD MAKE IT UNACCEPTABLE TO SEVERAL OF US, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS.

3...AFTER FEDORENKO'S NEGATIVE AND ILL-TEMPERED SPEECH TODAY WE CAN CONFIRM THAT WE CAN HAVE LITTLE OR NO HOPE OF FOUR-POWER COOPERATION IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES (BUT HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REJECT A PARAGRAPH 14 RESOLUTION AND HE DID NOT TAKE UP ANY POSITION ON THE STRAITS OF TIRAN).

4...IF HOWEVER THERE WERE SOME NEW DANGER OR EXPLOSION THE PRESENT CAUTIOUS AND NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF MOST MEMBERS MIGHT QUICKLY CHANGE. AND THERE WILL I THINK BE A BIG ROW FROM THE ARABS AS PRESS REPORTS OF U S/U K ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL COME IN. IT WILL BE LATER IN THE

/ WEEK

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U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1141 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

WEEK BEFORE WE CAN HOPE FOR ANY OUTCOME AND AS THINGS ARE AT PRESENT WE CANNOT PROPHECY ANY SATISFACTORY RESULT. WE ARE MEETING TOMORROW MORNING WITH THE AMERICANS, DANES, CANADIANS AND LATINS.
THEREAFTER THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND WE WILL THEN KNOW BETTER HOW WE STAND.
5...I SHOULD ADD THAT THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE DEBATE TODAY WERE FIRST A LONG AND REASONED STATEMENT FROM EL KONY (U A R) DEFENDING THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE U A R CLAIMS IN REGARD TO THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, AND SECOND GOLDBERG'S STRONG CALL FOR FOREGOING THE BLOCKADE. HE SAID: ''FOREGOING BELLIGERENCE DURING THE 'BREATHING SPELL' MUST MEAN FOREGOING THE BLOCKADE OF THE GULF OF AQABA.''
6...THE COUNCIL MEETS AGAIN AT 3 P M TOMORROW, TUESDAY.

F O PASS MOSCOW 86, PARIS 91, COPENHAGEN 30, TEL AVIV 95, CAIRO 63, DAMASCUS 86 AND AMMAN 80.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0250Z 30 MAY 1967
RECD 0250Z 30 MAY 1967

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 2346 29 MAY 1967 (EASTERN DEPT)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2346 OF 29 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

FOR LORD CARADON

FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER:

BEGINS:
IT IS THE OPINION OF THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE WESTERN POWERS TO TABLE A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE FREE PASSAGE IN THE TIRAN STRAITS. IT IS HIS OPINION THAT IF THE WESTERN POWERS EXPRESSED THEMSELVES VERY CLEARLY AND STRONGLY ON THE SUBJECT AND IF OTHER MARITIME POWERS WHO ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WROTE LETTERS TO THE COUNCIL TO THIS EFFECT, SOMETHING WHICH THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO BY NORMAL PROCEDURE, IT SHOULD SUFFICE. THIS IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS NOT FOR THE WESTERN POWERS, WHO MAINTAIN THE RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE WHICH IS ESTABLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION, TO GET A DECISION TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITION. IT IS RATHER UP TO THOSE WHO WANT TO NEGATE THIS ASSUMPTION TO TABLE A RESOLUTION TO THAT EFFECT AND SEEK A MAJORITY FOR THAT RESOLUTION. IT IS THEREFORE THE SUGGESTION OF THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD BE ADOPTED AND THAT IT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHO SUPPORT THIS POINT OF VIEW.
ENDS.

2. ALTHOUGH YOU WILL BE SPEAKING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE PASSAGE IN THE GULF OF AQABA DURING THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

/WE MAY

WE MAY WELL WANT TO TABLE A RESOLUTION LATER ON WHICH SPECIFICALLY RELATES TO FREE PASSAGE IN THE STRAITS. I FEEL THEREFORE THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER AND WE ARE SO INFORMING HIM THROUGH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR.

SOSFA SENT 1511Z 29 MAY 1967

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1142 29 MAY, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1142 OF 29 MAY, RFI TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS AMMAN, BEIRUT , NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, LAGOS, COPENHAGEN AND ADDIS ABABA.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

THE COUNCIL MET THIS AFTERNOON AND ADOPTED ITS AGENDA CONSISTING OF THE CANADIAN/DANISH LETTER OF 23 MAY (S/7902), THE UAR LETTER OF 27 MAY (S/7907) AND MY OWN LETTER OF 29 MAY (S/7910) WHICH HAD REQUESTED INCLUSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. IT WAS AGREED THAT ALL THE AGENDA ITEMS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED TOGETHER. ISRAEL, UAR, SYRIA AND JORDAN, ALL OF WHOM HAD ASKED TO BE HEARD, WERE THEN SEATED.

2. GOLDBERG (US) SPOKE FIRST. HE URGED THAT THE SITUATION WAS DANGEROUS AND NOW WAS NOT THE TIME FOR WASTEFUL RECRIMINATION. THE UN HAD IN THE PAST PERFORMED GREAT SERVICE IN THE NEAR EAST. THE COUNCIL'S DUTY WAS TO FIND NEW WAYS BY WHICH THE UN COULD REASSERT ITSELF AND BRING ABOUT PROGRESS TOWARDS A REASONABLE, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION. AFTER QUOTING FROM PARAGRAPHS 10 TO 14 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 26 MAY, GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE THAT ANY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE APPEAL IN PARA 14 OF THE REPORT.

3. THE ANNOUNCEMEN. OF THE BLOCKADE OF AQABA, THE CONTINUED CONFRONTATION ON THE FRONTIERS AND THE NEWS OF INCIDENTS IN WHICH CASUALTIES HAD OCCURRED HAD ALL INCREASED THE DANGERS. ONE FAVOURABLE DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN THE STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF

/ISRAEL

ISRAEL THAT HIS GOVERNMENT RELIED ON CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL ACTION IN THE WORLD ARENA TO ENSURE FREE INTERNATIONAL PASSAGE IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP IF MR. ESHKOL'S STATEMENT COULD BE MATCHED BY STATEMENTS BY OTHER PARTIES.

4. GOLDBERG WENT ON TO NOTE PRESIDENT NASSER'S STATEMENT RECORDED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT THAT THE UAR WOULD NOT INITIATE OFFENSIVE ACTION. BUT THE CLOSING OF AQABA REMAINED. THE US POSITION ON AQABA WAS NOT ONE OF PARTISANSHIP. AS PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD STATED, THE US WAS COMMITTED TO THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA AND THEY SOUGHT GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES.

5. THE FIRST STEP FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST SURELY BE TO PUT THEIR FULL AUTHORITY BEHIND THE APPEAL IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT FOR A BREATHING SPELL AND HIS CALL TO FOREGO BELLIGERENCE AND TO AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION. IN THE CASE OF AQABA, FOREGOING BELLIGERENCE MUST MEAN FOREGOING ANY BLOCKADE AND PERMITTING FREE PASSAGE OF SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS AND ALL FLAGS TO CONTINUE AS IT HAD DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WITHOUT THE THREAT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. THE US POSITION ON THE LEGAL ISSUE OVER AQABA WAS CLEAR. AS PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD STATED, THE GULF WAS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY, THE BLOCKADE OF WHICH WAS ILLEGAL AND DANGEROUS TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THE MATTER COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY UNILATERAL STEPS WHICH SOUGHT TO CHANGE A SITUATION WHICH HAD LASTED FOR TEN YEARS AND WHICH WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. IT WAS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE CHARTER FOR A STATE TO USE FORCE OR THE THREAT OF FORCE TO PRESS ITS CLAIM. ANY STATE WHICH WISHED TO ALTER THE STATUS QUO MUST PROCEED BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER.

/6. THERE

6. THERE WERE ALSO THE QUESTIONS OF THE HIGHLY DANGEROUS MILITARY CONFRONTATION ON THE FRONTIERS AND OF SABOTAGE, TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND RIGHTS OF CULTIVATION, ALL OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH. MOREOVER, THE FINAL STEP MUST BE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO REAFFIRM THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND TO REVITALISE THE ARMISTICE MACHINERY. THE U.N. HAD MANY DIPLOMATIC MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL AND DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RESOLUTIONS DID NOT EXHAUST THE ARMORY OF DIPLOMACY. WHAT THE UN COULD DO DEPENDED, HOWEVER, ON WHAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES WERE PREPARED TO DO.

7. EL KONY (UAR) SAID THAT ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE TO DISTORT THE SITUATION AND TO DISGUISE THE BASIC PROBLEM WHICH WAS THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IT WAS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THE PAST AND TO TRY TO RESTORE MATTERS AS THEY SHOULD BE. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE UAR HAD ASKED FOR THEIR ITEM TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA.

8. SINCE THEIR '' IMPOSITION ON THE AREA'', ISRAEL HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A HISTORY OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CHARTER. ISRAEL HAD BEEN PLANTED IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY COLONIALISM AND SERVED COLONIAL INTERESTS. THEY WERE BENT ON TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND EXPULSION OF THE INDIGENOUS INHABITANTS. EL KONY THEN WENT ON TO CITE EXAMPLES GOING BACK TO 1949 ON THE LINES OF THE UAR LETTER OF 27 MAY (S/79Ø7). THE MOST RECENT INSTANCE HAD BEEN THE ISRAELI PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH THE UAR, IN FULFILMENT OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND DUTY TO ITS FELLOW ARABS, HAD ASKED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF AND HAD PEACEFULLY RESTORED THE SITUATION TO WHAT IT HAD BEEN BEFORE 1957.

9. EL KONY DEALT AT LENGTH WITH THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE UAR CLAIM IN RELATION TO THE GULF OF AQABA JUSTIFYING THE STEPS TAKEN BY

TAKEN BY THE UAR TO CONTROL ACCESS. HISTORICALLY THE GULF HAD BEEN UNDER ARAB DOMINATION FOR A THOUSAND YEARS. IT WAS AN INLAND WATERWAY SUBJECT TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY AND NOT AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. ISRAEL'S POSSESSION OF A COASTAL STRIP ON THE GULF WAS ILLEGAL AND DEVOID OF ANY CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. THERE CONTINUED TO BE A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES AND WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT HAD AGREED TO SECURE FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE GULF THIS COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS APPLYING TO A STATE WITH WHICH THEY WERE AT WAR. IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT UNEF COULD NOT BE USED TO IMPOSE POLITICAL SOLUTIONS OR TO PREJUDICE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE IN DISPUTE.

10. EL KONY CONCLUDED WITH AN ATTACK ON THE WESTERN POWERS COMPARING THE AMERICAN BLOCKADE OF CUBA AND CHINA WITH THEIR ATTITUDE OVER AQABA AND THEIR OUTBURST WHEN AN AFROO-ASIAN COUNTRY SOUGHT TO EXERCISE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITH THEIR INACTION OVER SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND RHODESIA. HE ENDED THAT THE UAR, HAVING ACTED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, DID NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION BUT WOULD NOT HESITATE TO RESIST AGGRESSION. THE COUNCIL IN ITS SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION SHOULD FIRST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLE. THERE SHOULD BE FULL RECOGNITION OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND THE ARMISTICE MACHINERYY SHOULD BE OPERATIVE. THE EL AUJA HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE RECONSTITUTED AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO REPORT ON ACTION TAKEN WITHIN 15 DAYS WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY RECONVENE.

11. SEE MY I.F.T.

FO PASS ROUTINE TO MOSCOW NO.87, PARIS NO.92, TEL AVIV NO.96 AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS NO.14, AMMAN NO.7, BEIRUT NO.38, NEW DELHI NO.10, LAGOS NO.5, COPENHAGEN NO.28, AND ADDIS ABABA NO.18.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0343Z 30 MAY 1967
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[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1143 29 MAY
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1143 OF 29 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, AND TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, LAGOS, COPENHAGEN, ADDIS ABABA AND BEIRUT.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

2. RUDA (ARGENTINA) SAID THAT NOW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT HAD BEEN SUBMITTED, AND BEARING IN MIND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CHARGED AS ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE COUNCIL HAD A GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS PLEA FOR RESTRAINT, AND THE AVOIDANCE OF ANY ACT WHICH COULD PRODUCE INCREASED TENSION IN THE AREA. HE POINTED TO THE FRIENDLY TIES WHICH ARGENTINA HAD WITH BOTH JEWS AND ARABS WHICH MEANT THAT SHE COULD TAKE AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE SITUATION AND HIS PLEA FOR SUPPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS NOT MEANT TO FAVOUR EITHER SIDE. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT IT WAS THE COUNCIL'S TASK TO FIND AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER TO THE COMPLEX BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM. IT WAS ENOUGH FOR THE MOMENT TO STOP THE CONFLICT FROM BECOMING MORE ACUTE. HE ENDED WITH A TRIBUTE TO U N E F, DEPLORING THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAD BROUGHT ABOUT ITS WITHDRAWAL AND HOPING THAT SOME OTHER UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE AREA WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO GUARANTEE PEACE.

3. SETTE CAMARA (BRAZIL) STATED THAT HIS COUNTRY TOO HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH ARABS AND JEWS. AFTER REMINDING THE COUNCIL THAT A BRAZILIAN CONTINGENT HAD BEEN PART OF U N E F AND HAD STRENGTHENED HIS COUNTRY'S FRIENDSHIP WITH U.A.R. HE STATED THAT HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT ONCE THE HOST COUNTRY HAD WITHDRAWN PERMISSION HE COULD NO LONGER HAVE CONTINUED TO STATION U N E F ON EGYPTIAN SOIL. NEVERTHELESS,

/ HE FELT

HE FELT THAT THE TIMING OF THE REQUEST FOR THE TERMINATION OF U N E F LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOW TAKE ALL STEPS, WITHOUT TAKING SIDES, TO RESTORE AND MAINTAIN PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT HE STATED THAT IF THERE WERE FURTHER ACTS TO INCREASE THE EXISTING TENSION IT WOULD FIND IT EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT TO DO THIS.

4. I THEN SPOKE (TEXT PASSED TO C.O.I.).

5. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) SAID THAT WHEN THE U.A.R. BEGAN MAKING HER WARLIKE PREPARATIONS HE ASSURED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 15 MAY, 1967, THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT TAKING ANY THREATENING STEPS TOWARDS ITS ARAB NEIGHBOURS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LATER CONFIRMED THIS BY REPORTS FROM UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS ON THE GROUND. YET IT WAS THE UNFOUNDED CHARGE OF THREATENING ISRAEL TROOP MOVEMENTS WHICH WAS THE FOUNDATION OF THE U.A.R. CASE FOR HER LATEST ACTIONS. NASSER HAD CONSISTENTLY INFLAMED THE SITUATION BY PRECIPITATELY GETTING RID OF U N E F AND POURING TROOPS INTO THE SINAI. HIS OWN GOVERNMENT DID NOT TAKE ANY PREECAUTIONARY MEASURES UNTIL THESE TWO THREATENING ACTS HAD TAKEN PLACE. THEN NASSER MADE MATTERS WORSE BY HIS THREATS TO THE RIGHTS OF PASSAGE IN THE TIRAN STRAITS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL QUITE RIGHTLY STATED IN PARAGRAPH 1Ø OF HIS REPORT THAT THIS CREATED A NEW SITUATION. FINALLY, ON 26 MAY NASSER MADE HIS ULTIMATE DECLARATION WHEN HE STATED THAT ''SHARM EL SHEIK MEANS REAL CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL'' AND ANY ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH HIS BLOCKADE BY AN ISRAELI ATTACK WOULD LEAD TO FULI SCALE WAR BETWEEN THE TWO.

6. RAFAEL THEN OUTLINED THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS WHICH HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE ISRAELI REPRESENT-ATIVE ON 1 MARCH, 1957 AND REPEATED BY HIMSELF IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 24 MAY, 1967. THIS WAS IN BRIEF THAT ANY INTERFERENCE WITH FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THESE WATERS WAS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL AND A GROSS VIOLATION

/OF INTERNATIONAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. MANY GOVERNMENTS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. IT WAS THE EGYPTIAN BELLIGERENCE WHICH WAS THE CRUX OF THE MATTER, AND THIS WAS REVIVED WITH THE REMOVAL OF UNEF FROM SHARM EL SHEIK WHICH LED TO THE CONFRONTATION AND REVIVAL OF BELLIGERENCY. YET IN SEPTEMBER, 1951, SUCH BELLIGERENT OBSTRUCTION TO FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN HAD BEEN CONDEMNED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS NOT BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

7. ATTACKING EL KONY'S REMARKS AS FICTION HE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD FORGOTTEN TO MENTION THE REAL BASIS OF THE SITUATION WHICH WAS THAT ON 15 MAY, 1948, THE ARAB ARMIES INVADED THE STATE OF ISRAEL WITH THE AVOWED AIM OF DESTROYING IT. NOW NASSER HAD REVEALED HIS TRUE INTENTIONS WHEN ON 26 MAY, 1967, HE HAD SAID THAT EGYPT HAD BEEN WAITING FOR A SUITABLE DAY TO FIGHT AGAIN : HER STRENGTH WAS NOW SUFFICIENT AND HIS BASIC AIM WAS TO DESTROY ISRAEL. THE UAR WISHED TO RETURN TO THE CONDITIONS PREVAILING PRIOR TO 1956 BUT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WOULD NOT PERMIT THIS.

8. HE ENDED BY LISTING THE MEASURES THAT HAD TO BE TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WHICH WERE:

(A) ALL INFLAMATORY STATEMENTS WHICH THREATENED THE INTEGRITY OF STATES SHOULD CEASE:

(B) THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON NON-BELLIGERENCE:

(C) ALL ARMED FORCES ON BOTH SIDES SHOULD WITHDRAW TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS:

(D) ALL FORMS OF ARMED INCURSIONS AND SABOTAGE INTO ISRAEL SHOULD CEASE:

(E) THERE SHOULD BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH ANY SHIPPING IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.

/ 9. MAKONNEN

9. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA) MADE A SHORT STATEMENT IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT AS HE NEEDED MORE TIME TO STUDY IT. NEVERTHELESS, HE CONCURRED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S JUDGEMENT THAT A BREATHING SPACE WAS REQUIRED. THE FIRST OBJECTIVE HE STATED WAS THE AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICT OR OF ANY STEPS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A FURTHER CONFRONTATION AND HIS DELEGATION WAS PREPARED TO JOIN IN ANY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THIS. IF SUCH AN APPEAL WERE TO BE:
IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD CARRY THE UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL.

10. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) AFTER PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HIS REPORT SET OUT THE ISSUES ENDANGERING PEACE IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, THESE HAD TO BE LOOKED AT IN THE LIGHT OF THE BROADER BACKGROUND. THERE WAS NEED TO WORK FOR RESTRAINT AND REDUCTIONS OF TENSIONS AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD INDICATED POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SHOULD RESUME PARTICIPATION IN EIMAC AND THE TWO PARTIES SHOULD RESUME PARTICIPATION IN ISMAC. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE FULLY OBSERVED AND UNTSO SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED.
INDIA'S POSITION ON THE BASIC ISSUES WAS WELL-KNOWN AND HAD BEEN STATED IN THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT NAMELY:

(1) THE UAR WERE WITHIN THEIR RIGHTS IN ASKING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ACTED CORRECTLY IN COMPLYING:

(11) INDIA UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR THE PREPARATORY MILITARY MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UAR AND NOTED THAT THEY WERE DEFENSIVE:

(111) ALL PARTIES SHOULD OBSERVE THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS: AND

(1V) AQABA IS AN INLAND SEA AND ENTRY TO THE GULF LIES WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE UAR AND SAUDI

/ ARABIA.

ARABIA. NO STATE SHOULD SEEK TO CHALLENGE BY FORCE THE RIGHTS OF THE UAR OVER THE STRAIT OF TIRAN.

11. FEDERENKO (USSR) IN AN UNCOMPROMISING STATEMENT PLACED ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION UPON ISRAEL AND THOSE WHO SUPPORTED ISRAEL. THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST WAS DUE TO THE AGGRESSIVE ACTS OF ISRAEL AGAINST HER NEIGHBOURS FROM WHICH SHE HAD NOT BEEN DETERRED EVEN FOLLOWING THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNATION OF HER RECENT ATTACK ON JORDAN (ES SAMA). IF WASHINGTON AND LONDON WERE SERIOUS IN WISHING TO RELAX TENSION THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE THING THEY COULD DO WOULD BE TO WITHDRAW THEIR FLEETS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE ARAB STATES WERE LEGITIMATE ANSWERS TO THE THREATS FROM ISRAEL, AND THE USSR SUPPORTED THE ARABS IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE. THE AREA WAS ONE OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE USSR TO WHOSE BORDERS IT WAS CLOSE. AFTER REJECTING AGAIN THE CANADIAN/DANISH PROPOSAL PUT TO THE COUNCIL AT ITS PREVIOUS MEETING, AND CALLING ON THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN PROVOCATIONS AND THREATS AGAINST THE ARAB COUNTRIES, FEDERENKO CONCLUDED THAT IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS TO DISCUSS THE NEAR EAST SITUATION SERIOUSLY, IT MUST DO SO WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPLAINT WHICH THE UAR HAD PLACED UPON THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCIL.

12. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) THEN SPOKE BRIEFLY TO URGE THE NEED FOR SOME INTERIM ACTION TO ACHIEVE THE BREATHING SPELL CALLED FOR BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS A PRELUDE TO FURTHER ACTION. HE HOPED THAT THERE COULD BE EARLY AGREEMENT ON SUCH AN APPEAL.

13. THERE FOLLOWED A SERIES OF EXCHANGES IN RIGHT OF REPLY BETWEEN GOLDBERG AND FEDERENKO AND ALSO RAFAEL (ISRAEL) AND TOMEH (SYRIA).

14. THE COUNCIL THEN ADJOURNED UNTIL 3 P.M. TOMORROW 30 MAY.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS MOSCOW NO. 88, PARIS NO. 93, TEL AVIV NO.97, AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS NO. 15, AMMAN NO. 8, BEIRUT NO. 39, NEW DELHI NO.11, LAGOS NO.6, COPENHAGEN NO.29 AND ADDIS ABABA NO.19.

LORD CARADON

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IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 387 29 May 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

President Nasser's Press Conference of 28 May.

In opening statement the President said problem was not Tiran or UNEF but the permanent aggression of Israel. Any attempt to interfere with exercise of sovereignty at Tiran would be regarded as aggression on Egypt and Arab nation and aggressors would suffer unimaginable losses.

2. Points from replies:-

1. It was not true that United States had warned U.A.R. that it would oppose interference with shipping at Tiran by every means. But if United States did interfere Egypt would resist.

2. Use of Arab oil as a weapon was up to the Arab oil producing countries and the Arab people. There was no overall plan, but Kuwait's stand was welcome and that of Saudi Arabia and others was awaited.

3. U.A.R. do not accept any form of peaceful co-existence with Israel. Rights of Palestine people must be restored.

4. If there is any aggression now it must be from Israel and would lead to total war. But the war could be limited to the region provided it was between Arabs and Israel alone.

5. Disappointment with action of Canada as hostile neo colonialist, with West Germany for supplying arms to Israel and attacking Egypt in the Press, and with Britain for not having learned lesson of Suez (though we were preparing to improve our relations with her). Gratification at President de Gaulle's neutral role. Willingness to be friends with United States if they too would be neutral and cease to try to dominate U.A.R.

6. On Tiran, I shall not budge one inch.

7. Nothing would happen to the Suez Canal if the war was with Israel. If others interfered there will be no passage through the Canal.

8. The Palestine people have the full right to wage by themselves a liberation war.

9. There is a role for the United Nations if it restores the rights of the Palestine people according to the Charter and the United Nations Resolutions.

10. No friendly country had been asked to intervene. This was for them to decide. We never thought of making confrontation between the United States and U.S.S.R.

11. (In reply to question whether Egypt would accept

/resuscitation

resuscitation of mixed Armistice Commission) We would accept it as it was originally enforced. But this would mean the return of United Nations authority over El Auja.

Mr. Daniell

Sent 0720Z/29 May 1967
Recd 0845Z/29 May 1967

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En Clair

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 412 29 May 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 412 of 29 May, Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Paris and Moscow.

Following is text of Prime Minister's statement in the Knesset this evening.

Statement by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Mr. Levi Eshkol in the Knesset, 29 May, 1967.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset: following upon my statement to the Knesset last week about the security situation I shall survey the main developments that have taken place in the area: two weeks ago, the Egyptian Army began to move its concentration towards Eastern Sinai, opposite Israel's frontier. Today the main part of the Egyptian Army is concentrated, in battle order, in this area. On our Northern frontier, Syria, Egypt's ally is concentrating its Army. Parallel with this concentration, the United Nations Emergency Force has been hastily evacuated from Sinai, the Gaza Strip and Sharm-E-Sheikh; this force which was established by the United Nations entered Sinai and the Gaza Strip at the time as part of an arrangement with Israel for the evacuation of her Forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. This evacuation was carried out on the basis of clear international undertakings for free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the cessation of infiltration from the Gaza Strip.

The withdrawal of the United Nations Force marks the removal of the symbol of the relative quiet that has reigned on the Southern border for the past ten years. The United Nations Force constituted an expression of the will of the international community to ensure quiet on the border and free passage in the Straits. Nasser's agreement to the Force's remaining in Sinai and the Strip expressed for ten years Egypt's readiness to undertake to preserve quiet on her border with Israel and to refrain from interference with free passage in the Straits. A week ago, the Ruler of Egypt, Colonel Nasser, announced the closing of the Straits to Israeli shipping and ships carrying cargo to Israel. Since then, he has several times repeated this statement and threats against anyone who should try to break this illegal blockade.

The Egyptian President has further proclaimed his intention and readiness to attack Israel for the purpose of destroying her. Yesterday he went further, and threatened to begin at once with extensive sabotage operations against Israel, her towns and villages, and her citizens. This very day, attacks have been carried out against us from the Gaza Strip. These acts and declarations have altered the security and political situation in the area.

The Government of Israel has, therefore, adopted a number of security and political initiatives with the aim of safeguarding Israel's vital interests.

/A precondition

A precondition for safeguarding peace and our interests is our military strength. I therefore ordered, with the Government's agreement, the mobilization of the Reserves of the Israel Defence Forces, and they are ready and prepared today to frustrate the enemy's designs in all sectors and on all our borders.

Members of the Knesset, the Government of Israel has repeatedly stated its determination to exercise its freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, and defend it in case of need. This is a supreme national interest on which no concession is possible and no compromise is admissible. It is clear to us - and I feel that it is now clear to the Nations of the world - that so long as the blockade exists, peace is in danger. It is this grave situation that obligates us particularly to find out first of all and with great urgency whether those Governments that have undertaken to support and implement freedom of passage are prepared to translate their undertakings into the language of action in accordance with international law, which the Egyptian Ruler so criminally violates.

The Foreign Minister's brief visits to Paris, London and Washington were designed to clarify this question. He explained to the Presidents of the United State and France and the British Prime Minister that it was a matter of vital national interest which our country will unflinchingly protect. From the Foreign Minister's conversations we learned that all the Governments with which he came in contact desired that the status quo which had recently been violated should be respected.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Britain have made strong public statements on the subject. There is special interest in the attitude of the United States, for its Government was the first to convey undertakings to Israel in 1957, in diplomatic exchanges, in letters from the President and the Secretary of State, and in public statements in the United Nations and other places. After hearing President Johnson's statement of 23 May and the Foreign Minister's report of his talks in Washington, the Government was deeply impressed by the unambiguous stand of the United States in favour of the safeguarding of freedom of passage in these international waters.

A similar attitude is expressed by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, in his public statement and his talks with our Foreign Minister. Other maritime States have already informed us of their readiness to effectively support freedom of passage, and we have been told that practical consultations on the subject are already taking place. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to expect that the States which support the principle of free passage should carry out and coordinate effective action in order to ensure that the Straits and the Gulf shall be open to the passage of the ships of all Nations without discrimination within a short time.

This expectation, which is founded on authorised and expressed statements, has had a strong influence on the attitude and decisions of the Israel Government at this stage. There is no doubt that the readiness to protect freedom of passage which has been shown by great Nations has been influenced both by their attitude in principle and by their knowledge that the State of Israel will protect its rights.

/It was

It was our duty first of all to put international undertakings to the test. In the near future it will transpire whether this prospect is being realised. Israel's attitude in regarding the blocking of the Straits as an act of aggression against her remains fully in force. The Israel Government's statement to the United Nations Assembly on 1 May 1967 still expresses our policy with complete accuracy. We are now engaged in extensive political activity for the restoration of freedom of passage. This activity would not have been possible, and its prospects would have been dim, had it not been for our own strength and the justice of our claim. On the other hand, the ties which we have forged with other nations have helped, and will continue to help to enhance our strength and protect our rights.

Members of the Knesset, the Egyptian Ruler's statements about the closing of the Straits, about acts of violence, about his aggressive intentions and troop concentrations, have raised the tension in the area to a peak. Colonel Nasser has created a position in which there is a danger of war.

On several occasions I have informed the Knesset and the Nation of the growth in the power of the Israel Defence Force, today our Army is at the zenith of its strength in manpower, skill, fighting spirit and military equipment. We must devote our attention not only to ensuring the freedom of passage, but also to the danger of military aggression led by Egypt. No sensible person will find it difficult to understand that so long as there exists a massive concentration of the Forces of Egypt and her Allies in the neighbourhood of our borders, a conflagration could break out. The Israel Defence Forces will therefore remain mobilised at arms, ready for any test, and if the necessity arises they have the strength to defeat the aggressors.

Egypt's measures constitute a threat to peace in the whole of our area. The Egyptian President's inflammatory declarations and threat implant illusions in the hearts of his excitable devotees. The Egyptian Ruler should remember that this is not the first time that he has been borne on the wings of his imagination seeing himself a victor before he has gone out to war. He should remember that his disappointment was not long delayed as we ourselves have witnessed.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset, the situation imposes on the country, on the whole Nation and all the citizens, a heavy burden. We shall may every effort to ensure that the mobilization of the Reserves shall not disturb the course of our economic life and the life of the individual more than is absolutely necessary. In these days we are witnessing wonderful and widespread manifestations of the voluntary spirit among all parts of the people. Out of the midst of our ordinary, everyday lives, powerful currents of devotion, responsibility and loyalty break through to the surface. Israel is united in her understanding of the test that confronts her. Israel is faithful to herself, to her character and her ideals. These days will yet be remembered as a wonderful manifestation of national maturity.

I feel it my duty to say, from this rostrum, a few words to the Isreal Defence Forces, to our soldiers, who stand ready at these hours

/in

in the expanses of the Negev. In Galilee, along all our borders, in the air and at sea. As in every one of the tests we have met since the rise of the State, so in these days the citizens of Israel and the world draw confidence and strength from that wonderful phenomenon the Israel Defence Forces. Planning, organisation and execution, mass mobilization, the excellent armament, the determined deployment and the complete readiness for any mission - have been marked by superior skill, knowledge and judgement, and accompanied by splendid manifestations of unbounded dedication. You know, better than any, how much our strength has increased in recent years. The superiority of your Forces to those of our enemies is today, more than ever, the guarantee of our security by virtue of the power of your Forces to defeat the enemy in any situation, the Government of Israel is capable of taking, with confidence and fortitude, the difficult decisions that confront it by virtue of our supreme responsibility for the fate of our country and the Jewish people. We have complete confidence that, by maintaining your vigilant readiness, your strong morale and your faith in the justice of the struggle, you will continue in the days to come to guarantee Israel's security and rights in the face of the challenges she confronts. In the name of the Government, the Knesset and the entire nation, we thank you for all you have done so far and send you the greeting. Be strong and of good courage to meet the future. Mr. Speaker, I cannot, of course, go into any great detail in describing the situation. The Members of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee receive continual reports. Members of the Knesset, confident in the Israel Defence Forces, encouraged by the growing support and sympathy we have received from other Nations, fortified by the enthusiastic identification of the Jewish people with our cause, we stand on guard, ready to repulse any threat, any danger and any blow, until we attain security and peace.

Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 73, Washington 80, Paris 26.

Mr. Hadow Sent 1950Z 29 May
Recd 2300Z 29 May

[Repeated as requested]

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 415 29 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 415 of 29 May, Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington.

Your telegram No. 2346 to UKMIS New York: Middle East.

Israel Foreign Minister asked me to see him in Jerusalem this evening.

2. He said he had been much encouraged by his stop in London and his conversation with the Prime Minister which had showed that Her Majesty's Government were determined to do all they could to maintain the freedom of passage at Tiran.

3. He pointed out the difficulty the Israel Prime Minister was facing in not being able to give his public opinion more concrete assurances of what was being done (my telegrams Nos.402, paragraph 3 and 407, paragraph 2). On his arrival on Sunday he thought it would be touch and go in the Cabinet but had found they were prepared to accept the programme as outlined to him in Washington.

4. He fully accepted that action had to be taken first in the Security Council but he had sensed both in London and Washington that there was not much hope that this would achieve the opening of the Straits. There were the dangers inherent in any United Nations procedure of delays, watering down of positions in the hopes of attracting general support and so on. In particular, the Israelis felt that any Resolution actually affirming the right of free passage was misconceived in that it preceded the question and seemed to throw doubt on the validity of an accepted principle on international law. It would put the Russians, who had hitherto been careful not to commit themselves on free passage into the invidious position of having to take up an attitude which they might otherwise wish to avoid. He therefore hoped that the proceedings could be along the lines of those adopted in the Assembly in 1957 and that there should merely be affirmations by all those who were prepared to make them of the inviolability of the principle of free passage. It is only since my return that I have seen your telegram No. 2306 to New York (Mr. Eban did not tell me that he had sent you a message).

5. He spoke as though he expected the Security Council leg of the plan to last about a fortnight. He hoped that action to line up other maritime powers, and to prepare the steps we had in mind for practical implementation would be pursued concurrently so that we would be ready to act almost immediately after the Security Council phase. He asked if Britain as well as the United States was carrying out lobbying and consultations in other Capitals. I suggested that he could find this out more easily from his Ambassador in London. Mr. Comay, who was present at the meeting, said he was about to depart on a tour of Capitals of friendly maritime powers.

6. Mr. Eban said he hoped that you would also have in mind the question of the mutual reduction of force in Sinai and the Negev. This was naturally to Israel's advantage as it would become increasingly difficult for her to maintain large numbers of reservists, whereas the Egyptians had regular troops. The disruption of civil life and of the economy would begin to have an effect on public morale if the Israelis had to remain mobilised too long. Israel's enemies knew this and were likely to be playing for just such a situation.

7. He also spoke of the various dangers of war and of the possibility of the Egyptians really being in an offensive posture. This was all on standard lines and I replied accordingly.

8. Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 7, Washington 81.

Mr. Hadow Sent 2245Z 29 May
Recd 0145Z 30 May

[Repeated as requested]

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Mr. Pattison No 10

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 1817

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 MAY 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1817 OF 29 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1810: MIDDLE EAST.

AS FORECAST IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE BY ROSTOW, MR RUSK HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO GROMYKO. HE SHOWED ME THE TEXT THIS MORNING AND ALLOWED ME TO TAKE A FULL NOTE (HE APOLOGISED FOR BEING UNABLE TO GIVE ME A COPY BECAUSE OF RUSSIAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES) WHICH IS SUMMARISED BELOW.

2. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY. THE AMERICANS WERE ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THE REPORT CONTAINED IN KOSYGIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT (MY TELEGRAM NO 1808) THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PLANNING AN IMMEDIATE ATTACK. ESHKOL'S MOST RECENT STATEMENT SHOWED THAT THE VIGOROUS US REPRESENTATIONS IN ISRAEL HAD HAD THE RESULT HOPED FOR. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US GOVERNMENT WERE DISMAYED BY NASSER'S ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS STATEMENT COMMITTING HIMSELF TO CLOSING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. THIS WAS THE CENTRAL POINT ABOUT WHICH MR. RUSK WISHED TO ADDRESS MR. GROMYKO.

3. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD HAD SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL IN MR. KOSYGIN'S MESSAGE FOR CO-OPERATION IN UNDERTAKING TO SEE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MILITARY CONFLICT. THE US GOVERNMENT ENTIRELY AGREED WITH THE PASSAGE IN KOSYGIN'S MESSAGE 'HOWEVER COMPLICATED THE SITUATION MAY BE IN THE REGION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA AND THE UAR, MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO LIQUIDATE THIS CONFLICT AS A MILITARY ONE'.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE US GOVERNMENT WERE CONCERNED THAT US AND SOVIET APPEALS WOULD DO NO GOOD UNLESS THE CENTRAL POINT WERE LIQUIDATED, NAMELY THE BLOCKADING OF ISRAELI SHIPPING AND OF WHAT THE UAR CALLED 'STRATEGIC CARGOES' PASSING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. IF THIS POINT COULD BE SOLVED ALL OTHER ASPECTS WERE SOLUBLE.

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SECRET

5. THE US GOVERNMENT TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE GULF OF AQABA WAS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY AND THAT NO NATION HAD THE RIGHT TO PREVENT MARITIME PASSAGE IN THE GULF OR THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. THEY AGREED WITH EARLIER STATEMENTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UN AND OTHERS THAT BELLIGERENT RIGHTS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO EXIST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UAR.

6. AS MARITIME NATIONS, THE US AND USSR REGARDED PRESERVATION OF PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERS AS OF VITAL INTEREST. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT THROUGH TIRAN AS SO FUNDAMENTAL THAT THEY WOULD TAKE ACTION TO PRESERVE IT. THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER ANY INTERFERENCE WITH ISRAEL'S SHIPS OR ISRAELI-BOUND CARGOES AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION JUSTIFYING A RESORT TO SELF-DEFENCE. THIS WAS A POINT ON WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT BACK DOWN AND SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO DO SO.

7. THE US GOVERNMENT NOTED THAT THE UAR HAD NOT YET TAKEN HARD ACTION TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.

8. THE US AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS SHOULD FAVOUR ACTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR IN ANY OTHER WAYS TO BRING ABOUT A MORATORIUM OF TWO WEEKS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE UAR POLICY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS. THIS WOULD PRESERVE THE POSITION AS IT WAS BEFORE THE RECENT ACTION BY THE UAR AND WOULD GIVE THE CHANCE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO MEDIATE.

9. MR RUSK APPEALED TO MR GROMYKO THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WERE SEEKING, NAMELY THE AVOIDANCE OF HOSTILITIES AND THE RESOLUTION OF A COMPLEX PROBLEM BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

10. THE US GOVERNNMENT WOULD WELCOME THE THOUGHTS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY ON THE MEANS TO DEAL WITH PRESERVING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. THEY WOULD ACCEPT ANY PROCEDURE TO EXAMINE THE POINTS RAISED IN MR. RUSK'S MESSAGE BY CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON OR IN MOSCOW OR THROUGH THE

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PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AT THE UN. END OF SUMMARY.

11. MR. RUSK COMMENTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE HASTE IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN SENT OFF THE MESSAGE WAS NOT VERY ELEGANTLY DRAFTED BUT THAT THE MEANING WAS CLEAR ENOUGH.

12. YOU WILL NOTE THAT MR. RUSK'S MESSAGE INCLUDES IN ESSENCE POINTS (1), (2) AND (3) IN PARA ONE OF MY TEL UNDER REF. THE FOURTH POINT WAS OMITTED BECAUSE IT SEEMED TOO EARLY TO RAISE AT THIS PRESENT STAGE.

SEE M.I.F.T.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS 148, MOSCOW 116 AND TEL AVIV 26.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 1859Z 29 MAY 1967
RECD 1859Z 29 MAY 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Mr Sullivan
Secret
Mr

WC 031/29 00 TO 81829 DD UKMIS NEWYORK 23029

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1818 29 MAY 1967.

SECRET.

REPEATED FOREIGN OFFICE IMMEDIATE TEL NO 1818 OF 29/5 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

I P T.

RUSK TOLD ME THAT THE AMERICANS WERE MAKING A CAREFUL STUDY OF HOW TIME MIGHT BE WORKING FOR AND AGAINST NASSER. THE UAR NOW HAD LARGE FORCES IN SINAI AND IN THE YEMEN: THEY WERE IN GRAVE FINANCIAL TROUBLE BEFORE THE CRISIS BLEW UP AND WERE RECEIVING NO AID FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OR FUND NOR FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL SOURCES. ALL THIS MUST AMOUNT TO A VERY HEAVY STRAIN AND MR. RUSK WONDERED HOW NASSER COULD IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AFFORD TO CLOSE THE SUEZ CANAL AND TO TAKE THE LEAD IN INSTIGATING THE DESTRUCTION OF MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLIES.

2. THE AMERICANS ARE MAKING AN ASSESSMENT OF ALL THIS AND MR. RUSK WOULD WELCOME IT IF WE WERE TO DO THE SAME.

PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS 149 MOSCOW 117 AND TEL AVIV 27.

SIR P DEAN GR 130A SENT....29/2038Z PEJ

29/5

(Repeated as requested)

E.R.

SECRET

MR. PALLISER

Kuwait: Threat to Stop Supplies of Oil

I attach a copy of the report of a small interdepartmental Working Party which has made a first assessment, in response to the Prime Minister's request, of both the probable consequences if supplies of oil from the Middle East were interrupted and the scope for retaliatory measures by ourselves.

It can be assumed that the Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Ministry of Power will make copies of this report available to their own Ministers. But we will also have additional copies available to be handed round at Cabinet tomorrow, if the Prime Minister so wishes.

Burke Trend

29th May, 1967

MIDDLE EAST OIL

THE KUWAITI THREAT TO STOP SUPPLIES OF OIL TO ANY COUNTRY ASSISTING ISRAEL IN HOSTILITIES

Report by Officials

Officials of the Departments primarily concerned have considered the possible consequences of the Kuwaiti threat to stop supplies of oil for any country assisting Israel in hostilities. We have considered first the relevant facts of our supply of oil from world sources as a whole, the implications for our balance of payments of any interference with supplies from the Middle East and the consequences for the Arab supplying countries themselves of any interference with supplies of oil for the United Kingdom or with the operations of British companies. Annexes are attached dealing with each of these three aspects in greater detail. We then consider in the light of these factors what action can be taken now vis-a-vis Kuwait and any other country making similar threats.

Likelihood of Interruption of Supplies

2. Kuwait supplies 15 per cent of United Kingdom oil. It is one of the cheapest oil producers in absolute terms and much the cheapest source of supply in balance of payments terms. We think it likely that if Kuwait takes action against the United Kingdom oil supplies, Iraq and perhaps Libya will be forced politically to take similar action. We think it less likely that Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi would follow suit. Iran would no doubt seek to step up her production and would continue to supply us but in the short term there are limitations imposed by her present loading facilities. It must also be taken into account that supplies from Nigeria are at present uncertain because of Governmental instability there.

Form of Interference with Supplies

3. The consequences of any interference with our supplies of oil from Arab countries vary greatly according to whether the interference takes the form of an embargo on specific destinations for tankers or a cut off of supply by frustrating the operations of the oil companies (which would affect oil for all destinations) or in the last resort by taking over the oil companies and also according to whether the United Kingdom alone is the subject of an embargo in any form or whether the United States is included. The pipelines are not themselves a major element in the

system of supply nor is the Suez Canal crucial as far as oil alone is concerned: threats to these are not therefore effective as a means of pressure upon us in terms of oil.

4. We have assumed in what follows that we are likely to act in concert at least with the United States and therefore not to be the sole subject of an embargo. If however the United States were not included in the embargo, then the consequences for us of an embargo on oil supplies for the United Kingdom would not be serious, because we could by arrangement with the United States obtain our supplies at relatively small additional cost from other sources. There would be difficulties in singling out the United Kingdom for the severer forms of action by frustrating the activities of companies (or nationalising them) since in no company operating in the Middle East is there a British interest of more than 50 per cent (save in Abu Dhabi).

5. Annex III shows that despite the political compulsion to show solidarity in action against Israel and anyone assisting her, there are strong internal reasons why all the Arab countries concerned should limit their embargo to one on the destinations of oil tankers rather than to an interruption of the supply of oil from those countries. The former would have relatively little effect on their revenues whereas the latter would, at least in the medium and perhaps in the long term, have grave effects on their own economic position and therefore their internal political stability. Among the reasons which would weigh with Arab states are:

(a) oil exporting countries are increasingly committed to development expenditure which require a continuing flow of revenue. Accordingly, Governments can less readily contemplate the stoppage of oil revenue which overall amounts to approximately 80 per cent of the revenue of the Middle East exporting countries;

(b) the number of exporting countries has increased;

(c) the host-governments are increasingly aware of the difficulty of selling their oil without the facilities of the concessionary companies.

If their action were for these reasons to be limited to an embargo on oil tankers coming to the United Kingdom then again, whether or not similar action were taken in relation to the United States the effect would not be to interrupt our oil supplies but merely to impose some inconvenience in obtaining supplies and some relatively marginal additional cost on our balance of payments.

We should not however assume that only limited action will be taken by the Arab countries in this sense and we go on to consider the effect of an interruption of supplies at least through the frustration of the activities of the British and American companies.

Oil Supplies

6. In the short term (say three months) there would be no major supply problem for United Kingdom consumption because of the stockpile, but after that and in the longer term we should not only lose access to the cheapest sources of supply for both of us but the United Kingdom and other major consumers outside North America and Japan would find it difficult to ensure adequate supplies.

Balance of Payments Implications

7. The effect on our balance of payments would be that we should lose foreign exchange earnings from the operation of the oil companies of over £100 million a year and there would also be large additional payments for our oil imports at higher prices from other sources. If Kuwait and other sterling holders in the Middle East were to move their sterling balances, though it would not be an easy operation for them, over £400 million would be at risk in official holdings alone.

Credibility of any Countermeasures

8. We turn now to consider what threats we could credibly make against Kuwait or other Arab countries to deter their interfering with our supplies. Kuwait alone is more vulnerable than we are if our supplies are stopped. The effect on us of having to replace Kuwait oil with supplies from elsewhere would cause substantial damage to our balance of payments, not so much through the additional cost (of the order of £30 million a year) through obtaining our supplies from elsewhere at higher prices, as because of the likelihood of diversification of the Kuwait sterling balances. Interference with supplies, however, could only be achieved by frustrating the activities of the Kuwait Oil Company with devastating effects on Kuwait's own economy (see Annex III). Although in the longer term other companies might be willing to step in and gain access to this large source of cheap oil supplies this would take time and meanwhile Kuwait would have suffered heavily. If, however, we consider our vulnerability relative to Arab oil supply countries as a whole, the situation is reversed and we are more vulnerable than they are. Their economies would suffer heavily for the reasons given in paragraph 5, but the cessation of Arab oil supplies would do major damage not only to our balance of payments but also threaten the adequacy of our supplies. It is questionable whether,

particularly in these circumstances, any threat on our part would increase the awareness in Arab countries of the likelihood of the damage which they would inflict on themselves and would impose an additional deterrent to their Governments taking such action. Our assessment is that the countries concerned are well aware of the damage of carrying action to this point and that a threat from us, far from being likely to strengthen the deterrent, would be more likely to strengthen the hands of the political extremists who are willing to cause damage to their own interests so long as they can cause damage to us. There would be no advantage in seeking to bring pressure to bear on Kuwait by threatening to end our defence commitment. For the reasons given in Appendix III it is as much, if not more, in our interest as in Kuwaits.

Conclusion

9. Our view therefore is that both in terms of our own interest in relation to oil supplies and our balance of payments and in relation to the political attitudes of Kuwait and the other Arab countries concerned, any threat that we would seek alternative sources of supply would not be regarded as credible and would only strengthen the hands of those who wish to take more violent action against us. It is in our interests to remain silent on this issue and let the Arab leaders gain as much political kudos as they wish by making large sounding threats while limiting their action in a manner which does the least real damage to their interests and in consequence to our own.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
29th May 1967.

ANNEX I

ARAB OIL

The pattern of crude oil imports into the United Kingdom in 1966 was approximately as follows:-

1966 Imports

	Millions of tons
Iraq	14,500
Iran	6,250
Kuwait	12,400
Saudi Arabia	6,750
Abu Dhabi	2,000
Qatar	3,400
Libya	12,600
Nigeria	6,900
Venezuela	9,300
Others	4,000
	78,100

The fact that approximately 30 per cent of our United Kingdom supplies came from Kuwait and Iraq in 1966 has little significance in itself. Nearly all the crude oil imported into the United Kingdom is supplied by international companies with access to a variety of sources of supply. This means that the oil supply industry possesses considerable flexibility by reason of its ability to exchange supplies and draw from alternative sources. Physically a complete loss of Kuwait oil would not cause a shortage. There would, however, be adverse financial consequences. In 1966, British Petroleum as a 50 per cent partner in the Kuwait Oil Company took 57 million tons and Shell 36 million tons of Gulf's share through their long-term contract. We recently estimated that a complete loss of Kuwait crude if fully made up from other sources would cost the balance of payments £30 million per annum.

The Middle East and Libya continue to play a dominant role as the main source of supply providing about 60 per cent of the Free World's oil needs outside North America. There are four major oil producing countries in the Middle East: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran and production from the Trucial States, in particular Abu Dhabi, is now equivalent to a fifth major source. It is assumed that in the event

of Arab action on oil, supplies would continue to be available from Iran. The production by individual country in the Middle East and Africa in 1966 is shown below:

MIDDLE EAST

	Million tons
Iran	105.1
Iraq	68.0
Kuwait	114.4
Neutral Zone	22.3
Qatar	13.8
Saudi Arabia	119.4
Others	20.6
Total Middle East	463.6

AFRICA

Algeria (including Sahara)	33.8
Libya	72.3
Other North Africa	7.1
Nigeria	20.7
Other W. Africa	2.2
Total Africa	136.1

It is difficult to predict what action the Kuwaitis and possibly other Middle East Arab States would take to implement the threat of denying oil to any country giving succour to Israel. The action could, for example, range from control of export destinations to a ban on all exports by British and American companies. While there are various possibilities within this range, we have made a quick appreciation of what the position would be under the two extremes.

If interference by all Middle East Arab States were confined to a refusal to allow tankers destined for United Kingdom and United States ports to sail, there would be no shortage of oil and the effects would be confined to inconvenience in re-routing of tankers and some relatively small increases in the foreign exchange cost of our oil supplies. Crude oil normally moving to the United States from the Middle East would be made up by increasing Western Hemisphere production and the percentage of Iranian and Nigerian crude physically moving to the United Kingdom would be significantly increased. A refusal of Suez Canal transit rights on Iranian crude moving to the United Kingdom would not be serious. Tanker re-deployment round the Cape could be re-arranged quite quickly with little adverse effect on United Kingdom stocks.

Action against British and American companies, however, would present a different situation: one tantamount to a stoppage of Middle East Arab oil. The Shah would no doubt welcome an opportunity to increase exports but in the short term there are limitations on the additional supplies which could be made available because of restrictions on loading facilities. Similarly time would be needed to mobilise the spare capacity which exists in the Western Hemisphere. The problem would not be confined to the United Kingdom but would involve most of the Free World and in particular the European OECD area.

The following table indicates the shortages likely and the run-down in stocks should Middle East/Arab oil be denied in its entirety. It will be noted that the second and third columns indicate the percentages of normal demand satisfied by available supplies. The subsequent columns show the run down of stocks which when added to current supplies, would enable the normal demand to be met in full. A cut-back in consumption would clearly make stocks last longer. In all cases the Suez Canal and pipelines are assumed to be closed.

Hypothetical Interruptions in Middle East Supplies

Percentage stoppage of normal exports from M.E.	Percentage of normal demand satisfied during		Rundown in stocks (days) during	
	1st qtr.	3rd qtr.	6 mths.	9 mths. (cumulative)
20%	87	100	11	11
40%	86	100	17	17
60%	77	82	41	57
80%	72	72	54	79
100%	63	60	72	108

(United Kingdom stocks for civil purposes range between 80 and 90 days supply).

If all Arab Middle East oil ceased to flow and the OECD countries shared the remaining availability under the scheme to which the European members have adhered, approximately 11 per cent of our current energy supplies would be affected. The cost to our balance of payments of such a major change is impossible to quantify because the range of hypothesis is so wide but it would undoubtedly be very large.

ANNEX II

Balance of Payments Implications

A. Sterling balances

(a) Kuwait

Kuwait's official holdings of sterling at present amount to some £250 millions. These are the holdings of the Kuwait Government and the Kuwait Currency Board. In addition there are some £150 millions of private holdings which represent the assets of the banks against their local liabilities.

2. The Kuawit Government have so far a good record as a holder of sterling and have avoided embarrassing us in recent sterling crisis, though last August they used the sterling balances to attempt to blackmail the Government to bring pressure to bear on B.P. While their sterling holdings have remained stable, they have tended to put their new income into dollars. Their sterling holdings are in very liquid form and could therefore be switched into dollars fairly readily, though the effect on the rate of exchange would be a limiting factor on the pace of diversification and the Kuwaitis would also want to take relative interest rates into account.

3. The £250 millions of official holdings would seem to be more at risk than the £150 millions of private holdings since the former could be diversified by a political decision of the Government. The private holdings are a matter for the financial judgement of the banks. They would presumably continue to hold sterling unless events in the Middle East brought sterling under severe pressure or unless the Government ordered them to switch into dollars.

4. Kuwait's official dollar holdings at present amount to the equivalent of £150 millions-.some 40 per cent of their total foreign exchange holdings. The Government do not hold any gold, though the Currency Board holds some £27 millions. This would not be freely available for the purchase of foreign currency unless the Currency Law were modified.

(b) The other Arab countries

5. Some of the other Arab oil-producing countries also hold sterling,but on a much smaller scale than Kuwait. Libya holds £70 millions and Jordan £55 millions, almost all official. The Gulf States, other then Kuwait, hold £75 millions, of which about £40 millions is official. Thus, in addition to Kuwait, the Arab oil-producing countries have official holdings of some £165 millions.

Conclusion

6. Kuwait is the largest single holder of sterling(if both official and private balances are taken into account) and we therefore have a major interest in the stability of her balances. The holdings of the other Arab oil-producers are also significant in total. Any precipitate move to diversify on the part of these Governments - or of the Kuwait Government alone - would be extremely damaging to sterling and would have wide-spread repercussions on confidence. In present circumstances the United Kingdom could not afford the substantial loss to the reserves which could well ensue.

B. Foreign Exchange Costs of Alternative Supplies of Oil

This is covered in ANNEX I.

ANNEX III

Consequences for Kuwait and other Arab countries of interfering with oil supplies

The Kuwait threat to stop the flow of oil to "any Power which committed hostile acts against the Arabs must be taken seriously. In the context of Kuwait alone there has no doubt been very strong pressure from the more extreme "nationalistic" faction of the Cabinet that Kuwait should adopt a robust "Arab" attitude. It may well be that, having made the threat, the Kuwaitis will say no more unless forced to do so as a result for example of an outbreak of hostilities in which the United States and the United Kingdom were considered to be "hostile to the Arabs". They would, no doubt, hope that they would not be forced to stop oil production, the consequences of which are discussed in paragraph 4 below.

2. The Kuwaiti attitude cannot, however, be considered in isolation. Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq have made similar threats and other Arab oil-producing states (including Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Libya) will be under very strong pressure to fall into line - a pressure which they will find it difficult, if not impossible, to resist.

3. In our view an attempt to warn the Kuwatis off would probably strengthen the hand of the pro-UAR elements in Kuwait Government and force them to take an even more intransigent attitude. Furthermore other Arab states would almost certainly be informed which would result in their, too, adopting a more extreme attitude. It would also give the UAR ammunition for a propaganda campaign, perhaps leading to a closure of the Suez Canal either to British and United States tankers or to tankers carrying oil to the United Kingdom and the United States (the implications of a closure of the Canal for our oil supplies is discussed in the Ministry of Power's paper - but in general such action alone would not have serious consequences).

The Implications for Kuwait

4. If Kuwait implemented the threat and in so doing stopped her oil production altogether she would have to accept the following consequences:

(i) Oil earnings which form over 90 per cent of Government revenue would cease;

(ii) Kuwait's water and electricity supplies which depend on the gas which is produced in association with oil production would very soon be disrupted, if not completely stopped;

(iii) cuts in Government expenditure (which would have to follow quickly despite her large reserves) on which the economy wholly depends would rapidly lead to widespread unemployment and very probably political unrest amongst the foreign (largely Palestinian) Arab half of the polulation. This could be motigated in the short run to the extent that the Government were prepared to commit their financial reserves to maintaining economic activity.

5. The Kuwaitis might, alternatively, decide to nationalise the Kuwait Oil Company (50 per cent British, 50 per cent American) and attempt to continue production and marketing of oil themselves through the Kuwait National Petroleum Company, or in association with another (probably neither British nor American) oil company. In practical terms they would find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to operate on their own but they might not have much difficulty in finding a foreign partner to assist them (e.g. the Italian state-owned oil company ENI). However such action by an oil company would no doubt lead the owners of the Kuwait Oil Company to take legal action and although this might not, in the end, be successful it would undoubtedly lead to, at least, a serious hold up in production.

6. Because their effects are so serious Kuwait would seem almost certain instead to use selective sanctions e.g. preventing tanker sailings to countries which she considered had intervened in defence of Israel. The only immediate consequence for her of such action would then be a small and possibly temporary decline in her oil production and, hence, revenue. (The supply and financial implications for the United Kingdom are discussed in Annexes I and II.

The Kuwait Defence Commitment

7. Given the drawbacks of warning the Kuwaitis (see paragraph 3 above) and the difficulties over our oil supply that would stem from implementing the warning, it would be helpful if there were an alternative lever we could use against the Kuwaitis. But Kuwait obtains only two political benefits from us, the general stability of the Persian Gulf and our defence commitment to assist her against attack. Clearly our position in the Gulf is not usable and it is also very doubtful whether a threat to terminate the defence commitment would have any effect. The Kuwaitis have been slowly moving away from reliance on this commitment and in a crisis of the present time might simply accept its termination as a necessary price for playing their part in the Arab/Israel confrontation. In any case while there is a chance of our oil interests in Kuwait and her sterling balances remaining intact it would not be to our advantage to leave Kuwait undefended. She may not be threatened by Iraq during the present crisis but there is no means of telling whether conditions in the Arab world will not alter to her disadvantage when the crisis is resolved.

Other Arab countries

8. We have not considered in similar detail the consequences for Iraq and Libya of taking similar action but in broad terms they would be very similar.

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 1821

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 MAY 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1821 OF 29 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEWYORK PARIS MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

M.I.P.T. : DECLARATION BY MARITIME POWERS ON GULF OF AKABA.

DRAFT AMERICAN INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCT SELECTED POSTS TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN URGING GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED TO ACCEPT THE DECLARATION AND OTHER POSTS TO SUPPORT A BRITISH INITIATIVE. ALL POSTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH BRITISH EMBASSIES. INSTRUCTIONS SAY THAT ACTION WILL BE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY ISRAELI MISSIONS.
2. U.S. MISSIONS ARE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ORALLY:
(I) CURRENT CRISIS IS ALREADY THE WORST SINCE 1956:
(II) IT HAS BEEN MADE EVEN MORE SERIOUS BY THE CLOSING OF THE GULF OF AQABA:
(III) IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, THE STRAITS OF TIRAN ARE AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY BOTH BY CUSTOMARY USAGE AND THE 1958 CONVENTION:
(IV) THE U.S. HOPE A SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE UNITED NATIONS. AS PART OF THESE EFFORTS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REITERATED PROMPTLY THEIR VIEWS ON THE GULF OF AQABA AND BELIEVE THAT A DECLARATION SHOULD BE ISSUED BY AS MANY POWERS AS POSSIBLE BOTH ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE AQABA PROBLEM.
(V) THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH A DECLARATION WITH SUCH WIDE SUPPORT WILL GREATLY HELP U.N. EFFORTS.
3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, UNITED STATES MISSIONS ARE TO SAY THAT:-
(I) THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE DECLARATION IS TO HELP REMOVE THE DANGER IN THE PRESENT SITUATION:
(II) IF THE U.N. FAILS, THE U.S. DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION OUTSIDE THE U.N.
(III) THE DECLARATION COMMITS GOVERNMENTS SUBSCRIBING TO IT TO NO

/MORE

SECRET

MORE THAN ADHERENCE TO THE TWO PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN IT:
(IV) THE U.S. HOPE THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT WISH TO CHANGE THE SUGGESTED TEXT OF THE DECLARATION IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEXITY OF GETTING ADHERENCE FROM SO MANY NATIONS.

4. THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION ON WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOW WORKING IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT PROPOSE THAT THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THE FOLLOWING CAPITALS:-
ATHENS, PANAMA, MONROVIA, TOKYO, LISBON, ANKARA, TEHRAN, BUENOS AIRES RIO DE JANEIRO, DUBLIN, MANILA, ADDIS ABABA, ABIDJAN, TANANARIVE, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS.
THE UNITED KINGDOM SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN THE FOLLOWING CAPITALS:-
OSLO, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, PARIS, BRUSSELS, STOCKHOLM, ROME, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, ACCRA, NAIROBI.
THE U.K. SHOULD ALSO MAKE AND APPROACH IN BONN SUGGESTING THAT THE GERMANS AS NON-MEMBERS OF THE U.N. MAKE A PARALLEL DECLARATION.

6. COMMENT. WHEN THE BUREAU OF NEAR EAST AFFAIRS SHOWED US THESE DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS, WE COMMENTED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT WE THOUGHT YOU MIGHT PREFER THE ISRAELIS TO PLAY A MORE INCONSPICUOUS PART THAN THE DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS PROPOSE. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT AS PRESENTLY DRAFTED THE DECLARATION IS QUITE TOUGH. TO ENSURE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR IT, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO TONE IT DOWN A LITTLE. IN CERTAIN CASES ALSO THERE MIGHT BE SOME RISK OF PUTTING POSSIBLE SIGNATORIES OFF IF WE *REFERRED*, EVEN IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MARITIME ACTION OUTSIDE THE U.N. (PARA. 3(II) ABOVE).

7. THE ROUGH PRINCIPLE WE USED IN SUGGESTING IN WHICH CAPITALS THE U.S. AND U.K. SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE, WAS EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REST FOR THE UNITED STATES.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS 151, MOSCOW 119 AND TEL AVIV 29.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 2012Z 29 MAY 1967
RECD 2012Z 29 MAY 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO 1822

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

29 MAY 1967

8

REVISED TEXT

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1822 OF 29 MAY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

M.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT DECLARATION AS STATE DEPARTMENT NOW HAVE IT.

BEGINS:

THE GOVERNMENTS OF MARITIME NATIONS SUBSCRIBING TO THIS DECLARATION EXPRESS THEIR GRAVE CONCERN AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH ARE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR COUNTRIES, AS MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTED TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER, ARE CONVINCED THAT SCRUPULOUS RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IS INDISPENSABLE.

IN REGARD TO SHIPPING TH OUGH THE WATERWAYS THAT SERVE PORTS OF THE GULF OF AQ.BA, OUR GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRM THE VIEW THAT THE GULF IS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY INTO AND THROUGH WHICH THE VESSELS OF ALL NATIONS HAVE A RIGHT OF PASSAGE. OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL ASSERT THIS RIGHT ON BEHALF OF ALL SHIPPING SAILING UNDER THEIR FLAGS, AND OUR GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO CCOPERATE AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO JOIN WITH OTHERS IN SEEKING GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT.

THE VIEWS WE EXPRESS IN THIS DECLARATION FORMED THE BASIS ON WHICH A SETTLEMENT OF THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT WAS ACHIEVED IN EARLY 1957 - A SETTLEMENT THAT HAS GOVERNED THE ACTIONS OF NATIONS FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS.

THESE VIEWS WILL GUIDE OUR POLICIES AND ACTION IN SEEKING TO ASSURE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NEAR EAST.

ENDS

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS 152 MOSCOW 120AND TEL AVIV 30

copies to Foster (C O) Sir B Trend RB

SECRET

May 29, 1967

Michael Palliser sent you a copy of a letter dated May 27 from the Deputy High Commissioner for Canada in which he enclosed a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Pearson together with notes on the luncheon discussion between President Johnson and Mr. Pearson on May 25 and the private discussion on the Middle East with President Johnson on the dame date.

At about 6.30 p.m. on Saturday, May 27 Mr. Maclællan, a Counsellor at the Canadian High Commission, called at No. 10 Downing Street. He said that he had had a telephone conversation with Mr. Pearson's Office, as a result of which he had been asked to make amendments both to Mr. Pearson's message and to the records enclosed with it.

The following are the amendments:-

(a) <u>Mr. Pearson's message to the Prime Minister</u>

The second sentence of Paragraph 5 should read as follows:-

> "Any possible course of action outside of the United Nations will have the danger of creating more problems than would be solved or avoided - and I say this despite the concern which we share with you for the freedom of the Straits."

(b) Record of private discussion between President Johnson and Mr. Pearson

The first amendment is in what appears to be by the typescript the second paragraph on the first page. The amendments is to insert the word 'immediately' between 'a situation' and 'developing', in the sentence beginning 'Therefore the objective...'.

The seco d amendment is to delete the last two sentences of the record.

(c) Notes of the discussion between President Johnson and Mr. Pearson at lunch

The fourth sentence in Paragraph 3 should read:-

> "In this connection he wondered about the possibility of a role for a modified UNTSO and perhaps, though this did not seem very practical at the moment, for some kind of United Nations type of naval patrol in the straits."

I am sending copies of this letter to Forster (CO) and Burke Trend.

Michael Stewart

C.M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE HAGUE

TELNO 923 30 MAY 1967 (V)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO THE HAGUE TELEGRAM NUMBER 923 OF 30 MAY AND TO ROME AND OTTAWA REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1821: DECLARATION BY MARITIME POWERS.

MINISTERS HAVE NOW DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD JOIN WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IF POSSIBLE WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN URGING AS MANY MARITIME POWERS AS POSSIBLE TO SUBSCRIBE TO A DECLARATION IN THE TERMS OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1822.

2. THE NETHERLANDS, ITALY AND CANADA ARE THREE POWERS WHOSE EARLY ADHERENCE TO A DECLARATION AND CO-OPERATION IN OBTAINING FURTHER SUPPORT FOR IT WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE. I RECOGNISE THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES FROM THE CANADIAN POINT OF VIEW PRESENTED BY THE INVOLVEMENT OF CANADIAN TROOPS IN U.N.E.F. NEVERTHELESS, I HOPE THAT THEY AS WELL AS THE DUTCH AND ITALIANS WILL AGREE TO CO-OPERATE WITH US.

3. PLEASE THEREFORE CONCERT WITH YOUR UNITED STATES COLLEAGUES AN APPROACH TO THE NETHERLANDS/ITALIAN/CANADIAN GOVERNMENT. AS SOON AS HE HAS RECEIVED AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT YOUR APPROACH YOU SHOULD SPEAK TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED ON THE FOLLOWING LINES. WE CONSIDER THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION BY ISRAEL, SOONER OR LATER, IS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE ACTION TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE TOWARDS AND IN THE GULF OF AQABA. FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS ARE RULED OUT, AT ANY RATE FOR THE TIME BEING: AND ALTHOUGH WE ALL HOPE FOR EFFECTIVE UNITED NATION ACTION WE ASSUME THE DUTCH/ITALIANS/CANADIANS WILL AGREE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS UNLIKELY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE PROBLEM. YOU MAY ALSO USE ON BEHALF OF H.M.G. IF YOU SEE FIT, ON THE POINTS OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

/4.

4. WE THEREFORE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THE NETHERLANDS/ITALIAN/CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS WILL GIVE EARLY AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINING US AND OTHER MARITIME COUNTRIES IN URGING THE MARITME POWERS TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE DECLARATION. IF THEY AGREE, WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:-

(A) IN WHICH OF THE CAPITALS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1821 THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE AUTHORISED TO JOIN WITH THEIR BRITISH (AND ANY OTHER ASSOCIATED) COLLEAGUES IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED: AND

(B) WHETHER THEY WOULD WISH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TO TAKE THE LEAD IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS IN ANY OF THESE CAPITALS. WE SHOULD PARTICULARLY VALUE THE CO-OPERATION OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT IN APPROACHES TO THE DANISH, NORWEGIAN, AND SWEDISH GOVERNMENTS.

5. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

SOSFA SENT 0854Z 31 MAY 1967

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE HAGUE

TELNO 924 30 MAY, 1967 (V)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO THE HAGUE TELNO 924 OF 30 MAY AND TO ROME OTTAWA REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON.

M I P T.

MINISTERS ARE ALSO ANXIOUS THAT AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR ESCORTING MERCHANT SHIPPING TOWARDS AND IN THE GULF OF AQABA. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE GO ON TO ASK THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED WHETHER THEY COULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS PLANNING ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS ONLY AND AD REFERENDUM TO GOVERNMENTS. IT WOULD BE OF THE UTMOST VALUE IF THEY COULD DO SO, ESPECIALLY IF THEY FELT ABLE TO OFFER SOME CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION.

2. SIMILAR APPROACHES ARE BEING MADE TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE NETHERLANDS CANADIAN AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS.

3. H.M. AMBASSADOR AT THE HAGUE SHOULD ALSO ENQUIRE WHETHER THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH US IN A CONFIDENTIAL APPROACH TO THE DANISH, NORWEGIAN AND SWEDISH GOVERNMENTS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEY TOO WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING. WHILE I RECOGNISE THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL MAY PRESENT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT, I HOPE THEY WILL GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO THE NECESSITY OF ENSURING THAT THIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING WE HAVE IN MIND IS PUT UPON AS BROAD AN INTERNATIONAL FOOTING AS POSSIBLE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PARTICIPATION OF AS MANY GOVERNMENTS AS POSSIBLE, EVEN IF THEY CANNOT THEMSELVES MAKE A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION, IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.

/4. TO THE HAGUE ONLY.

S E C R E T

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 924 TO THE HAGUE

4. TO THE HAGUE ONLY.

WE REGARD THE DUTCH AS THE MOST LIKELY PARTICIPANTS IN THIS PROJECT AND ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SECURING THEIR COOPERATION. DO YOU THINK IT WOULD HELP IN PERSUADING DR LUNS IF THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR THOMSON, WERE TO VISIT THE HAGUE TO TALK ABOUT THESE PLANS? PLEASE DO NOT MENTION THIS POSSIBILITY TO THE DUTCH AS THIS STAGE.

SOSFA SENT 0845Z 31 MAY, 1967

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Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY VALLETTA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 554 30 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 554 of 30 May, Repeated for information to Commander British Forces Cyprus.

My telegrams Nos. 550 and 551: Middle East Crisis: Defence Agreement.

Borg Olivier has, in his statement to Parliament, confirmed position taken by Amato Gauci in television interview (my telegram No. 545). Although he has said that Malta would not allow herself to be used as a base for action against any of the countries involved in the Middle East crisis, he has left his Government's hands almost completely free by adding the qualification that it would be in Malta's interest to take part if the principles of her foreign policy were at stake. In fact during last week when the Council of Atlantic Association was meeting in Malta, the principles of collective defence against aggression and the maintenance of the rule of law in international relations received powerful support in speeches by both M. Spaak and Dr. Borg Olivier.

2. The continued operation of Defence Agreement has not been questioned either by Opposition in Parliament or by M.L.P. or G.W.U. Press, all of whom have implicity recognised existence of Defence Agreement. (Borg Olivier himself said that Royal Navy movements were covered by Defence Agreement). As the months go by since Borg Olivier's formal statement in Parliament in January that Agreement had lapsed, it is becoming more firmly established in practice, and accepted by Government and Opposition, that provisions of Defence Agreement are still operative. The longer this position endures the more difficult it would be for Borg Olivier to upset status quo. There would seem to be good reason for our part to reciprocate and impose no further administrative delay in implementation of Financial Agreement. It would be understood between us that non-observance of the one Agreement would entail a disturbance in the fulfilment of the other.

Commonwealth Office pass Commander British Forces Cyprus.

Sir G. Tory Sent 1701A 30 May
Recd 1606Z 30 May

[Sent to D.C.C.]

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[redacted]/CAT'A'

IMMEDIATE RIO DE JANEIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 245

SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

DATED 30 MAY 1967

[redacted] TO F O TELNO 245 OF 30 MAY REPTD FOR INFMN TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

[redacted] P T: MIDDLE EAST.

I [redacted] CLOSE TOUCH WITH MY ISRAELI COLLEAGUE CSAMUEL DIVON WHOM I SERVED 3 YEARS IN ETHIOPIA AND WHO IS, I THINK, WELL BRIEFED BY HIS GOVERNMENT. AT THE RISK OF TELLING YOU THINGS WHICH YOU ALREADY KNOW, I REPORT THE FOLLOWING FROM HIM.

2. HE FINDS THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE SUPINE AND INTELLECTUAL. HE SPOKE STRONGLY YESTERDAY TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, URGING HIM TO SPEAK UP IN PUBLIC FOR THE POINT OF VIEW WHICH HE PROFESSES TO SUPPORT, BUT SO FAR ONLY IN PRIVATE. HE FINDS THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION MUCH AS WE HAVE REPORTED IT. HE IS ENCOURAGED BY THE PUBLIC RELATIONS BLUNDERS OF THE NEW EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR.

3. MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, [redacted]ING HIS OWN GOVERNMENT'S

3. MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, REGARDING HIS OWN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE, THE AMBASSADOR SAYS: ''TIME IS AGAINST US. WE CANNOT REMAIN INACTIVE WHILE THE UNITED NATIONS PREVARICATES. IF WE DO, NASSER WILL CLOSE THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND WE SHALL FIND OURSELVES CUT OFF FROM OUR MAIN OIL SUPPLY (IRAN: 80 PERCENT). WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT HAS NOW PUSHED NASSER INTO THIS NEW ADVENTURE. IT MAY BE JUST ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HIS TRADITIONAL DIVERSIONARY OPPORTUNISM/ BUT IT MAY ~~375 85 .-6~~ ALSO THIS TIME BE A SERIOUS INTENTION TO LIQUIDATE ISRAEL. IF THE FORMER, WE SEE NO NEED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS NOW TO SUBSCRIBE TO YET ANOTHER EXERCISE FOR SAVING NASSER'S FACE. IF THE LATTER, (23) .7[illegible] ~.5 ?3%9RE HE CAN SECURE EFFECTIVE RUSSIAN SUPPORT. [illegible]2' [illegible] SUPPORT.

MY GOVERNMENT WILL ONLY WAIT A DAY OR TWO MORE BEFORE TRYING CONCLUSIONS IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. WE KNOW THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE ALREADY RE-INSTALLED ARTILLERY AT SHARM-ES-SHEIKH AND ARE MINING THE STRAITS. UNLESS THE UNITED NATIONS COMES UP IMMEDIATELY WITH SOME VIABLE SOLUTION, WE WILL VERY SOON SEND A SHIP THROUGH. IF THE SHIP IS ATTACKED, WE WILL COUNTER-ATTACK.''

4. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO LOCAL COUNTER-ATTACK, THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED: ''IN OUR POSITION WOULD YOU STOP AT THAT? AND WAIT FOR THE EGYPTIANS TO MOBILISE THE FULL STRENGTH OF THE ARAB WORLD, PROBABLY WITH RUSSIAN SUPPORT TOO? OF COURSE WE SHALL RETALIATE WITH THE FULL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL AND HIT THE EGYPTIANS WHERE IT WILL REALLY STOP THEM. FOR US IT WILL BE A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL.''

5. I TAKE THIS TO HAVE ONLY ONE MEANING, NAMELY THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL IMMEDIATELY BOMB CAIRO.

6. I DO NOT KNOW WITH WHAT DEGREE OF AUTHORITY OR INSIDE KNOWLEDGE MY ISRAELI COLLEAGUE WAS TALKING LAST NIGHT, BUT I FEEL THAT I SHOULD [illegible] WOULD BE GRATEFUL

6. I DO NOT KNOW WITH WHAT DEGREE OF AUTHORITY OR INSIDE KNOWLEDGE MY ISRAELI COLLEAGUE WAS TALKING LAST NIGHT, BUT I FEEL THAT I SHOULD REPORT HIS WORDS. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF IN ANY FURTHER REFERENCE HIS NAME COULD BE LEFT OUT.

F O PASS PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK 15 WASHINGTON 14.

RUSSELL

SENT AT 2305Z 30/5/67

RECD AT 2317Z 30/5/67

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

2c.

Dept

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

NO. 1840 30 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1840 OF 30 MAY REPEATED ROUTINE MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK
FOR INFO~~AU 703 +10 +3 59 .9 192 0-48 53) --8- -. 7C.8 .32 694C.~~

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

EUGENE ROSTOW ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT TO DECIDE TOMORROW ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS PUT TO HIM BY RUSK AND MCNAMARA. THERE WOULD THEN BE DISCUSSION WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.

2. ROSTOW SAID THE INDICATIONS WERE THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE BEING ADVISED BY THE RUSSIANS TO SIT TIGHT NOW THAT THEY HAD GRABBED SHARM EL-SHEIKH. NASSER'S FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE WAS NOT TO DESTROY ISRAEL, WHICH HE NO DOUBT RECOGNISED AS IMPOSSIBLE, BUT TO TAKE OVER THE ARAB WORLD. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS IT WAS BECOMING CLEARER EVERY DAY THAT, AS H.M.G. HAD REALISED FROM THE OUTSET, THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE THE FOCAL ISSUE AND THAT THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID AN ARAB/ISRAEL WAR OR A U.S./U.A.R. CONFRONTATION WAS TO SECURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY OUTSIDE THE U.N. A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO BEFORE NASSER'S SPEECH. WE SHOULD THEN HAVE A BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH TO SECURE A MORE LASTING SETTLEMENT.

ROSTOW SAID THAT THE NEXT STEP WAS TO DISCUSS A DRAFT PLAN [illegible] TO TEST NASSER'S INTENTIONS.

3. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE NEXT STEP WAS TO DISCUSS A DRAFT PLAN FOR A PROBE, ESCORTED OR UNESCORTED, TO TEST NASSER'S INTENTIONS. TWO SHIPS, THE AMALIA (PANAMANIAN FLAG) AND ANGELE (GREEK FLAG) HAD PASSED THROUGH THE STRAITS TO EILAT ON 27 MAY (C.F. TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 413). ROSTOW SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ALL THE INFORMATION WE COULD SUPPLY ON SHIP MOVEMENTS (WE HAVE GIVEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THE TELEGRAMS WE HAVE RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT) AND ASKED AGAIN WHETHER WE COULD SPEAK TO LLOYD'S ABOUT SHIPS (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1813).

4. CONTRARY TO WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME YESTERDAY (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1820 (I)) ROSTOW SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOW TOLD THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE FENICE WAS BEING HELD AT MASSAWA, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS TOOK THE VIEW THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SHIP BEING TURNED BACK WITHOUT TAKING ACTION. IF A SHIP WAS TURNED BACK THEY CONSIDERED THIS WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO TAKE ACTION IN SELF DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT OFFERED ISRAEL ANY ADVICE ABOUT THE FENICE.

5. ROSTOW MENTIONED JOINT NAVAL PLANNING. I REPEATED THAT WE WERE ANXMOUS TO GET ON WITH THIS BUT THAT THE UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FELT THEY COULD DO NOTHING UNTIL THEY HAD A POLITICAL DIRECTIVE. THEY ALSO SEEMED TO BE RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER PLANNING FOR A NUMBER OF CONTINGENCIES. ROSTOW AGREED THIS SHOULD GO FASTER ONCE THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN HIS DECISIONS. ROSTOW SAID THAT MCNAMARA'S INCLINATION WAS TO PLAN ON THE BASIS OF A FUSION OF THE U.S. AND U.K. FORCES NOW AVAILABLE IN THE RED SEA, IF POSSIBLE UNDER BRITISH COMMAND.

6. ROSTOW SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON THE USEFULNESS OF HAVING A NATO WORKING GROUP OR SOME SUCH BODY EXAMINE THE PRESENT CRISIS AND LONGER RUN PROBLEMS SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD RAISED THIS IN NATO BEFORE AND DEAN RUSK WAS KEEN THAT NATO SHOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS TO YOU IMMEDIATELY BUT POINTED OUT THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT ON PRESENTATIONAL AND SECURITY GROUNDS TO HAVE SUCH A GROUP.

7. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD DENIED AUTHORITATIVELY A NEW YORK TIMES STORY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF A MONTREUX-TYPE SOLUTION FOR THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.

[illegible] PARIS 156 AND TEL AVIV 33

F.O.

P.S.
MR. MULLEY
MR. THOMSON
P.U.S.
SIR D. ALLEN
MR. BRENCHLEY
MR. GREENHILL
MR. HAYMAN
MR. ROSE
HD. OF EASTERN DEPT.
HD. OF N.E.A.D.
HD. OF D.D. & P.U.S.D.
HD. OF U.N. DEPT.
HD. OF NEWS DEPT.
HD. OF CONSULAR DEPT.
EMERGENCY UNIT
HD. OF PERSONNEL DEPT.
HD. OF OIL DEPT.
HD. OF GENERAL DEPT.

C.O.

P.S.
P.U.S.
HD. OF M.E.W. & U.N.D.

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR B. TREND CABINET OFFICE
D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE
D.I.S. M.O.D.
D.O.C. M.O.D.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1153 30 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1153 OF 30 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE BEEN IN DISCUSSION THROUGH THE MORNING WITH ARTHUR GOLDBERG AND SEVERAL OTHER AMBASSADORS, AND THEN WITH RALPH BUNCHE AND BRIAN URQUHART. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT THEY HAVE SAID I HAVE THOUGHT AGAIN ABOUT OUR PURPOSES AND TACTICS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT NEW PROPOSAL WHICH I WISH TO PUT TO YOU (I HAVE MENTIONED IT TO GOLDBERG AND I THINK HE IS INCLINED TO AGREE). IT IS THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS TO OUR HOLDING RESOLUTION WE SHOULD WITHIN A FEW DAYS BE READY WITH A COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION COVERING ALL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION AND INCLUDING SUCH ELEMENTS AS

I) A PERIOD (SAY OF A MONTH OR TWO) DURING WHICH THE RIGHTS CLAIMED BY THE U A R IN THE GULF OF AQABA WOULD NOT BE EXERCISED WHILE A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT TAKES PLACE WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

II) DISENGAGEMENT OF TROOPS FROM THE U A R/ISRAEL BORDERS.

III) PROPOSALS FOR REVIVED AND IMPROVED U N PRESENCE AND CONTROL.

IV) A RETURN TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

V) THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL CONCERNED WITH THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES.

THEY MIGHT BE SOME OTHER PROPOSALS ADDED.

2...THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO SET OUT A GENERAL PLAN FOR DEALING WITH THE SITUATION AND SOLVING EXISTING PROBLEMS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD SHOW IMPARTIALITY AND FAIRNESS AND THUS APPEAL NOT ONLY TO UNCOMMITTED OPINION HERE AT THE U N BUT ALSO TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION GENERALLY. WE COULD EXPRESS READINESS TO EMBARK ON A FULL DISCUSSION ON ALL THESE QUESTIONS.

3...WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS THAT IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE ONLY WITH A BARREN DEBATE ON FREE NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA WITH NO RESULT WE SHALL HAVE FAILED TO MAKE OUR REASONABLE POSITION AND OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM PUBLICLY KNOWN. EVEN IF OUR PROPOSALS ARE NOT SUPPORTED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THEY CAN BE DEFENDED IN WORLD OPINION.

4...THE TACTICS CAN BE CONSIDERED LATER. WE MIGHT DECIDE FIRST TO PRESS THE HOLDING RESOLUTION TO A VOTE, EVEN IF WE ARE TO LOSE IT. OR POSSIBLY WE MIGHT JUDGE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO PROCEED STRAIGHT TO A COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION OF THE KIND I HAVE SUGGESTED. BUT IN ANY EVENT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT WOULD PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND THUS GIVE US MORE ROOM TO MANOEUVRE.

5...ON THE TIMING I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD BE READY WITH A DRAFT LATER THIS WEEK WHEN THE NEW PRESIDENT, TABOR (DENMARK), TAKES OVER ON 1 JUNE.

6...IF YOU AGREE THAT WE SHOULD URGENTLY FOLLOW UP THIS IDEA I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON WHAT MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A RESOLUTION. MEANWHILE WE HAVE HAD A SHOT AT IT HERE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND A FIRST ROUGH DRAFT IS IN M I F T.

7...I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT A RESOLUTION OF THIS KIND WILL PASS. BUT WHAT WE ARE ANXIOUS TO DO IS TO WIDEN THE DEBATE AND IF NECESSARY PRESS THE RESOLUTION TO A VOTE IN ORDER TO SHOW THE POSITIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE PLAN WHICH WE FAVOURED.

7...I HAVE NOT REPEATED THIS TELEGRAM WIDELY TO OTHER POSTS. IF YOU APPROVE THE IDEA YOU MAY WISH TO DO SO.

[illegible] CARADON.

ADVANCE COPIES

F.O.

P.S.
MR. MULLEY
MR. THOMSON
P.U.S.
SIR D. ALLEN
MR. BRENCHLEY
MR. GREENHILL
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MR. ROSE
HD. OF EASTERN DEPT.
HD. OF N.E.A.D.
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HD. OF U.N. DEPT.
HD. OF NEWS DEPT.
~~HD. OF CONSULAR~~ DEPT.
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
HD. OF PERSONNEL DEPT.
HD. OF OIL DEPT.
HD. OF GENERAL DEPT.
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

C.O.

P.S.
P.U.S.
HD. OF M.E.W. & U.N.D.

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR B. TREND CABINET OFFICE
D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE
D.I.S. MOD
D.O.C. MOD
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

CYPHER:CAT 'A'

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1154 30 MAY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1154 OF 30 MAY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.:

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

QUOTE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE MENACING SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST, AS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT,

NOTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DEEP CONCERN OVER THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD ENSUE FROM RESTRICTING INNOCENT PASSAGE OF SHIPS IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN AND HIS HOPE THAT NO PRECIPITATE ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN,

NOTING ALSO HIS VIEW THAT OTHER PROBLEMS, SUCH AS SABOTAGE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND RIGHTS OF CULTIVATION IN DISPUTED AREAS IN THE DEMILITARISED ZONE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, WILL, UNLESS CONTROLLED, ALMOST SURELY LEAD TO FURTHER SERIOUS FIGHTING,

NOTING, HIS OPINION THAT "IT WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE HELPFUL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WERE TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION AND RESUME ITS PARTICIPATION IN EIMAC,"

NOTING ALSO HIS SUGGESTION THAT "IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL

NOTING ALSO HIS SUGGESTION THAT ''IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF QUIET ALONG THE ISRAEL-SYRIA LINE IF THE TWO PARTIES WOULD RESUME THEIR PARTICIPATION IN ISMAC, BOTH IN THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SESSION AND IN THE REGULAR SESSIONS'',

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VIEW THAT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WILL DEPEND UPON A BREATHING SPELL DURING WHICH PERIOD ALL CONCERNED SHOULD EXERCISE SPECIAL RESTRAINT, FOREGO BELLIGERENCE AND AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION, AND THUS TO ALLOW THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS AND TO SEEK SOLUTIONS,

1. DECIDES URGENTLY TO CONSIDER THE STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO FIND REASONABLE, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS TO THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS,

2. AS AN INTERIM STEP TO ASSIST SUCH CONSIDERATION:

(A) CALLS UPON EACH OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR OWN POSITIONS, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY MILITARY ACTION, THREAT OF ACTION, OR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN OR THE GULF OF AQABA OF ASSERTED RIGHTS AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS OF ANY OTHER STATE,

(B) AS AN EXPRESSION OF GOOD FAITH, CALLS FOR PROMPT DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES FROM THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE VARIOUS ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES:

3. CALLS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ARTICLE XII, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ACHIEVED: AND ACCORDINGLY CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO REACTIVATE THE EIMAC AND FOR THEIR FULL COOPERATION WITH THE MAC AND WITH THE UNTSO:

4. CALLS UPON BOTH PARTIES TO RESUME THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE EIMAC, BOTH IN THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SESSION AND IN THE REGULAR SESSIONS AND CALLS ATTENTION TO ARTICLE III(3) OF THE ISRAEL-SYRIA GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PROVIDING THAT NO WARLIKE ACT OR ACT OF HOSTILITY SHALL BE CONDUCTED FROM TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY OR AGAINST CIVILIANS IN TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF THAT PARTY,

5. CALLS ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO THE MANDATORY ORDER

5. CALLS ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO THE MANDATORY ORDER CONTAINED IN ITS RESOLUTION 54 (1948), REAFFIRMED IN RESOLUTION 7[redacted](1949), TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE; AND LIKEWISE CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO ASSURE FULL APPLICATION AND OBSERVATION OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS,

6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DISPATCH A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA TO ARRANGE WITH THE PARTIES FOR THE ADOPTION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH, AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE PARTIES AND THE CHI F OF STAFF OF UNTSO, HE CONSIDERS WOULD REDUCE EXISTING TENSIONS ALONG THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES, INCLUDING

A. FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR UN OBSERVERS ALONG THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE, IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES AND IN THE DEFENSIVE AREAS, AND

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS AND PROMPT DETECTION OF ANY VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS,

C. SUCH OTHER MEASURES AS MIGHT IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNTSO,

7. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS TO COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION,

8. DURING THE BREATHING SPELL OBTAINED BY IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 2 ABOVE CALLS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ALL PEACEFUL MEANS TO ASSURE A PEACE, INCLUDING THOSE LISTED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER:

9. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXERT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO GIVE EFFECT TO THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONSIDERATION OF ANY FURTHER ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED.

UNQUOTE.

PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

LORD CARADON

SENT 310423Z MTH

SENT WTON 31/0324Z W

ADVANCE COPIES

F.O.

P.S.
MR. MULLEY
MR. THOMSON
P.U.S.
SIR D. ALLEN
MR. BRENCHLEY
MR. GREENHILL
~~MR.~~ TAYMAN
MR. ROSE
HD. OF EASTERN DEPT.
HD. OF N.E.A.D.
HD. OF D.D. & P.U.S.D.
~~HD.~~ OF U.N. DEPT.
HD. OF NEWS DEPT.
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~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
~~HD. OF PERSONNEL DEPT.~~
HD. OF OIL DEPT.
HD. OF GENERAL DEPT.
~~PROTOCOL CLERK~~

C.O.

P.S.
P.U.S.
HD. OF M.E.W. & U.N.D.

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR B. TRENDCABINET OFFICE
D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE
D.I.S. M.O.D.
D.O.C. M.O.D.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

22

Room

NYWON 00931 PP FO 15830 RR UTON 44030 RR OTTAWA 20930

GPS 275A

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 1158 30 MAY, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1158 OF 30 MAY, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UNITED STATES DRAFT:-

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN DOCUMENT S/7906,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES,

CONCERNED AT THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

NOTING THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS IN HIS REPORT EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ''A PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WILL DEPEND UPON A BREATHING SPELL WHICH WILL ALLOW TENSION TO SUBSIDE FROM ITS PRESENT EXPLOSIVE LEVEL'', AND THAT HE THEREFORE URGED ''ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE SPECIAL RESTRAINT TO FORGO BELLIGERENCE AND TO AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION, TO ALLOW THE COUNCIL TO

'SEEK SOLUTIONS'.

1. CALLS ON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED AS A FIRST STEP TO COMPLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL,

2. ENCOURAGES THE IMMEDIATE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL /DIPLOMACY IN ...

DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERESTS OF PACIFYING THE SITUATION AND SEEKING REASONABLE, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS,

3. DECIDES TO KEEP THIS ISSUE UNDER URGENT AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW SO THAT THE COUNCIL MAY DETERMINE WHAT FURTHER STEPS IT MIGHT TAKE IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

FO PASS PARIS 96, MOSCOW 91, COPENHAGEN 32, TEL AVIV 101 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 12, DAMASCUS 18 AND CAIRO 27.

LORD CARADON

SENT 31/0439Z TG

[illegible]ON 31/0439Z W

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,
CANADA HOUSE,
LONDON, S. W. 1.

SECRET

R May 30, 1967

Dear Mr. Palliser,

On May 27, acting on instructions, I sent to Prime Minister Wilson three texts which I had received from Ottawa. The first was a message dated May 26 in response to Prime Minister Wilson's message of May 25. The other two papers we concerned with discussions between President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson on May 25. These papers were delivered by hand by Mr. K.W. MacLellan, Counsellor at Canada House.

Late in the afternoon of May 27 we were informed from Ottawa that the Prime Minister wished to make certain changes in the text. This information was communicated to 10 Downing Street by Mr. MacLellan who undertook to provide you with revised texts. These are now attached. I assume that you will not retain the earlier texts.

Yours sincerely,

Geoffrey Murray

Mr. A.M. Palliser, C.M.G.
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
H.M. Treasury
Great George Street
S.W. 1

Revised version of T140/67

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
~~SECRET~~

SERIAL No. T140/67

MESSAGE TO THE RT. HON. HAROLD WILSON, O.B.E., M.P.
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
FROM THE RT. HON. LESTER B. PEARSON, P.C., O.B.E.
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

"I well understand that with the critical stage reached in the Mideast situation you would think it desirable to curtail your visit here next week. I am glad however that you will be here on Thursday before you go on to Washington.

"The assurances given by Eban that no irretrievable action will be taken by Israel until he returns from his present trip to the United States hopefully suggests that the Israelis will allow us enough time to see what can be done to meet the situation. Although time is working to their disadvantage, the Israelis should be pressed to the utmost not to embark on some desperate course.

"Like you, I am placing some hope on four power consultations. Despite the apparent rebuff which the French proposal is reported to be meeting from the USSR, further persistence on your part and that of the United States and France, especially if the attempt is framed in a United Nations context, may have the eventual effect of convincing Russia that this is a possible way out of the ultimate confrontation which everyone wishes avoided. We must keep in mind that the Russians will find it

...2

extremely difficult to endorse any arrangement which does not go some way to meet with Nasser's requirements or allow him to save sufficient face. I hope we shall see more clearly into this when the results of U Thant's mission to Cairo become clear.

"As you will be informed through Charles Ritchie, the question of a four power meeting came up during the President's visit here yesterday. The President made it clear that he preferred exhausting all the possibilities of the United Nations. It may be that the report of the Secretary-General will suggest something on which we may be able to build. It is in this connection that the possibilities of setting in train some form of consultation among the four major powers would seem to be of particular importance. For without at least the tacit concurrence of the USSR it is difficult to see how the Security Council can contribute in any effective form.

"It is my strong belief despite the rebuff met by our attempt to get Security Council action that we must continue to strive for a possible solution in a United Nations context. Any possible course of action outside of the United Nations will have the danger of creating more problems than would be solved or avoided - and I say this despite the concern which we share with you for the freedom of the straits. As you know, our own experience in the various peacekeeping efforts in the

...3

area have led us to think in terms of the possibilities open after the withdrawal of UNEF for at least a partial solution of the problem through the reactivation of UNTSO. I believe the Secretary-General has been thinking along somewhat similar lines. While I realize this may not appear to provide a solution for the Gulf of Aqaba, we are exploring the possibilities of relating the two. This is something that we can go into when you are here if events have not already overtaken this approach."

Ottawa, Canada

May 26, 1967

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER PEARSON'S NOTE ON HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF MIDEAST QUESTION, MAY 25, 1967 WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON -

"After luncheon, the President and I remained behind for coffee as I thought it would be useful to have some time alone with him. We went over the Mideast ground again and I tried to emphasize that there were two immediately critical points:

(1) The Gulf of Aqaba where the Israelis would fight if it was blocked and expect help, especially from the United States, in line with the Dulles letter of 1957.

Therefore the object was to prevent a situation immediately developing where the Israelis would be challenged and this meant a) being tough with the UAR over its declared control policy in the Gulf and b) persuading the Israelis to avoid a direct challenge as long as possible.

(2) On the Israel-UAR border United Nations machinery must be brought into operation between the two forces through UNTSO and this meant a concession by Israel in accepting the military armistice and IEAC. The fact that Israel had previously refused to do this was at this moment an advantage.

"I repeated my caution to LBJ that this was not 56-57 and I could see no rabbit to pull out of a hat at this time; none especially in reviving tripartite UK-USA-France machinery.

...2

"The USSR must be included in any proposal for four power talks as De Gaulle had done. The President did not object but insisted that any such talks should be in a United Nations context, between the four Permanent Members of the Security Council. I agreed that this was important but if France refused, then talks outside the United Nations should not be ruled out if that was agreeable to the USSR. The President was not enthusiastic about this and seemed to cling to United Nations procedure and action, notwithstanding yesterday's depressing meeting of the Security Council.

S E C R E T

NOTES ON LUNCHEON DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER PEARSON, MAY 25, 1967

"At luncheon at Harrington Lake the Prime Minister referred to the very dangerous situation in the Mideast.

"The Prime Minister asked whether United States visitors had learned anything particularly significant from their sources during the morning. Rostow said they had been somewhat relieved to learn that two Liberian tankers (one of which was the LEON) which seemed likely momentarily to approach the Gulf of Aqaba were now not expected to reach the Strait of Tiran before May 29, according to information from Lloyds.

"The Prime Minister referred to discussions in the Security Council. He realized that the Canadian resolution had not been as strong as some, including the United States, might have wished but in the light of what happened to that resolution he was just as glad that it had not been more ambitious. He expressed his hope that some way might be found for the United Nations to prevent a conflict. In this connection he wondered about the possibility of a role for a modified UNTSO, and perhaps, though this did not seem very practical at the moment, for some kind of United Nations type naval patrol in the straits. He referred also to suggestions which had been made for some sort of four-power discussions.

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"The President expressed doubts about the wisdom of any four-power meeting. He thought this was a way of getting the subject out of the United Nations. He obviously favoured exhausting the possibilities of the United Nations before anything else was attempted.

"The Prime Minister wondered if a four-power discussion might not be reconciled with United Nations responsibilities by having that discussion take place within the Security Council framework.

"The President said he might be rather suspicious but he was not inclined to rely very much on the Russians in this situation. He added that he thought the three Governments which had subscribed to tripartite declaration should stand by it.

"The Prime Minister and Minister reverted to the possibility of a larger role for UNTSO which it was thought might figure in U Thant's proposals. The Prime Minister noted that for it to be effective UNTSO would have to observe along the whole border and presumably also on the point of land opposite the Strait of Tiran. It was recognized that it would presumably have to be on both sides of the border and there were some inconclusive discussions about the likelihood of Israelis accepting UNTSO on their side of the boundary. It was noted that at best UNTSO would be only an observer group with no force

...3

at its disposal and that it would probably have to operate with fairly small numbers. The Prime Minister remarked that if there was any chance of UNTSO being acceptable to the Arabs it would probably be necessary to reduce or remove prominent United States element. He thought the Canadian element might also be suspect.

"A reference was made to the suggestion that maritime powers might make a strong declaration about the rights of innocent passage and might consider some arrangement for supporting such rights. It appeared that the President was not too familiar with details and he did not seem to like what he had heard of the proposal.

"The Minister enquired whether the United States had considered the possibility of referring Aqaba situation to the International Court for an advisory opinion. Rostow said that this possibility had been gone into very thoroughly and that the United States authorities were against such a reference, particularly with the present composition of the Court. The Minister wondered whether the Corfu precedent would not lead the Court to reach the right opinion. A reference to the Court might serve as a face-saver and provide some time. The United States side still did not seem to be favourable to the idea.

"At this point while the rest left the room the President and the Prime Minister remained for a private conversation.

...4

"At a later stage when the discussion on Mideast was resumed in the front room, the Prime Minister reemphasized his unhappiness at any attempt to deal with this situation by a device which would exclude the Russians. He thought they should be brought along somehow. The Prime Minister also suggested to the President that it was desirable to involve the French and for this reason he wondered whether a proposal from De Gaulle for a four-power meeting should be rejected, especially if some means could be found of bringing it within the United Nations. The President did not appear to commit himself regarding the idea. It was noted by someone that the presence of the Chinese might make it difficult to base anything on the Permanent Members of the Security Council but this appeared to be regarded as a theoretical problem which could be overcome.

"The Prime Minister told the President that if there was any way that occurred to him in which Canada could play a constructive part he would like to hear from him."

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 5625 30 MAY 1967 (NEAD)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELNO 5625 OF 30 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS ROME MOSCOW TEL AVIV THE HAGUE.

MY TELNO 5570 (NOT REPEATED TO ROME OR THE HAGUE) : MIDDLE EAST.

MINISTERS HAVE NOW DECIDED THAT H.M. REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO JOIN IN CANVASSING THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR A DECLARATION TO ASSERT THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE FOR SHIPPING INTO AND THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA. THIS SUPERSEDES THE DECISION IN PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 5334 (NOT REPEATED TO ALL) THAT A FOUR POWER MEETING SHOULD PRECEDE ANY FURTHER CANVASSING.

2. WHILE IT IS ACCEPTED THAT WE CANNOT AVOID TO SOME EXTENT TAKING THE LEAD IN THIS, WE SHOULD NEVERTHELESS SEEK TO ASSOCIATE OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND CANADA, WITH THE CANVASSING

3. PLEASE THEREFORE TELL THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE NOW INSTRUCTING H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS, OTTAWA ROME AND THE HAGUE TO CONCERT WITH THEIR U.S. COLLEAGUES IN MAKING AN APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED (THEY ARE AUTHORISED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THESE APPROACHES). THE OBJECT IS TO URGE THOSE GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES IN MAKING APPROACHES IN AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE OTHER CAPITALS LISTED IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 1821, TO URGE THEM TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE DECLARATION IN YOUR TELNO 1822.

4. I HOPE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS, OTTAWA ROME AND THE HAGUE CAN BE AUTHORISED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO JOIN US IN MAKING THESE REPRESENTATIONS. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT I AM ALSO PROPOSING TO INVITE THEM TO SUGGEST ANY ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES WHERE THEY THEMSELVES MIGHT CANVASS SUPPORT FOR THE DECLARATION.

/5.

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 5625 TO WASHINGTON

5. PLEASE ALSO TELL THE AMERICANS THAT I CONFIRM OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF COUNTRIES TO BE APPROACHED. ON HEARING THE RESULT OF THE APPROACHES DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, I SHALL INSTRUCT H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CAPITALS LISTED IN PARA 5 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1821 TO CONCERT WITH THEIR U.S. AND AS APPROPRIATE OTHER COLLEAGUES ON APPROACHES TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED.

6. M I F T

SOSFA SENT 0205/31 MAY

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PPPPP

SECRET

May 31, 1967

Thank you for your letter of May 30 to Michael Palliser enclosing the revised texts of the three documents which you forwarded to the Prime Minister under cover of your letter of May 27. As you have requested, I am returning with this letter the original texts which were amended in manuscript.

Derek Rakes.

G.S. Murray, Esq.,
Deputy High Commissioner for Canada

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 1163
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
31 MAY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1163 OF 31 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, LAGOS, COPENHAGEN, ADDIS ABABA, BEIRUT AND BAGHDAD.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1151: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

AT THE RESUMED SESSION THIS AFTERNOON ISRAEL, U.A.R., SYRIA, LEBANON AND JORDAN WERE AGAIN SEATED. IN ADDITION, IRAQ AND MOROCCO WERE INVITED AT THEIR REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE.

2. PACHACHI (IRAQ) SPOKE FIRST. HIS GOVERNMENT SAW THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS TO BE ISRAEL'S THREAT TO START A WAR IF ITS DEMAND FOR FREE NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA WERE NOT MET. THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT ON THE OTHER HAND HAD INFORMED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IT WOULD NOT INITIATE AGGRESSIVE ACTION. FURTHERMORE, THE ISRAELI THREAT WAS BASED ON ARGGUMENTS OF DOUBTFUL LEGAL VALIDITY. ON THE LEGALITIES OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF PACHACHI SUPPORTED EL KONY'S EXPOSITION OF THE CASE ON 29 MAY. BEFORE 1956 U.A.R. CONTROL OF THE GULF OF AQABA HAD GONE UNCHALLENGED: THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOW SIMPLY RESTORED THE STATUS QUO BEFORE ISRAEL'S 1956 AGGRESSION. IT WAS AXIOMATIC THAT RIGHTS OR PRIVILEGES ARISING FROM ACTS OF AGGRESSION COULD HAVE NO LEGAL VALIDITY.

3. THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WAS GRATEFUL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS DECISION TO COMPLY PROMPTLY WITH THE U.A.R. REQUEST FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF. IN PARAGRAPHS 2 TO 7 OF HIS REPORT S/7906 OF 26 MAY, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MADE AN UNANSWERABLE CASE FOR UNEF'S WITHDRAWAL.

4. PACHACHI AFFIRMED THAT NO RESOLUTION ON NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA HAD EVER BEEN ADOPTED: THE U.N. HAD NEVER TAKEN A POSITION ON

/THE SUBJECT

THE SUBJECT. BUT NO LESS THAT 18 U.N. RESOLUTIONS REAFFIRMED THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES. IF THE ARAB STATES WERE TO DECLARE THAT NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THESE RESOLUTIONS WAS A CASUS BELLI, WOULD NOT THEIR POSITION BE MORE LOGICAL THAN THAT OF ISRAEL IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE? IN ANY CASE WHY SHOULD THE SECONDARY PROBLEM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA BE SINGLED OUT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHEN THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF PALESTINE WENT UNSOLVED?

5. PACHACHI ENDED BY WARNING THAT THERE WERE QUICK OR EASY SOLUTIONS TO THIS CRISIS. THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT HAD A FEW DAYS AGO DECIDED TO DENY ITS OIL RESOURCES TO ANY STATE WHO JOINED IN ACTS OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARABS. OTHER OIL-PRODUCING ARAB COUNTRIES HAD BEEN INVITED TO ALIGN THEIR POSITIONS WITH IRAQ. ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PLUNGE THE WORLD INTO WAR TO PRESERVE THE ILL-GOTTEN GAINS OF 1956. THE MACHINERY ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO KEEP PEACE IN THE AREA SHOULD BE REACTIVATED, BUT SUCH REACTIVATION MUST BE SEEN TO BE IMPARTIAL.

6. COMMENTING ON THE UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION (SEE BELOW), PACHACHI SAID THAT AT A FIRST GLANCE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT CONFORMED WITH THE INTENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT (S/7906) OF 26 MAY, BUT WOULD AWAIT U.S. COMMENTS AND EXPLANATION.

7. MATSUI (JAPAN) THEN SPOKE BRIEFLY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT IN QUESTION WAS WIDE RANGING, FAIR AND WISE. JAPAN PARTICULARLY SUPPORTED HIS APPEAL IN PARAGRAPH 14 FOR RESTRAINT BY BOTH SIDES AND THE FOREGOING OF BELLIGERENCE, SO THAT BASIC CAUSES OF TENSION COULD BE DEALT WITH BY THE COUNCIL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD DRAWN ATTENTION, IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF HIS REPORT, TO THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD ENSUE IF INNOCENT PASSAGE OF SHIPS IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN WAS RESTRICTED. THIS WAS THE NUB OF THE PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION WOULD NOT COME EASILY: BUT THE STAKES WERE TOO HIGH TO ALLOW FOR CYNICISM OR DESPAIR. NEARLY TWO WEEKS HAD PASSED SINCE THE TENSION BEGAN. FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS DETENTE WAS NOW VITAL.

/8. GOLDBERG

U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.1163 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

8. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) THEN PUT FORWARD THE U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION. THIS WAS DESIGNED AS AN INTERIM MEASURE TO UNDERWRITE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL FOR A BREATHING SPACE. IT CALLED FOR TIME, SO THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND COULD BE DEFUSED. GOLDBERG CONTINUED THAT IN HIS STATEMENT ON 29 MAY HE HAD REFERRED TO THE RESPITE WHICH HAD BEEN OBTAINED ALREADY BY DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. TENSION HOWEVER REMAINED GREAT, AND TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS DESIGNEDLY SMALL SO THAT PROMPT ACTION COULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE U.N. IN TIMES LIKE THESE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVED THAT THE COUNCIL OUGHT TO TAKE RELEVANT DECISIONS STEP BY STEP IN IMPORTANT CRISES SUCH AS THIS: IT WAS NOT HIS COUNTRY'S INTENTION TO EVADE OR BYPASS THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THE ROOT CAUSES FOR THE CRISIS.

9. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, HE EXPLAINED, TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFUSING THE CRITICAL SITUATION, AND SEEKING THEREAFTER A REASONABLE AND JUST SOLUTION. EVERY U.N. MEMBER HAD A CORRESPONDING DUTY IN THIS RESPECT. GOLDBERG ENDED BY REMINDING THE COUNCIL THAT THE POTENCY AND EFFICACY OF THE U.N. ITSELF WAS AT STAKE IN THIS CRISIS. HAD THE ORGANISATION THE COURAGE AND VISION TO EXERT ITS CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY? MANY CONFLICTING INTERESTS WERE REPRESENTED IN THE COUNCIL, BUT THE NEED FOR PEACE WAS MOVERRIDING. IT WOULD NOT DO TO GIVE THE WORLD THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLAIN OF PARTISANSHIP IN THE COUNCIL AT A TIME LIKE THIS.

10. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 92 PARIS 97 TEL AVIV 102 AND SAVING DAMASCUS 19 AMMAN 13 NEW DELHI 13 LAGOS 8 COPENHAGEN 31 ADDIS ABABA 21 BEIRUT 41 AND BAGHDAD 8.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0117Z 01 JUNE 1967
RCVD 0117Z 01 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1165 31 MAY, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1165 OF 31 MAY, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, LAGOS, COPENHAGEN, ADDIS ABABA AND BEIRUT AND BAGHDAD.

MY I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE U.A.R. RESOLUTION.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

MINDFUL OF ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 24(1) OF THE CHARTER,

CONSCIOUS OF THE GRAVE SITUATION PREVAILING IN THE MIDDLE EAST RESULTING FROM THE INABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION TO FUNCTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT,

NOTING WITH GRAVE CONCERN THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VARIOUS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND, IN PARTICULAR, HIS LATEST REPORT (DOCUMENT S/7906) THE AFOREMENTIONED UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY BECAME PARTICULARLY INOPERATIVE DUE TO THE ATTITUDE OF ISRAELI AUTHORITIES REGARDING THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT,

CONSIDERING THAT THE UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION BY ISRAEL OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED OR TOLERATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND DOES NOT ABSOLVE ISRAEL OF ITS OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THAT AGREEMENT,

FULLY CONVINCED THAT SUCH UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION BY ISRAEL AND ITS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE

/DETERIORATION

DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
THREATENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA,

1. DECIDES THAT THE EGYPTIAN-!SRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS STILL VALID AND REITERATES THAT THE UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY EMANATING THEREFROM SHOULD BE FULLY OPERATIVE,

2. CALLS UPON THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT TO RESPECT AND ABIDE BY ITS OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS STIPULATED IN THE EGYPTIAN--ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND TO ACT ACCORDINGLY,

3. INSTRUCTS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE (UNTSO) TO PROCEED PROMPTLY AND REINSTITUTE WITHIN TWO WEEKS THE HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE EGYPTIAN--ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION IN EL-AUJA FROM WHERE IT DISCHARGED ITS DUTIES PRIOR TO THE ISRAEL UNILATERAL ACTION FORCING ITS EXPULSION FROM THAT ZONE,

4. DECIDES TO BOLSTER ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION IN CASE OF THE NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WITH THE TERMS OF THIS RESOLUTION,

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTACT THE PARTIES TO THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FOR THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECISION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS FOR ITS APPROVAL WITH REGARD TO ADDITIONAL MEASURES.

6. DECIDES TO RECONVENE TO DISCUSS THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IMMEDIATELY UPON ITS SUBMISSION.

F O PASS ROUTINE TO MOSCOW NO.94, PARIS NO.99, TEL AVIV NO.104 AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS NO.21, NEW DELHI NO.15, AMMAN NO. 15, LAGOS NO.10, ADDIS ABABA NO.23, BEIRUT NO.43 COPENHAGEN NO.33 AND BAGHDAD NO.10.

LORD CARADON

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1169 31 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1169 OF 31 MAY REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MYTEL 1153:
MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE LOOKED AGAIN AT OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION ON SUBSTANCE WHICH WAS SENT TO YOU YESTERDAY (MYTEL 1154). ON REFLECTION IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS ARE RATHER TURGID AND OUT OF BALANCE. BEARING IN MIND THAT ONE AIM SHOULD BE TO MAKE THE ISSUES CLEAR TO PUBLIC OPINION OUTSIDE THE U N WE HAVE REDRAFTED THESE PARAGRAPHS TO MAKE THEM MORE GENERAL IN CHARACTER AND AT THE SAME TIME HAVE TIGHTENED UP SOME OF THE LANGUAGE IN THE OPERATIVE CLAUSES. THE REVISED TEXT IS IN M I F T.

2...YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MYTEL 1164 THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE ALREADY COUNTERED THE AMERICAN INTERIM RESOLUTION (MYTEL 1158) BY THEIR OWN DRAFT OF SUBSTANCE WHICH TAKES OF COURSE A PURELY PRO-ARAB LINE (TEXT IN MYTEL 1165). IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DEVELOP-MENT I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EARLY COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL I PUT FORWARD IN MYTEL 1153 AND ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION I AM NOW SENDING YOU.

3...GOLDBERG IS INCLINED TO THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IF WE (THE U K) TABLED A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES AT ONCE. I CAN SEE SOME TACTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR DOING SO BUT IT MAY BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE PRESENT TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT WITH OTHER FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS (SO FAR WE HAVE DISCUSSED IT ONLY WITH THE AMERICANS). WHAT DOES SEEM TO ME MOST IMPORTTANT IS TO FIND OUT WHAT THE ISRAELIS THINK OF THE DRAFT. SOME PARTS OF IT WILL CERTAINLY BE UNPALATABLE TO THEM THOUGH THEY MAY SEE WHAT WE ARE DRIVING AT.

4...MY SUGGESTION IS THAT BEFORE WE MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO YOU ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THIS I SHOULD ASK GOLDBERG TO APPROACH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE, TELL HIM WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND AND SEE WHAT HE SAYS.

LORD CARADON.

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1170 31 MAY, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1170 OF 31 MAY, RFI TO WASHINGTON.
M.I.P.T.
FOLLOWING IS REVISED TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN DOCUMENTS ..... AND S/796,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE MENACING SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST, AS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORTS,
DETERMINED TO EXERCISE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,
RECALLING THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE STATES CONCERNED ARE PARTIES CONTEMPLATE ''THE RETURN OF PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE'' AS SET OUT IN ITS RESOLUTION 89 (1950) OF 17 NOVEMBER, 1950,
RECALLING THAT ONE OF THE FIRST PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS TO BRING ABOUT BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, ADJUSTMENT OR SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES OR SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A BREACH OF THE PEACE,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VIEW THAT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT CRISIS WILL DEPEND UPON A BREATHING SPELL DURING WHICH PERIOD ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED SHOULD EXERCISE SPECIAL RESTRAINT, FOREGO BELLIGERENCE AND AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS AND TO SEEK SOLUTIONS,
1. DECIDES URGENTLY TO CONSIDER THE STEPS THAT MIGHT BE

/TAKEN TO

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1170 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TAKEN TO FIND REASONABLE, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT CRISIS.

2. AS INTERIM STEPS TO ASSIST SUCH CONSIDERATION:

(A) CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN THE MEAN-TIME AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR OWN RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY WARLIKE OR HOSTILE ACTION, OR THREAT OF SUCH ACTION, OR IMPLEMENTATION OF RIGHTS CLAIMED IN THE GULF OF AQABA ON THE BASIS OF THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR AND AFFECTING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF ANY OTHER STATE;

(B) CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AS AN EARNEST OF THEIR GOOD FAITH, PROMPTLY TO DISENGAGE THEIR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES FROM THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF VARIOUS ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES;

3. REMINDS THE PARTIES CONCERNED THAT THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A PEACEFUL SETTLE-MENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ACHIEVED,

4. ACCORDINGLY, CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO THE EGYPT/ ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT TO REVIVE THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION FOR WHICH PROVISION IS MADE IN THAT AGREEMENT AND TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION AND WITH THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANISATION.

5. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO THE SYRIA/ISRAEL GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT TO RESUME THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION, FOR WHICH PROVISION IS MADE IN THAT AGREEMENT, BOTH IN THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SESSIONS AND IN THE REGULAR SESSIONS, AND CALLS ATTENTION TO ARTICLE 111 (3) OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES THAT NO WARLIKE ACT OR ACT OF HOSTILITY SHALL BE CONDUCTED FROM TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY OR AGAINST CIVILIANS IN THE TERRITORY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THAT PARTY.

6. CALLS THE ATTENTION OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO THE MANDATORY ORDER CONTAINED IN ITS RESOLUTION 54 (1948) /REAFFIRMED

REAFFIRMED IN ITS RESOLUTION 73 (1949) TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 4Ø OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE: AND ACCORDINGLY CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ENSURE THE FULL APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.

7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARYY-GENERAL TO DESPATCH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA TO ARRANGE WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED FOR THE ADOPTION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH, AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE PARTIES AND THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANISATION, HE CONSIDERS WOULD REDUCE EXISTING TENSIONS ALONG THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES, INCLUDING

(A) FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS ALONG THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE, IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES AND IN THE DEFENSIVE AREAS,

(B) ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS AND PROMPT DETECTION OF ANY VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS

(C) SUCH OTHER MEASURES AS WOULD IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANISATION.

8. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO THE VARIOUS GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS TO CO-OPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION,

9. DURING THE BREATHING SPELL OBTAINED BY IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND ALL CONCERNED TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS TO THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE THE UTILISATION OF ONE OR MORE OF THE PEACEFUL MEANS OF SETTLEMENT LISTED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER.

/1Ø. REQUESTS

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1170 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

10. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE IN GIVING EFFECT TO THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONSIDERATION OF ANY FURTHER ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED.

LORD CARADON

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IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1171 31 MAY 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1171 OF 31 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1157: MIDDLE EAST.

AS FORECAST IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE GOLDBERG CALLED A MEETING THIS MORNING WITH OURSELVES, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CANADA, DENMARK AND JAPAN TO CONSIDER THE TEXT OF HIS HOLDING RESOLUTION (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1158) AND TACTICS.

2. GOLDBERG SAID HE HAD REPORTS THAT THE U.A.R. PLANNED TO FILIBUSTER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WERE GATHERING FOREIGN MINISTERS HERE FOR THIS PURPOSE. (THE LEBANON FOREIGN MINISTER AND PACHACHI, IRAQ, ARE HERE.) THE AIM WOULD BE TO SECURE THE PASSAGE OF A U.A.R. SPONSORED RESOLUTION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVED THAT IF A U.A.R. RESOLUTION WERE PASSED THIS WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN AN ISRAELI ATTACK. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, OF THE NEWS OF SOVIET WARSHIPS ENTERING THE MEDITERRANEAN, OF RUSSIA'S REFUSAL TO HAVE FOUR-PART TALKS AND OF RENEWED PRESSURE FROM TEL AVIV LAST NIGHT, GOLDBERG FELT THAT SOME IMMEDIATE STEP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOW ESSENTIAL. HE ALSO HAD IN MIND THAT EBAN WAS SHORTLY TO COME TO NEW YORK AND WOULD EXPECT THE COUNCIL AT LEAST TO MAKE AN INTERIM CALL TO ALLOW SHIPPING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ASSERTED RIGHTS WHILE CALLING ON THE PARTIES NOT TO FIGHT.

3. GOLDBERG SAID HE THEREFORE INTENDED TO CHECK ON THE SUPPORT HIS LATEST DRAFT RESOLUTION MIGHT OBTAIN IN THE COUNCIL. THE U.K. ARGENTINA, CANADA, DENMARK, AND JAPAN PROMISED SUPPORT. SETTE CAMARA (BRAZIL) POINTED TO THE DELICATE INTERNAL PROBLEM OF LARGE

/COMMUNITIES

COMMUNITIES OF ARABS AND JEWS IN BRAZIL BUT GOLDBERG SAID HE WAS LOBBYING IN CAPITALS AND HOPED FOR A FAVOURABLE BRAZILIAN REPLY TODAY. HE WOULD ALSO SPEAK TO CHINA ON WHOM HE RELIED. THE TROUBLE WAS WHERE TO FIND THE 9TH VOTE. IN SPITE OF LOBBYING HE FEARED A FRENCH ABSTENTION. NIGERIA WAS TOO TROUBLED TO BE RELIED ON. ONLY ETHIOPIA AMONG THE REMAINING COUNCIL MEMBERS WAS A STARTER AND THE AMERICANS WERE LOBBYING IN ADDIS ABABA.

4. BUT WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A MAJORITY FOR THE INTERIM DRAFT RESOLUTION GOLDBERG FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO TABLE IT TODAY SO AS TO PRE-EMPT THE EGYPTIANS, (HE DID SO THIS AFTERNOON).

5. THERE WAS NO GREAT ENTHUSIASM FOR GOLDBERG'S PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH THE DANES WERE SOLID, CANADA, BRAZIL AND JAPAN WOULD CLEARLY HAVE PREFERRED TO CONTINUE CONSULTATION IN THE HOPE OF GETTING NEAR UNANIMITY ON A TEXT EVEN THOUGH THIS DID NOT SPELL OUT QUOTE FOREGO BELLIGERENCE UNQUOTE.

6. I SAID I THOUGHT WE WERE CERTAINLY MOVING TOWARDS A SHOWDOWN AND IT MIGHT BE WELL THAT WE WERE DOING SO. I AGREED THAT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THE AMERICANS TO TABLE THEIR DRAFT. BUT WHETHER WE SHOULD FORCE THE COUNCIL TO DIVIDE ON AN INTERIM RESOLUTION DIRECTED TO THE SINGLE ISSUE OF AQABA OR FIGHT OUR CASE ON WIDER ISSUES NEEDED THOUGHT. IT MIGHT BE BETTER JUST TO TABLE THE INTERIM PROPOSAL. IF WE FELT IT WOULD FOUNDER IN A VOTE EITHER BECAUSE OF NO MAJORITY OR A SOVIET VETO WE MIGHT BE BETTER OFF IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD WERE WE TO FACE SUCH A FAILURE ON A SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON THE WHOLE ISSUE.

7. TABOR NEXT EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO ATTEMPT TO ORGANISE TALKS WITH THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS WHEN HE BECOMES PRESIDENT TOMORROW THOUGH HE WAS NOT HOPEFUL AND THE REST OF US HAVE NO ILLUSIONS. AS TO AN INTERIM SOLUTION HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE WORDING OF PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 26 MAY AND INDEED A CERTAINTY THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE DIVIDED ON THE BASIC QUESTION OF WHETHER THE

/STATUS QUO

STATUS QUO IN THE GULF IMPOSED BY NASSER SHOULD BE ACQUIESCED IN OR NOT.

8. GOLDBERG THEN TOOK UP MY REMARKS AND ASKED FOR VIEWS ON FUTURE MOVES IN THE COUNCIL. HE THOUGHT WE MUST TAKE UP A FIRM POSITION IN THE FACE OF THE EXPECTED EGYPTIAN DRAFT. FOR ANY WIDER RESOLUTION HE HAD IN MIND CALLING FOR A RETURN TO THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD INCLUDE FREEDOM OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA AND A DENIAL OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS. (HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REOPEN THE SUEZ CANAL TO ISRAELI SHIPPING.) RUDA (ARGENTINA) HOPED WE WOULD NOT GET INTO THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS. THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS A POLITICAL BODY. INNOCENT PASSAGE PREDICATED A TIME OF PEACE AND THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY WITH A DEBATE ON SUCH ABSTRACT QUESTIONS. THE JAPANESE WERE ALSO DOUBTFUL.

9. IT WAS AGREED THAT EVEN WERE THE AMERICANS TO TABLE THEIR TEXT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF PUTTING IT TO A VOTE IMMEDIATELY. THERE IS TO BE ANOTHER MEETING OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AS SOON AS THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE HAVE BEEN HEARD IN THE COUNCIL AND THE NON-PERMANENTS HAVE AGREED NOT TO CONSIDER TABLING ANY RESOLUTION UNTIL THIS ROUND HAD BEEN COMPLETED, WHICH MIGHT BE TOMORROW.

1Ø. AFTERWARDS I SPOKE TO GOLDBERG WHO, IN THE LIGHT OF EXPECTED EGYPTIAN MOVES, IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN A SUBSTANTIVE DRAFT ON THE LINES OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 1154 (NOT TO ALL). WE HAVE SAID WE HOPED TO HAVE YOUR REACTIONS BY TOMORROW AND I THINK THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE US TO GO AHEAD AND TABLE SOMETHING ON THESE LINES VERY SOON. (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 1169, NOT TO ALL).

F.O. PASS PARIS 1ØØ, MOSCOW 95, COPENHAGEN 33, TEL AVIV 1Ø5, AND SAVING AMMAN 16, DAMASCUS 22, AND CAIRO 28.

LORD CARADON

SENT Ø3Ø2Z Ø1 JUNE 1967

RCVD Ø3Ø2Z Ø1 JUNE

[REPETITIONS TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

GHM

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
F L A S H PARIS
TELEGRAM NO.527
SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
31 MAY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.527 OF 31 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS.1587 AND 1588.

MIDDLE EAST.

MY UNITED STATES COLLEAGUE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON AND IS ASKING FOR THEM URGENTLY. HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT, IN VIEW OF WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW OF THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, WE SHALL BE COURTING A REBUFF IF WE INVITE THEM TO JOIN IN SPONSORING OR MAKING A DECLARATION AFFIRMING THAT THE GULF OF AQABA IS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY AND THAT WE SHALL ASSERT OUR RIGHT OF PASSAGE. BEFORE LEARNING OF OUR INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD ALREADY SENT A TELEGRAM EXPRESSING THIS VIEW TO WASHINGTON AND HE WAS HOPING TO DISSUADE THEM FROM AN APPROACH WHICH SO FIRMLY REJECTS THE VIEWS THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY PUT TO US. HIS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ASKING THE FRENCH TO JOIN IN A DECLARATION APPLY WITH EVEN MORE FORCE TO ASKING THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING. HE HAS NOT, REPEAT NOT, MENTIONED TO THE FRENCH THE POSSIBLE USE OF DJIBOUTI AS A BASE AND AS FAR AS HE KNOWS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOT DONE SO EITHER.

2. I AGREE WITH BOHLEN ABOUT THE LIKELY FRENCH REACTION TO OUR APPROACH. COULD WE NOT SIMPLY ASK THEM FOR THEIR VIEWS ON ISSUING A DECLARATION AND GIVE THEM THE TEXT IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO.1822 AS A DRAFT ON WHICH WE WERE SEEKING THEIR OPINION?

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE I HAVE NOT ACTED ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TODAY: AND UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY, I WILL WAIT UNTIL BOHLEN HAS HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND WE CAN CONCERT ACTION. NO TIME HAS IN FACT BEEN LOST, SINCE THE GENERAL AND COUVE DO NOT RETURN UNTIL LATE TOMORROW.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON 150.

SIR P. REILLY.

SENT AT 1646Z 31 MAY 1967
RECD AT 1646Z 31 MAY 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [COPIES SENT TO CABINET OFFICE]
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C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. DEPT.

SECRET

S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH BAHRAIN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 364 31 May, 1967

S E C R E T

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 364 of 31 May, Repeated for information to Kuwait, H.C.Aden, C-in-CME and Saving to Tel Aviv, Bahrain Agency, Nicosia.

Middle East Crisis: My immediately preceding telegram.

Ruler's approach arises out of the general Middle East situation and not out of the particular question of minesweepers dealt with in your telegram No. 589. Indeed he did not mention this particular topic, possibly because his brother, Shaikh Khalifah, was present and he may not have been informed by the Ruler of what he was told by the Political Agent, Bahrain (my telegram No. 359). There is some increase in excitement in Bahrain about the events in the Levant and Ruler is undoubtedly under fairly heavy pressure to be seen to be doing something to help the Arabs. King Hussein's Defence Agreement with the U.A.R. will probably feed this pressure. The gesture Ruler has chosen would get him off the hook and he genuinely believes that it will not make difficulties for us.

2. I realise that a statement such as he has suggested, to which we are in some sense parties, is likely to be unwelcome to you, both as implying that we might have thought of taking sides and because of possible repercussions elsewhere in Aden and Cyprus. Now, however, that the three minesweepers have left Bahrain (the last one will leave a.m. tomorrow) I presume that there is no question of Gulf being drawn upon for other Forces. Moreover, paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 589 makes distinction between Naval and other Forces here. I hope therefore that you would agree to Ruler's proposal.

3. As to the method, it seems to me that there would probably be difficulty about trying to agree a form of words with Ruler and that what would be best would be a unilateral statement by us which he could quote: we could not then necessarily be tied down by any embellishments that he added. The best course might be a reference in your speech in today's Middle East debate (which is the reason why I have sent these telegrams emergency) but if it is too late for that then an alternative would be reply to an early Parliamentary Question.

4. I should be grateful for an early indication of your views since there must be some risk that Ruler will feel obliged to say something unilaterally himself which might put us more on the spot.

5. C-in-C Middle East pass H.C. Aden No. Personal 21.

6. Foreign Office pass Kuwait No. 64 and Saving to Tel Aviv No. 2 and Nicosia No. 2.

7. Defence COMCEN pass Foreign Office London.

/Sir S. Crawford

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Bahrain Telegram No. 364 to Foreign Office

Sir S. Crawford Sent 1002 31 May

Recd 1123Z 31 May

[Repetition to Kuwait referred for Departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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S E C R E T

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1846

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 31 MAY 1967

SECRET
ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1846 OF 31 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK,
THE HAGUE, ROME, OTTAWA AND PARIS.

YOUR TELS.NO.5625 AND 5626 TO ME AND YOUR TELS. 923 AND 924 TO THE HAGUE: MIDDLE EAST.

THE FULL SUBSTANCE OF THESE TELS. HAS BEEN PASSED TO EUGENE ROSTOW AND I WILL BE SEEING HIM MYSELF AT 1Ø A.M. WASHINGTON TIME 31 MAY. U.S. INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR AMBASSADORS IN POSTS CONCERNED WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WHICH IS EXPECTED SOMETIME ON 31 MAY, AND H.M. REPRESENTATIVES MAY LIKE TO BEAR THIS IN MIND IN ANY APPROACHES TO THEIR U.S. COLLEAGUES.
F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO THE HAGUE 38 ROME 99 PARIS 158

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT Ø525Z 31/5/67
RECD AT Ø525Z 31/5/67

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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AC

PPPPP

SECRET

En Clair

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 501 31 May, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 501 of 31 May. Repeated for information to Bagndad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, JIG Cyprus, CIO Cyprus, MOD, MO4 and DI4.

Jordan U.A.R. Joint Defence Agreement.

Following are the main points of this agreement, which was signed in Cairo on 30 May, as published in the Jordanian Press on 31 May (copies of the agreement as published follow by bag).

(i) The two contracting States will regard any armed attack on either one as an attack on both and will use all available means including armed forces to assist each other.

(ii) The two States will at the request of either one consult in any circumstances where the security or independence of either one are threatened. They will take immediate protective and defensive steps in the face of any danger.

(iii) The machinery for implementing the agreement will consist of

(a) a Defence Council comprising the Defence and Foreign Ministers of both countries;

(b) a Council of Chiefs of Staff consisting of the two Chiefs of Staff;

(c) the Joint Staff responsible to the Council of Chiefs of Staff.

(iv) In the event of military operations the Chief of Staff of the U.A.R. armed forces will assume direction of operations in both countries.

(v) Each country will meet any costs incurred in its own country by virtue of this agreement.

(vi) The agreement is for 5 years automatically renewable for a further five years. Withdrawal from the agreement requires one year's notice.

See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass MOD Washington 72 MOD pass CIO Cyprus, JIG Cyprus 40 MO4, DI4.

Mr. Adams

Sent 1105Z/31 May
Recd. 1341Z/31 May

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1847
SECRET

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 31 MAY 1967

M.I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST

WHEN WE SAW ROSTOW TO GIVE HIM SUBSTANCE OF YOUR DECISIONS, HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY HOLDING JOINT U.K./U.S. OIL TALKS.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 0528Z 31/5/67
RECD AT 0530Z 31/5/67

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No 10 (12)

COPY NO.

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH OTTAWA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO 748 1 JUNE 1967
SECRET

ADDRESSED CO TELNO 748 OF 1 JUNE 1967 REPEATED WASHINGTON
FOLLOWING FOR LE CHEMINANT, 10 DOWNING STREET, FROM HALLS

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS READ WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 1847 OF MAY 31 ABOUT ROSTOW'S SUGGESTION FOR HOLDING JOINT UK/US OIL TALKS. HE WISHES TO KNOW WHAT WE ARE DOING ABOUT THIS SUGGESTION.
SIR H LINTOTT

Sent 21552 1/6
Recd 22052 1/6

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC CO/FO

S E C R E T

MW

Ward ~~from~~ (Disputes file)

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

George Thompson saw James Dickens at the weekend and she will file the (Thames Water) on the telephone. I told the Chief

31/5

Published paper(s)

At this point on the file, there was enclosed a copy of the following published paper(s), a copy of which may be found elsewhere in the Public Record Office:

House of Commons Hansard, Cols 102 to 212
dated 31 May 1967
"Middle East"

The copy enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed

Signed J.R. Green Date 2.1.97

JR Green
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

CONFIDENTIAL

D/M.465/67

31st May 1967

Dear Philip,

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 26 May to Denis Allen about the collecting of information on shipping in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Aqaba.

2. We are content that the Naval Operations Room in the Ministry of Defence should be the focus of information on all shipping movements (not only British shipping, though naturally our information will be less complete for foreign shipping). We propose for the time being to issue a daily Sitrep to all concerned.

3. An essential part of this arrangement is that all other departments having access to sources of information, especially the Foreign Office, should pass information, without delay, to the Naval Operations Room (Ministry of Defence, Ext. 6105) so that their "plot" is kept up to date. We shall need to rely on the Foreign Office and Board of Trade between them to evaluate and clarify any dubious or contradictory information that may be received: our Sitreps will simply record the best information available to us, in terms of facts about past transit dates and estimates of future transit dates.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Denis Allen, Michael Palliser, and also to Meynell at the Board of Trade.

Yours ever,

Pat Nairne

(P.D. NAIRNE)
PRIVATE SECRETARY

P. Rogers, Esq., CB, CMG

WONFO 83 023

...

OTWON 002/2 -ZZ- CO -OO- WTON 16402

CYPHER /CAT A

FLASH OTTAWA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 750 1 JUNE 1957

SECRET

No 10

ADDRESSED TO CO TEL. 750 OF 1 JUNE REPEATED WASHINGTON

FLASH

FOLLOWING FROM PRIME MINISTER.

MIDDLE EAST

WE HAD A LONG TALK ON THIS SUBJECT WITH THE CANADIAN TEAM AND I LATER HAD A PRIVATE TALK WITH MR PEARSON. THE UPSHOT IS THAT COLON DASH

(A) THEY ARE STILL PUBLICLY CLINGING TO THE POSITION THAT ACTION SHOULD BE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT PRIVATELY HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF ANY SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(B) THEY ARE STILL IN SOME DOUBT ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT OUR PROPOSALS FOR A COLLECTIVE DECLARATION BY MARITIME POWERS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING. AS THINGS STAND AT THIS MOMENT, I WOULD ASSES THAT THEY WOULD NOT JOIN IN ANY USE OF FORCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS BUT MAY BE BROUGHT EVENTUALLY TO SIGN A DECLARATION, THOUGH ONLY ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS DOES NOT COMMIT THEM TO USE OF FORCE.

2. HIGH COMMISSIONER WILL BE TAKING FOLLOW UP ACTION ON SECURING CANADIAN SIGNATURE TO DECLARATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE SHALL NOW HAVE TO GO AHEAD IN OTHER CAPITALS WITHOUT CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN SPONSORING THE DECLARATION.

SIR H LINTOTT GRS 175 SENT 02010 LOCAL L3

SENT AT 0417 Z FOE

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel.No. 193 1 June 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 193 of 1 June. Repeated for information to MOD as signal FCK 42 (Priority) Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Jedda, Addis Ababa, U.K.Mission New York and Washington (Routine). And Saving to Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Baghdad and Aden.

Middle East Situation.

The Sudan's position is that the new Prime Minister has expressed his Government's solidarity with the U.A.R. and said that in the event of war with Israel units of the Sudan armed forces will fight with the Arabs. He has declared a state of readiness. A delegation of three Ministers has been to Cairo and Damascus to discuss the Sudan's role, the Army Commander has also been to Cairo. The Opposition Leader, Sadiq El Mahdi, has declared his support in reasoned terms.

2. Actual military operations, however, have been restricted to the formation on paper of an ad hoc battalion consisting of companies from different parts of the country, these have so far remained at their locations and are continuing normal training. In addition pro-Egyptian groups have called for volunteers to train for action with the U.A.R. forces.

3. The indications are that, short of an all-out Arab Israel war, the Sudan is not anxious to get involved in the dispute apart from ritual declarations of support, telegrams, delegations etc. The Government and Press have been giving almost more attention to the situation on the Sudan/Ethiopian (see my immediately following telegram not to all), one influential daily has taken the line that it is the Sudan's primary duty to protect her Eastern frontier as a rearguard of the Arab armies against "an Ethiopian conspiracy with Zionism and American imperialism". In other words the Sudan Government may try to use the Sudan/Ethiopian situation as an excuse, however far fetched, for not giving direct military support to the U.A.R. The Egyptian influence in the new Council of Ministers is now strong, however, and there is growing pressure in the three towns in support of the Arab cause. The Prime Minister may therefore be forced to find ways of giving more positive support.

Foreign Office please pass to MOD as signal FCK 42 (Priority) and unnumbered to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Jedda, Addis Ababa, U.K.Mission New York and Washington Routine and Saving to Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Baghdad and Aden.

Sir.R. Fowler

Sent 1530Z/1 June
Recd 2215Z/1 June

[Repetition to Amman, Cairo, Damascus and Tel Aviv, referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts.]

[Copies sent to M.O.D.]
[Sent to D.C.C.]

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HHHHH

? file

En Clair

DAR ES SALAAM TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 588 1 June, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.588 of 1 June, Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Nairobi (for Spec Rep) Ottawa (for DEA)

My telegram No.577 : Middle East Crisis.

Today's Press carries text of a message from President Nyerere to President Nasser. The message was apparently sent from Iringa where the President is attending the TANU National Executive Meeting in reply to one received from President Nasser ten days ago. The text of the message is as follows:-

Begins:

On my own behalf and on behalf of the Government and people of Tanzania I wish to assure you and through you the people of the United Arab Republic of the sympathy and support of the Government and people of Tanzania in your struggle to protect the freedom and sovereignty of the Arab nation.

Allow me to congratulate you and King Hussein of Jordan in your courageous agreement to cooperate in defence of your rights against imperialism.

Ends.

2. The Standards political correspondent comments that "it appeared that the Tanzania Government believed Western Powers - presumably Britain and America had used Israel to instigate (instigate) the latest Middle East crisis". The political correspondent adds "Tanzania recognizes Israel's existence as a separate sovereign State and it appears Government circles felt that Israel had a good case to argue against the blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba but at the same time a reported Israeli threat to overthrow the Syrian regime is regarded as inexcusable".

Commonwealth Office please pass Tel Aviv 3, Cairo 9, Nairobi (for SpecRep) 175 and Ottawa (for DEA) 213.

Mr. Wilson

Sent Untimed 1 June
Recd 0910Z/1 June

[Repeated as requested]

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CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO ADDIS ABABA

TELNO 314 1 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO ADDIS ABABA TELEGRAM NO. 314 OF 1 JUNE AND TO PARIS LAGOS BUENOS AIRES RIO DE JANEIRO AND TOKYO REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AND TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AMMAN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE AMERICANS HAVE NOW TABLED A DRAFT HOLDING RESOLUTION CALLING ON ALL CONCERNED TO RESPOND TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPEAL TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND TO FOREGO BELLIGERENCE AND DECIDING TO KEEP THE ISSUE UNDER URGENT AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW. THE UAR HAVE TABLED A COUNTER-DRAFT PLACING THE WHOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT CRISIS ON ISRAEL, WHICH IF WIDELY SUPPORTED WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN AN AMERICAN VETO. THERE IS ALSO A PROSPECT OF AN ARAB FILIBUSTER IN THE COUNCIL OR OF A CONSENSUS OR A WATERED-DOWN HOLDING RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD FAIL TO SAY, EVEN BY IMPLICATION, ANYTHING ABOUT THE GULF OF AQABA. SUCH A RESULT WOULD TEND TO SHOW THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS QUITE INEFFECTIVE AND THUS HEIGHTEN THE RISK OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK.

2. IT IS THEREFORE MOST IMPORTANT TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN HOLDING RESOLUTION. THE AMERICANS HAVE PROMISES OF SUPPORT FROM ARGENTINA, CANADA, DENMARK AND JAPAN AS WELL AS OURSELVES, ALTHOUGH ARGENTINA AND JAPAN STILL APPEAR TO HAVE DOUBTS. THEY HOPE TO RALLY CHINA. BUT BRAZIL IS DOUBTFUL, THEY FEAR FRENCH ABSTENTION, AND THEY MUST SEEK THE NINTH VOTE FROM EITHER NIGERIA AND ETHIOPIA.

3. PLEASE APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL, AND URGE THAT INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO THEIR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK TO VOTE FOR THE AMERICN DRAFT.

4. THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM THAT THE HOLDING RESOLUTION FOCUSES ATTENTION ON WHAT NASSER MUST DO AND IGNORES THE NECESSITY FOR ISRAEL TO PLAY ITS PART. THIS IS NOT SO. THE PLAIN FACT IS THAT THE IMMEDIATE FLASH POINT IS THE GULF OF AQABA. THE US AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, FOREGOING

/ BELLIGERENCE

BELLIGERENCE MEANS FOREGOING A BLOCKADE IN THE GULF. BUT EQUALLY OF COURSE WE ACCEPT THAT IT APPLIES TO ANY AGGRESSIVE ACT ON THE BORDERS BY EITHER ISRAEL OR ANY OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES. BUT IF A BREATHING SPACE CAN BE OBTAINED BY THE HOLDING RESOLUTION, WE REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE US RESOLUTION, KEEP THIS ISSUE UNDER URGENT AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW AND GO ON TO PROPOSE OTHER MEASURES WHICH WILL ALSO INVOLVE ISRAEL IN MAKING CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE A FINAL SETTLEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU COULD DRAW ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 31 MAY: QUOTE WE ARE RIGHT TO PRESS THAT ISRAEL AS WELL AS THE ARAB COUNTRIES MUST ACCEPT A UN PRESENCE ON THEIR SOIL UNQUOTE: ALSO TO MY STATEMENT IN THE SAME DEBATE QUOTE THE ISRAELIS HAVE UNWISELY, IN MY VIEW, REJECTED (A UNITED NATIONS FORCE ON THEIR SIDE OF THE FRONTIER) IN THE PAST AND WE HAVE MADE OUR VIEWS INESCAPABLY CLEAR TO THEM IN THE LAST FEW DAYS UNQUOTE.

5. YOUR US COLLEAGUE WILL PROBABLY BE MAKING REPRESENTATIONS ON THE SAME LINES. YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS AND IF NECESSARY CO-ORDINATE ACTION. BUT YOU SHOULD NOT DELAY YOUR APPROACH IF YOUR US COLLEAGUE HAS NO INSTRUCTIONS.

6. (ADDIS ABABA) YOU SHOULD ACT AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE UNLESS YOU CONSIDER IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN VIEW OF DR TESFAYE'S KNOWN ATTITUDE.

7. (TO LAGOS) WE REALIZE IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO FOCUS NIGERIAN ATTENTION ON THIS JUST NOW. BUT THE NIGERIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAS SPOKEN IN THE DEBATE IN NEW YORK AND WILL VOTE: AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO FIND THE NINTH VOTE.

SOSFA SENT 1652Z 1 JUNE

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Re

Cipher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel.No. 225 1 June 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 225 of 1 June. Repeated for information to U.K.Mission New York and Washington.

My telegram No. 210 (not to New York and Washington): Middle East situation.

When I accompanied Mr. McDonald to call on Ethiopian Prime Minister today, conversation turned quickly to Middle East crisis and I asked Prime Minister for his views.

2. He said that Ethiopia was in a very difficult position. Both the other African members of the Security Council were supporting the Egyptian view as was India. Virtually all Ethiopia's closer neighbours favoured Egypt. Although Ethiopia had good relations and much sympathy with Israel it was really not possible for her to support any resolution in the United Nations which could be interpreted as anti-Arab. Furthermore, a division of African opinion on the subject could blow the O.A.V. apart. Ethiopia would certainly support a resolution which simply urged the parties to exercise the utmost restraint and to avoid armed force. The trouble with the American resolution now before the Security Council lay in the word "belligerent". If this were interpreted to mean that the Straits of Tiran must be opened, rather than that the use of force must be avoided, Ethiopia would, though with regret, be unable to support it.

3. The Prime Minister realised that the vague kind of resolution in the Security Council which he was advocating would not have very much effect but he believed that the crisis could only be solved through intensive and secret diplomatic negotiation, primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union. I pointed out to him that if no action were taken which could lead to the re-opening of the Straits of Tiran, the risk was very great that Israel would sooner or a little later resort to force out of sheer desperation despite the fact that she could perhaps exist without the use of the Port of Eilat. I also pointed out that the more maritime powers that could band together to assert the right of free passage in internation waterways with vigour, the greater the chance of giving Egypt pause. He acknowledged the danger of Israeli action (mentioning in the context possible bombing of the Aswan High Dam) but did not believe that Egypt would be moved by any pressure, given the amount of international support she already had. He reasserted that intensive negotiations behind the scenes were the only hope.

/4. My American

4. My American colleague, when carrying out instructions from Washington yesterday to urge support for the American Resolution, had almost exactly the same reaction from the Prime Minister.

5. When we were lunching with the Emperor following our interview with the Prime Minister, the Emperor told Mr. McDonald that it was impossible for Ethipia either to oppose Israel or to oppose the Arabs. He evidently regarded the situation with considerable pessimism. He also said that emissary with a message from Nasser had arrived today to press the Egyptian case. He appealed in reply, as he had earlier to the Israeli Ambassador, for the utmost restraint and avoidance of force.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate U.K.Mission New York 10, and Routine Washington 8.

Sir.T. Bromley

Sent 1520Z/1 June
Recd 1810Z/1 June

[Repeated as requested]

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En Clair

PRIORITY BONN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 847 1 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 847 of 1 June
Repeated for information Saving to UKDEL NATO.

The Federal Republic and the Middle East Crisis.

At his Press conference on 31 May Herr Brandt was asked whether the Federal Government intended to maintain their neutral position towards the situation in the Middle East. He replied that their attitude was clear. They were as much concerned as other Governments that peace should be maintained in the area. They were not among the Powers to whom France had appealed and they were confining themselves to stressing the need for the great Powers to take pains to keep the peace. They supported the efforts of the United Nations but were not intervening. They represented a policy of the renunciation of forces and were, not only for this reason, of the opinion that the freedom of the seas should be preserved and that peaceful development should not be hindered. In this connexion Herr Brandt also emphasized that the Federal Government desired friendly relations with the Arab peoples and had inflamed no conflicts. He declined to give further details on the grounds that the Federal Republic was not seized of the issue in detail and did not wish to appear to be giving advice in public.

2. The German Israel Society had published an appeal for political and financial assistance for Israel, signed by a number of members of the Bundestag, church leaders in Bonn and writers. There is no doubt that public opinion in the Federal Republic and the German Press and television are overwhelmingly sympathetic towards Israel in this crisis.

3. Die Welt on 1 June reports that Israel asked the Federal Government last week to supply 20,000 gas masks very urgently from military stocks, the Defence Minister refused to obey a direct instruction from the Chancellor to supply these, basing himself on a NATO decision not to supply military equipment to crisis areas. The matter now awaits a formal Cabinet decision.

Foreign Office pass Saving to UKDEL NATO 57.

Sir F. Roberts Sent 1100Z/1 June
Received 1840/1 June

[Repeated as requested]

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1184 1 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1184 OF 1 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO OTTAWA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO. 1171: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

I SPOKE TO GOLDBERG THIS MORNING ON THE BASIS OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND HE AGREED(SEE PARA 4 OF TELNO. 1169 TO SPEAK TO RAFAEL (ISRAEL) IN GENERAL TERMS TO SEEK HIS REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION MIGHT BE TABLED ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT WHICH WE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING.

2. WHEN GOLDBERG HAD DONE SO RAFAEL FIRST CAME TO SEE HOPE AND THEN CAME BACK TO SEE ME. HE IS NATURALLY GREATLY CONCERNED AND UNDERSTANDABLY NERVOUS ABOUT THE SITUATION AND THE GENERAL THEME OF HIS COMMENT WAS THAT ISRAEL NEVER WANTED A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAS CONVINCED THAT NO GOOD WOULD COME FROM IT. THE DISCUSSIONS SO FAR HAD CONFIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT IN ITS FIRST JUDGEMENT AND HE THOUGHT THAT EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHOULD NOW BE MADE TO BRING THE DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL TO AN END AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, SINCE THERE WAS NO HOPE OF ANY SATISFACTORY RESULT. CONSEQUENTLY HE THOUGHT THAT TO TABLE A COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE SINCE IT WOULD DRAG THINGS OUT IN THE COUNCIL AND LEAD TO INDETERMINATE DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH THE ARABS AND THE COMMUNISTS WOULD GAIN GROUND. MEANWHILE PRESSURE ON THE MARITIME POWERS WOULD WEAKEN AND ACTION OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY. IN HIS VIEW EVERYTHING SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON DEFEATING THE BLOCKADE IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND ACHIEVING A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE UAR/ISRAEL BORDERS

/3. I TOLD

3. I TOLD HIM THAT MY IMMEDIATE CONCERN WAS NOT ON THE LARGER QUESTIONS OF ACTION OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL. I HAD TO CONSIDER WHAT THE BEST TACTICS WERE AT THIS STAGE IN THE COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS AND I WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT A COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION OF THE KIND WE HAD HAD IN MIND WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY PUT FIRST THE NEED TO MAINTAIN FREE PASSAGE IN THE GULF AND TO ACHIEVE A WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM THE BORDERS WOULD PUT US IN THE BEST POSITION AS FAR AS PUBLIC OPINION WAS CONCERNED BOTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND POSSIBLY EVEN MORE IMPORTANT OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION. BUT RAFAEL STUCK TO HIS POINT THAT ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT PROLONG THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNCIL WAS TO BE AVOIDED AND WOULD BE VERY ILL-RECEIVED BY HIS GOVERNMENT. HE STRONGLY ARGUED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS NOT MORE DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL BUT EFFECTIVE ACTION OUTSIDE IT.

4. NO DOUBT RAFAEL WILL BE REPORTING TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND I IMAGINE THAT WE CAN EXPECT THAT REPRESENTATIONS WILL COME QUICKLY FROM TEL AVIV.

5. IN VIEW OF THIS I DO NOT PROPOSE THAT WE SHOULD TABLE THE RESOLUTION UNTIL I HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU.

6. I MYSELF STILL FEEL THAT THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR TABLING THE COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION SOON. SO FAR I HAVE SHOWN THE DRAFT ONLY TO GOLDBERG AND IGNATIEFF (CANADA). BUT SUBJECT TO YOUR DIRECTIONS I SHOULD LIKE NOW TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT AND THE QUESTION OF TACTICS AND TIMING WITH ONE OR TWO OTHER DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY WITH TABOR (DENMARK).

7. GOLDBERG SAID LATER THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT RAFAEL WISHED TO END THE COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS AND THAT HE WAS STILL INCLINED TO AGREE WITH MY VIEW.

8. I AM TO HAVE A GENERAL DISCUSSION LATER THIS EVENING WITH /GOLDBERG

CONFIDENTIAL

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1184 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

GOLDBERG, IGNATIEFF AND TABOR AND I SHALL REPORT AGAIN THEREAFTER.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV 107 ROUTINE PARIS 102,
MOSCOW 97, COPENHAGEN 34 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 18, DAMASCUS 24
AND CAIRO 30.
LORD CARADON

SENT 0148Z 2/6 RD 0148Z 2/6

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL
DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHERR/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1185 1 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1185 OF 1 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW COPENHAGEN OTTAWA TEL AVIV
AND SAVING TO AMMAN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MYTEL 1171:
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

THERE HAVE BEEN THE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN GOING ON HERE THROUGHOUT THE DAY.

2...THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MET THIS AFTERNOON WHEN INDIA CIRCULATED A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN M I F T). THIS WAS WELCOMED BY MALI, ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA, BULGARIA, AND EVEN BRAZIL. THE DANES ASKED IF THE TEXT WAS DESIGNED TO HOLD THE POSITION ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO. THE INDIANS CONFIRMED THIS AND THE DANES POINTED OUT THAT THE EFFECT WOULD THEREFORE BE TO ENDORSE WHAT NASSER HAD DONE INCLUDING THE BLOCKADE. BRAZIL ASKED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MENTION IN THE COUNCIL OF THE STATUS QUO WHICH COULD ONLY MAKE MATTERS MORE DIFFICULT AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE ETHIOPIAN.

3...TABOR (DENMARK) CONCLUDES THAT THE INDIANS MAY PERHAPS HAVE FIVE OR CONCEIVABLY SEVEN VOTES FOR THEIR DRAFT BUT THE AMERICANS, IN SPITE OF THIS AFTERNOON, MAY BE ABLE TO SECURE BRAZIL'S VOTE FOR SOMETHING LIKE THE AMERICAN TEXT (SEE MYTEL 1158).

4...THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS ARE TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW AFTERNOON AT 4 P M FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION BY WHICH TIME THE AMERICANS HOPE TO HAVE MORE FAVOURABLE NEWS FROM RIO DE JANEIRO. THEY HAVE MEANWHILE HEARD THAT THE ETHIOPIAN INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO DO NOTHING DAMAGING TO ISRAEL OR IMPAIR ETHIOPIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. THERE IS THEREFORE NO HOPE OF A VOTE FOR THE AMERICAN DRAFT FROM THAT QUARTER.

5...TIMING OF THE NEXT MEETING.

AFTER CONSULTATION WITH PACHACHI, GOLDBERG THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE MERIT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING A LITTLE LATER THAN

/ TOMORROW

TOMORROW MORNING. THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY SOME OF THE NON-PERMANENTS AT THEIR MEETING BUT MALI, BULGARIA AND INDIA INDICATED A PREFERENCE FOR TOMORROW THUS MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE ARABS ARE KEEN ON ANOTHER ROUND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE GROUP FINALLY SETTLED ON SATURDAY MORNING AS THE TIME FOR THE NEXT MEETING. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SINCE CONCURRED AND WE CAN THEREFORE ASSUME THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN. (I TOO CONCURRED BEARING IN MIND MY CONVERSATION WITH RAFAEL OF ISRAEL (SEE MYTEL 1184)).

6...AT OUR MEETING TONIGHT WITH THE DANES, AMERICANS AND CANADIANS WE CONSIDERED FIRST THE PROSPECT OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT INTERIM RESOLUTION. WE CONCEDED THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY NOT GET NINE VOTES FOR IT BUT THAT WE MUST ALSO THINK OF SOME WAY IN WHICH TO COUNTER THE EGYPTIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (MYTEL 1165). GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT ONE WAY OF SECURING MORE SUPPORT FOR HIS TEXT WOULD BE TO INTRODUCE THE IDEA OF NO PREJUDICE (''WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS''). HE THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO HIS TEXT OR INTO THE EARLIER DANISH-CANADIAN PROPOSAL. PURELY AS A FALL BACK POSITION HE ALSO SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATIVE TEXT (SEE MYTEL 1185). I SAID I WOULD NEED TO RESERVE THE POSITION WITH MY GOVERNMENT ON THIS EVEN AS A FALL BACK POSITION AND BOTH GOLDBERG AND I DOUBTED WHETHER SUCH A WEAK TEXT WHICH DOES NOT SPELL OUT THE TERMS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPEAL WOULD BE TOLERABLE.

7...TABOR IS TO SEE FEDORENKO TOMORROW MORNING AND OUR SMALL GROUP WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW EVENING AFTER THE MEETING OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS.

F O PASS PARIS 103, MOSCOW 98, COPENHAGEN 35 AND TEL AVIV 108 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 19, DAMASCUS 25 AND CAIRO 31.

LORD CARADON.

SENT 02182 4/6
RECD 02182 4/6

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1187 1 JUNE, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1187 OF 1 JUNE, RFI TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN. OTTAWA, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1185: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GOLDBERG'S FALL BACK DRAFT (WHICH HE HAS NOT PUT TO WASHINGTON).

''THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING CONSIDERED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT

NOTING THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT AND IN PARTICULAR THE APPEAL SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 14

CALLS ON ALL PARTIES AS A FIRST STEP AND, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS CLAIMS AND POSITIONS, TO COMPLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL

CALLS FOR THE USE OF ALL PEACEFUL MEANS IN A SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION

CALLS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL URGENTLY TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT TENSIONS''

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS PARIS NO.105, MOSCOW NO.100, COPENHAGEN NO.37, TEL AVIV NO.110 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO.21, DAMASCUS NO. 27, AND CAIRO NO.33.

LORD CARADON SENT 0221Z 2/6 RECD 0221Z 2/6

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UK MISSION NEW YORK

TELNO 2423 1 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2423 OF 1 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AND TEL AVIV.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1171 AND EARLIER TELEGRAMS (NOT TO ALL).
MIDDLE EAST.
WE AGREE BROADLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL TACTICS WHICH YOU HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE AMERICANS. IN OUR VIEW THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS TO ENSURE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL KEEPS THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS UNDER URGENT AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW. IF THE COUNCIL WERE TO GIVE UP AFTER PERHAPS FAILING TO PASS THE HOLDING RESOLUTION THIS WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND MIGHT WELL ENCOURAGE ISRAEL TO TAKE MATTERS INTO HER OWN HANDS.
2. THE HOLDING RESOLUTION TABLED BY THE AMERICANS SEEMS TO US WELL-DESIGNED TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUOUSLY SEIZED OF THE WHOLE MATTER WE CONSIDER THEREFORE THAT THERE SHOULD BE VIGOROUS LOBBYING IN SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION IN APPROPRIATE CAPITALS AS WELL AS IN NEW YORK. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS OBTAINED ON THE TELEPHONE, WE ARE TELEGRAPHING TO THE POSTS CONCERNED ACCORDINGLY.
3. DURING THE DISCUSSION ON THE AMERICAN RESOLUTION YOU WILL NO DOUBT MAKE IT VERY PLAIN THAT H.M.G. REGARDS THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE FOREGOING BELLIGERENCE UNQUOTE IN BOTH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT AND IN THE RESOLUTION AS APPLYING TO ANY UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE UAR TO CLOSE THE GULF OF AQABA AS WELL AS TO ACTS OF AGGRESSION COMMITTED BY EITHER SIDE ON THE ISRAEL/ARAB BORDER. (SEE THE RELEVANT PASSAGE IN MY SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY).
4. WE SEE GREAT VALUE IN THE MORE DETAILED DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH YOU HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SECRETARIAT (YOUR TELNO 1170) THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION CAN BE FULLY JUSTIFIED FROM THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL POINTS OF VIEW. A FEW MINOR DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS ARE CONTAINED IN M.I.F.T. OF COURSE THE DRAFT CONTAINS VARIOUS POINTS WHICH WOULD BE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. WE ACCEPT THAT IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF ATTRACTING SUFFICIENT VOTES TO BE PASSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT IT WOULD BE OF

/ GREAT

GREAT VALUE PRESENTATIONALLY IN DEMONSTRATING QUITE CLEARLY THAT WE WERE AIMING AT A FAIR AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT.

5. THE TACTICS OF HOW THIS RESOLUTION SHOULD BE HANDLED IN NEW YORK ARE VERY MUCH A MATTER FOR YOU TO DECIDE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. AS SEEN FROM HERE, WE SHOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU SHOULD FLOAT THE RESOLUTION FORTHWITH, AND DECIDE IF AND WHEN IT SHOULD BE TABLED IN THE LIGHT OF COMMENTS FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENS OR SEEMS LIKELY TO HAPPEN TO THE AMERICAN RESOLUTION.

6. MEANWHILE WE ARE WORKING ON THE OUTLINES OF WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE BY WAY OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. HERE THE UNITED NATIONS , AND PARTICULARLY A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE AND A U.N. PRESENCE MUST PLAY A MOST IMPORTANT PART. WE SHALL BE SENDING YOU FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THIS WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO.

7. SIR L.GLASS CONCURS.

SOSFA SENT 1615Z 1 JUNE

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CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UK MISSION NEW YORK

TELNO 2424 1 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 2424 OF 1 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV.
MY TEL 2423 PARA 4 :
WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING VERY MINOR ALTERATIONS TO SUGGEST ON THE TEXT IN YOUR TEL. 1170 :-
(I) PARA 2 (A) : FOR QUOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF RIGHTS UNQUOTE SUBSTITUTE QUOTE EXERCISE OF RIGHTS. UNQUOTE
(II) PARA 2 (B) : FOR QUOTE DISENGAGE UNQUOTE SUBSTITUTE QUOTE WITHDRAW. UNQUOTE
(III) PARA 5 : THE QUOTATION FROM ARTICLE III 3 OF THE ISRAEL/SYRIAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SHOULD READ.. QUOTE CIVILIANS IN TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF THAT PARTY. UNQUOTE.

SOSFA SENT 1600Z 1 JUNE

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CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1651

TELEGRAM TO OTTAWA

DEDIP/~~DEFCON~~

~~IMMEDIATE~~/FLASH

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR HALLS ~~OR BALFISH~~, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY,

FROM LE CHEMINANT

~~The~~ Paymaster wants following information to be given to the Prime Minister at earliest opportunity.

2. Marcus Sieff telephoned Paymaster this morning to say that Baron Edmond de Rothschild, whom he thinks is close to Pompidou, had been in direct contact with him to suggest that an urgent personal message should go from the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle before tomorrow morning's meeting of the Conseil des Ministres. The message should he thought say that because France was not actively engaged in hostilities in any part of the world a positive statement by the President that there will not be a Middle Eastern Munich could have a great stabilising effect on the situation. He thought that a personal message from the Prime Minister, delivered in time, could influence the General to make such a statement.

3. The Paymaster undertook to pass this to Prime Minister but is reluctant to give elsewhere or take further steps unless instructed.

4. On separate subject. Ned ~~has~~ told Paymaster this afternoon that C.P. telephoned Drew to say that he understood Danny's activities were being studied. He would not use this information unless others did so. Ned is investigating source [redacted].

Y

June 1, 1967

V

ZZ - OTTAWA 65101
CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO. 1651

TO OFFTTAWA
1 JUNE 1967

D E D I P
SECRET
PERSONAL FOR HALLS, PRIME MNINISTER'S PARTY, FROM LE CHEMINANT.

PAYMASTER WANTS FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN TO PRIME MINISTER AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

2. MARCUS SIEFF TELEPHONED PAYMASTER THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT BARON EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD, WHOM HE THINKS IS CLOSE TO POMPIDOU, HAD BEEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIM TO SUGGEST THAT AN URGENT PERSONAL MESSAGE SHOULD GO FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL DE GAULLE BEFORE TOMORROW MORNING'S MEETING OF THE CONSEIL DES MINISTRES. THE MESSAGE SHOULD HE THOUGHT SAY THAT BECAUSE FRANCE WAS NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES IN ANY PART OF THWE WORLD A POSTIIVE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT THAT THERE WILL NOT BE A MIDDLE EASTERN MUNICH COULD HAVE A GREAT STABILISING EFFECT ON THE SITUATION. HE THOUGHT THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, DELIVERED IN TIME, COULD INFLUENCE THE GENERAL TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT.

3. THE PAYMASTER UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS TO PRIME MINISTER BUT IS RELUCTANT TO GIVE ELSEWHERE OR TAKE FURTHER STEPS UNLESS INSTRUCTED.

4. ON SEPARATE SUBJECT. NED TOLD PAYMASTER TUHIS AFTERNOON THAT C.P. TELEPHONED DREW TO SAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD DANNY'S ACTIVITIES WERE BEING STUDIED. HE WOULD NOT USE THIS INFORMATION UNLESS OTHERS DID SO. NED IS INVESTIGATING SOURCE.

COSCROSEC SENT AT GPS 180A

TELEGRAM TO OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

FOR LINTOTT FROM LE CHEMINANT, 10 DOWNING STREET

Important that my immediately following telegram prefixed DEDIP and addressed personally for Halls should reach Prime Minister immediately on arrival. Grateful if you could arrange this.

June 1, 1967

ZZ - OTTAWA 65001
CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH FORECOMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO. 1650

TO OTTAWA
1 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
FOR LINTOTT FROM LE CHEMINANT, 10 DOWNING STREET

IMPORTANT THAT MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM PREFIXED D E D I P AND ADDRESSED PERSONALLY FOR HALLS SHOULD REACH PRIME MIMISTER IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ARRANGE THIS.

CROSEC

SENT AT

GPS 40A

Secret SECRETARY OF STATE

MEMORANDUM

From PRIVATE SECRETARY

To Mr Le Chevrier

WAP 13627—134 033364/146985 100 pads 12/66 Grp. 719

I attach the originals of your 2 telegrams which have been despatched to Ottawa as Nos. 1650 and 1651. No copies have been retained here.

Oliver Rawlinson
1/6

ZZ = OTTAWA 65101

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 1651

TO OTTAWA

1 JUNE 1967

Hcr has copy to show P.M.
1 other copy being sent to Mr Halls at Rideau Gate - no other circulation

//EDIP

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR HALLS, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY, FROM LE CHEMINANT.

PAYMASTER WANTS FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN TO PRIME MINISTER AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

2. MARCUS SIEFF TELEPHONED PAYMASTER THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT BARON EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD, WHOM HE THINKS IS CLOSE TO POMPIDOU, HAD BEEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIM TO SUGGEST THAT AN URGENT PERSONAL MESSAGE SHOULD GO FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL DE GAULLE BEFORE TOMORROW MORNING'S MEETING OF THE CONSEIL DES MINISTRES. THE MESSAGE SHOULD HE THOUGHT SAY THAT BECAUSE FRANCE WAS NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD A POSTIVE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT THAT THERE WILL NOT BE A MIDDLE EASTERN MUNICH COULD HAVE A GREAT STABILISING EFFECT ON THE SITUATION. HE THOUGHT THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, DELIVERED IN TIME, COULD INFLUENCE THE GENERAL TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT.

3. THE PAYMASTER UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS TO PRIME MINISTER BUT IS RELUCTANT TO GIVE ELSEWHERE OR TAKE FURTHER STEPS UNLESS INSTRUCTED.

4. ON SEPARATE SUBJECT, NED TOLD PAYMASTER THIS AFTERNOON THAT C.P. TELEPHONED DREW TO SAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD DANNY'S ACTIVITIES WERE BEING STUDIED. HE WOULD NOT USE THIS INFORMATION UNLESS OTHERS DID SO. NED IS INVESTIGATING SOURCE.

Extract to Security (D Watts) Mr

CROSEC SENT AT 1701Z/01 AV GPS 180

RECD 1.08 PM 1 JUNE MH

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 2459 2 JUNE, 1967 (UP)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO UKMISS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 2459 OF 2 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO OTTAWA TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS
MOSCOW COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.
YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 1184 AND 1187.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR FULL REPORTS OF THE COMPLICATED POSITION IN NEW YORK. I SHOULD FIRST LIKE TO REAFFIRM, AS I EMPHASIZED IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2377 (NOT TO ALL) THAT H.M.G'S POLICY IS TO MAKE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO OUR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. APART FROM ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE CAN ONLY REACH A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS WHOLE PROBLEM UNDER U.N. AUSPICES. WE SHALL SAY THIS QUITE FIRMLY TO THE ISRAELIS AS AND WHEN THE OCCASION ARISES.
2. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I THINK THAT YOUR IMMEDIATE TACTICS IN NEW YORK SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:-
(A) IN ORDER TO CONTINUE TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL FULLY SEIZED OF THE SITUATION WE MUST STILL WORK FOR A HOLDING RESOLUTION.
WE DO NOT WANT TO BE MANOEUVRED INTO A POSITION OF HAVING TO USE THE VETO AGAINST THE TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY UAR RESOLUTION AND WE CONSIDER THE INDIAN RESOLUTION MUCH TOO FEEBLE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE THINK YOU SHOULD :-
(I) STILL WORK HARD FOR THE MAIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION (YOUR TELNO 1158). WE HAVE NOT YET HEARD THE RESULTS OF OUR LOBBYING IN CAPITALS AND I SUPPOSE WE COULD STILL GET NINE VOTES IF NATIONALIST CHINA AND NIGERIA COOPERATED.

(II) IF THIS FAILS, WE SHOULD SUGGEST TO THE AMERICANS THAT THEY SHOULD TABLE THEIR ''FALL BACK DRAFT''. WHILE THIS DOES NOT REFER SPECIFICALLY TO FOREGOING ''BELLIGERANCE'' IT DOES SO BY IMPLICATION SINCE IT QUOTES PARA. 14 OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. BOTH YOU AND GOLDBERG COULD THEN MAKE YOUR

/ RESPECTIVE

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RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR ABOUT ''BELLIGERENCE'' (SEE MY TELNO 2423 PARA 3)

(B) WE STILL CONSIDER THAT YOUR LONGER DRAFT RESOLUTION IS OF GREAT VALUE PRESENTATIONALLY. WE HAVE OF COURSE NO INTENTION WHATEVER OF DROPPING IT AS SUGGESTED BY THE ISRAELIS. THE QUESTION OF WHEN IT SHOULD BE TABLED MUST, HOWEVER, BE CLOSELY RELATED TO THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING OVER THE DECLARATION. WE DO NOT WANT TO TABLE IT IMMEDIATELY LEST IT DISCOURAGES WAVERERS FROM ADHERING TO THE DECLARATION ON THE GROUND THAT AS THERE WOULD THEN BE A SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION (INSTEAD OF A HOLDING RESOLUTION) BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NO FURTHER ACTION FROM THEM WAS REQUIRED. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT WANT TO DELAY TABLING THE RESOLUTION TOO LONG. AFTER FULL CONSIDERATION WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR TACTICS SHOULD BE:-

(I) TO FLOAT THE RESOLUTION NOW AMONG FRIENDLY COUNTRIES MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ITS USEFULNESS IS LIKELY TO DEPEND UPON THE DEGREE OF DETERMINATION THE MARITIME COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO SHOW IN SUPPORT OF THE DECLARATION ON FREE PASSAGE.

(II) THE TIME WHEN WE SHOULD ACTUALLY TABLE THE RESOLUTION WOULD DEPEND ON (A) THE VIEWS OF THE AMERICANS AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES: (B) THE RESULT OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON A HOLDING RESOLUTION AND (C) THE RESULTS OF OUR CANVASSING FOR SUPPORT FOR OUR DECLARATION. WE SHALL KNOW MORE ABOUT THIS WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS.

SOSFA SENT 1330Z/2 JUNE

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IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1193 2 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1193 OF 2 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1170 : MIDDLE EAST.

WE HAVE HAD FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES MISSION HERE ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON SUBSTANCE SET OUT IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM SETS OUT VARIOUS AMENDMENTS, MAINLY OF A TIDYING-UP NATURE, WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED AD REFERENDUM WITH THE UNITED STATES MISSION.

2. THE PRINCIPAL CHANGE OF SUBSTANCE RELATES TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(A). THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED THAT THE PHRASE ''ON THE BASIS OF THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR'' COULD BE INTERPRETED AS LIMITATIVE, SINCE THE U.A.R. MIGHT CLAIM, EVEN IF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WERE ADOPTED, TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON THE BASIS THAT THE PASSAGE WAS NOT ''INNOCENT''. WE ALSO CONSIDERED, ON REFLECTION, THAT IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO REFER TO THE STRAITS OF TIRAN RATHER THAN THE GULF OF AQABA IN THIS CONTEXT.

3. THE AMERICANS PRESSED US TO RESUBSTITUTE ''DISENGAGE'' IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(B) ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS POSSIBLY MORE REALISTIC TO CALL FOR DISENGAGEMENT RATHER THAN WITHDRAWAL.

4. IN TRANSFERRING THE CONCLUDING PHRASE OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 TO THE END OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3, YOU WILL NOTE THAT

/WE

WE HAVE OMITTED THE WORD ''FULL''. THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED THAT THE INCLUSION OF THE WORD ''FULL'' MIGHT BE TAKEN TO IMPLY ISRAELI EVACUATION OF EL AUJA.

5. FOR THE REST, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ARE SIMPLY DRAFTING IMPROVEMENTS.

6. THE AMERICANS STRESS THAT THEY HAVE SO FAR HAD NO GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON ON OUR PROPOSED DRAFT AND THEY MUST THEREFORE RESERVE THEIR POSITION ACCORDINGLY.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0059Z 3/6/67
RECD AT 0105Z 3/6/67

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1194 2 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1194 OF 2 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.
FOLLOWING ARE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AGREED AD REFERENDUM WITH THE UNITED STATES MISSION:
(1) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(A), DELETE EVERYTHING AFTER ''THREAT OF SUCH ACTION'' AND SUBSTITUTE ''OR FROM THE EXERCISE OF RIGHTS CLAIMED OVER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE RIGHTS CLAIMED BY ANY OTHER STATE:''.
(2) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(B), FOR ''WITHDRAWAL'' (YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2424) RESUBSTITUTE ''DISENGAGE''.
(3) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3, AFTER THE WORD ''ACHIEVED'' ADD ''AND CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ENSURE THEIR APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE''.
(4) CONSEQUENTIALLY TO AMENDMENT (3) ABOVE, DELETE THE LAST THREE LINES OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6.
(5) IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6, INSERT THE WORD ''AS'' AFTER THE REFERENCE TO ''RESOLUTION 54 (1948)''.
(6) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 9 HAS BEEN REVISED TO READ:
''REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND ALL CONCERNED, DURING THE BREATHING SPELL OBTAINED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS TO THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS INCLUDING THE UTILISATION OF THE PEACEFUL MEANS OF SETTLEMENT LISTED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CHARTER''.

LORD CARADON

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CYPHER/CAT'A'
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1195 2 JUNE, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1195 OF 2 JUNE, RFI TO WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

ACTION. FIRST THING SATURDAY MORNING.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2459: MIDDLE EAST.

SEYDOUX (FRANCE) TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT HE WILL SPEAK LAST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW (SATURDAY) MORNING. HE WILL BASE HIS SPEECH ON PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY AND MAKE AN APPEAL TO THE PARTIES FOR RESTRAINT AND TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO HELP TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HE WOULD THEN MOVE THE ADJOURNMENT IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE HIS CONSULTATIONS. THIS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE AGREED AND THE COUNCIL WOULD THEN RESUME EARLY NEXT WEEK WITHOUT COMING TO ANY VOTE TOMORROW.

2. MEANWHILE THE NON PERMANENT MEMBERS UNDER TABOR'S CHAIRMANSHIP HAVE CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON A HOLDING RESOLUTION. THE LATIN AMERICANS PUT FORWARD A DRAFT (THE TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) AND THIS EVENING TABOR PUT TO US AMENDMENTS TO IMPROVE IT (SEE MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) WHICH HE INTENDS TO TRY ON THE NON PERMANENT MEMBERS WHEN THEY MEET AGAIN TOMORROW AFTERNOON. TABOR WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR COMMENTS ON THESE TWO DRAFTS. OUR VIEW HERE IS THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN

DRAFT COULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. TABOR'S DRAFT WE THINK MIGHT BE ACCEPTED, THOUGH HE HAS NO REAL HOPE THAT IT WILL BE ACCEPTED BY MOST OF THE NON PERMANENT MEMBERS.

3. NINE VOTES ARE STILL LACKING FOR ANY KNOWN TEXT AND WE HAVE OF COURSE WASTED MUCH TOO LONG IN TRYING TO FIND A HOLDING RESOLUTION: SO WHEN WE MEET AGAIN NEXT WEEK I THINK THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. IN SPITE OF THE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS BY THE ISRAELIS I STILL THINK THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD OUR COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION THOUGH A DECISION ON THIS CAN BE DELAYED FOR A DAY OR TWO.

4. THE ONLY IMMEDIATE HOPE OF MAKING SOME USEFUL PROGRESS SEEMS TO ME TO BE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (OR EVEN CONCEIVABLY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIMSELF) TO GO TO CAIRO AND TEL AVIV TO CONTINUE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND IF YOU AGREE I WILL SUGGEST TO THE PRIME MINISTER TOMORROW THAT HE SOUNDS U THANT ON THIS SUGGESTION.

5. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY ON PARAGRAPH 4 BY 1Ø A.M. NEW YORK TIME.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS TO TEL AVIV NO. 111, PARIS NO. 1Ø6, MOSCOW NO .1Ø1, COPENHAGEN NO. 38 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 22, DAMASCUS NO. 28 AND CAIRO NO.35.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø2Ø5Z 3/6/67
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[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS],

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 5795 2 JUNE, 1967 (ERD)

SECRET.
WE HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TREASURY TO THE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A DETERIORATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND OUR PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ARE SUMMARISED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WHICH SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY ON ARRIVAL. THE READINESS OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO ENTER INTO CONTINGENCY DISCUSSIONS ON OIL IS WELCOMED AND INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS WILL FOLLOW.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSIDER WHAT HE MIGHT SAY TO THE PRESIDENT ON THESE ASPECTS ALL OF WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER EXAMINATION. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE ENOUGH FOR THE PRESENT TO REFER IN RATHER GENERAL TERMS TO THE OBVIOUS OIL SUPPLY DIFFICUT-IES WHICH MAY BE EXPERIENCED IF THE ARABS ADOPT A HOSTILE ATTITUDE TO ANY MEASURES TAKEN IN WHICH WE PARTICIPATED AND TO THE CONSEQUENT RISKS TO STERLING WHICH COULD BE SERIOUS.
I WOULD NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD ENGAGE IN ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION ABOUT THE DANGERS TO STERLING THE DOLLAR AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AS A WHOLE.
THE PRIME MINISTER MAY HOWEVER WISH TO STRESS THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONCERT BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS.

SOSFA SENT 1410Z 2 JUNE

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SECRET

In the event of
further questions
you have, that accords
with our understanding.

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 5796 2 JUNE, 1967 (ERD)

SECRET.
MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.
INDICATIONS FROM ARAB CAPITALS SUGGEST THAT REACTIONS WOULD BE VERY HOSTILE TO ANY MOVE TO ASSERT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE TIRAN STRAIT BY PHYSICAL ACTION. IF THEREFORE THINGS WERE TO COME TO THIS, U.K. PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE CERTAIN HAZARDS FOR OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS WHICH NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN ADVANCE SO THAT WE CAN BE READY TO TAKE IF NECESSARY THE APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE MEASURES. THE MAIN POINTS OF SENSITIVITY ARE OIL SUPPLIES AND STERLING.
2. OIL. OVER 60% OF THE U.K.'S IMPORTS COME FROM ARAB COUNTRIES. THE REMAINDER IS DERIVED FROM VENEZUELA, NIGERIA AND OTHER MINOR SOURCES. THE MAJOR U.K. SUPPLIERS IN THE ARAB WORLD ARE IRAQ, KUWAIT, LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA. IF THE ARAB OIL COUNTRIES WERE TO PROHIBIT THE OIL COMPANIES IN THEIR TERRITORIES FROM SUPPLYING ARAB OIL TO THE U.K. (AND THE U.S.), SUPPLIES COULD BE READJUSTED BY USING NON-ARAB SOURCES IN SUCH A WAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SHORTAGE OF OIL IN THE U.K. BUT AT SOME RELATIVELY SMALL COST TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IF, HOWEVER, SUCH FRUSTRATION OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WERE TO PROVOKE THE LATTER, THEY MIGHT TAKE EXTREME ACTION, SUCH AS EXPROPRIATION OR SEQUESTRATION OF THE COMPANIES ASSETS OR THE SUSPENSION OF ALL EXPORTS, THEREBY CREATING A GENERAL OIL SUPPLY CRISIS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN.
3. THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF TWO OF THE MAIN ARAB SOURCES WOULD NOT CAUSE INSURMOUNTABLE SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES SINCE THE SHORTFALL COULD BE MADE UP, THOUGH AT SOME EXTRA BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COST, FROM ELSEWHERE. IF, HOWEVER, ALL OR MOST OF THE ARAB STATES WERE TO DENY EXPORTS GENERALLY, THE IMPOSITION OF RATIONING IN THIS COUNTRY, THE REST OF THE WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN WOULD BE AN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCE, AND THE EFFECT ON OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WOULD BE SEVERE.
4. A CONFERENCE OF ARAB OIL MINISTERS HAS BEEN SUMMONED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO MEET IN BAGHDAD ON 4 JUNE TO CONSIDER IRAQI PROPOSALS FOR A BAN ON THE EXPORT OF ARAB OIL TO STATES HELPING
/ ISRAEL

SECRET

ISRAEL WHICH WOULD ACTIVATE THE PROPOSED BAN IS NOT PRECISELY DEFINED: BUT IT INCLUDES NOT MERELY QUOTE AGGRESSION UNQUOTE AGAINST ARAB STATES BUT ALSO ACTION TO OPEN THE GULF OF AQABA. IF PRODUCING COMPANIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST DO NOT SIGNIFY THEIR READINESS TO COMPLY WITH THE BAN, IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENTS SHOULD TERMINATE THE CONCESSIONS UNDER WHICH THOSE COMPANIES OPERATE. NON-ARAB OIL PRODUCERS (IRAN, VENEZUELA AND INDONESIA AMONG OTHERS) ARE TO BE ENCOURAGED TO TAKE PARALLEL ACTION.

5. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ACT ON THE IRAQI PROPOSALS, OUR COMPANIES MAY FACE THE CHOICE OF COMPLIANCE, THUS STOPPING SHIPMENTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, OR REFUSAL WITH THE RISK OF LOSING THEIR ASSETS. ONE COMPANY, THE I.P.C. IN IRAQ ITSELF, HAS ALREADY BEEN INVITED TO STATE ITS POSITION. IT WILL NO DOUBT TEMPORISE, AS WILL OTHER COMPANIES IF APPROACHED. THE UNDERLYING DILEMMA NEVERTHELESS REMAINS. THE MATERIAL INTEREST OF THE OIL PRODUCING ARAB COUNTRIES MUST, ON ANY RATIONAL ASSESSMENT, WEIGH HEAVILY WITH THEM AGAINST THE IMPOSITION OF THE PROPOSED BAN, AND AGAINST ITS LITERAL ENFORCEMENT IF IMPOSED.

ON THE OTHER HAND RATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS MAY NOT PREVAIL IN THE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CRISIS.

STERLING

6. IF AS A RESULT OF MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS OIL SUPPLIES TO THE U.K. SEEM TO BE AT RISK WITH EFFECTS SIMILAR TO THOSE AT THE TIME OF SUEZ, THE REVIVING CONFIDENCE IN STERLING COULD BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED. WE THINK HOWEVER THAT THE EXISTING BASLE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SWAP ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE U.S. AUTHORITIES WOULD BE ADEQUATE IN THE SHORT TERM TO DEAL WITH THE PRESSURES THAT MIGHT DEVELOP ALTHOUGH OF COURSE AT THE COST OF PILING UP SHORT-TERM DEBT. IF THE DRAIN WAS PROLONGED AND SEVERE, HOWEVER, DIFFICULTIES MIGHT ARISE BEFORE LONG WITH SOME OF THE EUROPEANS.

7. WE HAVE ALSO TO RECKON WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT ARAB HOLDERS OF STERLING WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO DIVERSIFY. IT WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO BUT THE SITUATION ENVISAGED IS NOT ONE IN WHICH ACTION WOULD BE GOVERNED BY LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

/ 7. HOWEVER

8. HOWEVER THERE ARE LIMITATIONS ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOLDERS COULD CONVERT INTO CONTINENTAL CURRENCIES AND THEY WOULD BE LIKELY FOR THE MOST PART TO CONVERT STERLING INTO DOLLARS AND THEN QUICKLY INTO GOLD. THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE ON THE GOLD PRICE AND STRAIN ON THE EXISTING GOLD POOL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD BREAK DOWN.

9. WHILE EXISTING EMERGENCY POWERS MIGHT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ENVISAGED INTITLE US TO FREEZE HOLDINGS THIS WOULD BE A MOST UNDESIRABLE STEP TO TAKE. SOME NON-ARAB HOLDERS WOULD TAKE FRIGHT AT SUCH A MEASURE AND GET OUT OF STERLING OVER A PERIOD WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE LONG TERM POSITION OF STERLING.

10. WE RECOGNISE THAT IF THE U.S. AND U.K. WERE HAVING OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD TO HOLD OPEN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WITHOUT ANY SETTLEMENT BEING REACHED AND IN CONDITIONS OF CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION COULD ARISE FOR WHICH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT BE ADEQUATE.

SOSFA SENT 1428Z 2 JUNE

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S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 5806 2 JUNE, 1967 (DUSS (F.O.))

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 5806 OF 2 JUNE, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, THE HAGUE AND ROME.

WASHINGTON ALSO PASS FOR PRIME MINISTER.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 1840, 1850 AND 1861:

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE OUR PROVISIONAL REACTIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO THOSE IDEAS WHICH HAVE COME UP IN YOUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH ROSTOW AND HAVE NOT BEEN COVERED IN OTHER TELEGRAMS. OUR VIEWS ON MILITARY PLANNING FOLLOW IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

1. PROBE.

2. THE POSSIBILITY OF ORGANISING A DELIBERATE PROBE CLEARLY FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF OUR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. MEANWHILE WE MAY BE FACED WITH THE NEED TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO IF A BRITISH OR AMERICAN SHIP BOUND FOR EILAT ASKS FOR ADVICE OR IS IMPEDED ON ITS PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS. AT PRESENT WE KNOW OF NO BRITISH SHIP BOUND FOR EILAT. BUT IF ONE DID TURN UP UNEXPECTEDLY, MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES BUT OUR PRESENT INCLINATION WOULD BE TO ADVISE IT TO SUBMIT UNDER PROTEST TO ANY CONTROLS AND SEARCHES WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE EGYPTIANS. FROM PARA. 4 OF YOUR TEL. NO. 1840 WE TAKE IT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE UNLIKELY, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, TO TRY A PROBE ON THEIR OWN. IS THIS THE AMERICAN VIEW?

...11. LLOYDS...

S E C R E T

II. LLOYDS.

3. WE HAVE ANSWERED THIS POINT SEPARATELY.

III. NATO.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF NATO TELEGRAMS NOS. 222 AND 225 WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE NATO COUNCIL WOULD BE THE RIGHT PLACE TO CANVAS SUPPORT FOR THE DECLARATION AND STILL LESS FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. WE AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT NATO SHOULD BE KEPT INFORMED OF OUR BI-LATERAL APPROACHES TO MARITIME GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE DECLARATION.

IV. APPROACHES TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS (YOUR TEL. NO. 1850, PARA 3).

5. WE ARE CONSIDERING A MORE GENERAL APPROACH TO ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND HOPE TO CONSULT THE AMERICANS SOON. WE MUST NOT ACT PREMATURELY AND TIMING WILL NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

V. ALLOCATION OF COUNTRIES TO BE CANVASSED.

6. WE AGREE THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN BONN: AND WE WILL ADD HELSINKI TO OUR OWN LIST. WE NOTE THAT THE AMERICANS DO NOT WISH TO PHASE THEIR APPROACHES. BUT AS YOU KNOW, MINISTERS HAVE DIRECTED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT SOME OTHER GOVERN-MENTS, BESIDES OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS, TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF THE DECLARATION IN OTHER CAPITALS.

SOSFA SENT 1340Z 2 JUNE, 1967

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 1884 2 JUNE, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 247 OF 2 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 213 TO OTTAWA: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.
FOLLOWING FOR LORD CARADON FROM PRIIME MINISTER.
IN VIEW OF YOUR TALK WITH U THANT, I THINK I SHOULD
NOW BRIEFLY VISIT UNITED NATIONS TOMORROW AND MEET HIM.
2. I WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESULT FROM SUCH
A MEETING. I TAKE IT THAT HIS MAIN PURPOSE IS LIKELY TO
BE TO EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY HIS OWN RECENT BEHAVIOUR, AS WELL
AS GIVING SOME RATHER FULLER IMPRESSIONS OF HIS VISIT TO CAIRO.
SINCE I MYSELF HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY SOMEWHAT CRITICAL OF HIM,
I FEEL THAT I OWE HIM THE COURTESY OF SUCH A MEETING TO
GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY OF EXPLAINING WHAT HE HAS BEEN DOING.
BUT I THINK THERE ARE OTHER AND PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT
REASONS WHY, IN THE SOMEWHAT CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE I
FIRST CONSIDERED GOING TO NEW YORK, SUCH A VISIT COULD NOW
BE USEFUL. FIRST, SINCE OUR PUBLIC POSTURE IS TO SEEK TO
WORK AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL (AND
SINCE WE MAY NEVERTHELESS FIND OURSELVES OBLIGED BEFORE LONG
TO CONTEMPLATE ACTION OUTSIDE IT) I THINK THAT I SHOULD
EXPOSE H.M.G. TO CRITICISM IF, AT THE VERY TIME WHEN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL WAS MEETING TO CONSIDER THE CRISIS, I FLEW
STRAIGHT OVERNEW YORK FROM A BI-LATERAL ANGLO-AMERICAN MEETING
WITHOUT SEEKING TO MEET THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND GETTING A
BRIEF FIRST-HAND IMPRESSION OF DEVELOPMENTS AT THE U.N.
INDEED, SINCE U THANT HAS MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF MY COMING,
HE HIMSELF MIGHT TAKE IT AS A REBUFF AND POSSIBLY EVEN EXPLOIT
IT PUBLICLY. SECONDLY, I BELIEVE THAT A VISIT OF THIS KIND WOULD
BE WELCOME TO BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION AND TO THE GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPORTERS GENERALLY.
3. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE VIEWS ON THE
FORM OUR MEETING SHOULD TAKE. YOU KINDLY SUGGESTED THAT
YOU MIGHT ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO LUNCH WITH ME TOMORROW.

/ ALTERNATIVELY

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 1884 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

ALTERNATIVELY, I SUPPOSE THAT, WHEN HE LEARNS THAT I AM COMING, HE MAY WISH HIMSELF TO OFFER ME LUNCH, AS HE HAS DONE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS: AND THIS MIGHT BE A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY FOR ME TO MEET ALSO SOME OF THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE CRISIS, IF HE INVITED THEM AND THEY WERE ABLE TO COME AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE. IN ANY CASE, HE WOULD NO DOUBT WANT TO HAVE A PRIVATE TALK WITH ME BEFORE OR AFTER LUNCH FOR THE REASON GIVEN AT THE BEGINNING OF PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. OR, IF LUNCH, WHETHER GIVEN BY HIM OR BY YOU, IS NOT CONVENIENT I COULD EASILY PLAN TO SPEND A COUPLE OF HOURS AT U.N. HEADQUARTERS IN THE EARLY AFTER-NOON. CLEARLY THE PURPOSE OF MY VISIT, IN ADDITION TO SEEING THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS TO MAKE A GENERAL GESTURE OF COURTESY TO THE ORGANISATION, NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO GET INTO NEGOTIATION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM.

4. PERHAPS YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BY TELEPHONE TO WASHINGTON WHAT WILL BE MOST CONVENIENT ARRANGEMENT.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 1641/Ø2 JUNE
RECD 1641/Ø2 JUNE

PRISEC (F.O.)

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IMMEDIATE CANBERRA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 890 2 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER.

ADDSD TO C.O. TELNO 890 OF 2 JUNE REPTD FOR INFMN TO WASHINGTON AND WELLINGTON.

MY TELNO 886: MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE HAD MESSAGE FROM P.M'S DEPARTMENT THAT MCEWEN, ACTING PRIME MINISTER, HAS SHOWN PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE RESPONSE TO OUR APPROACH OF THE THREE LEADING POWERS, NETHERLANDS, ITALY AND CANADA (YOUR TELNO 1185, PARAS 2 AND 3). I AM SURE THAT EARLY NEWS OF FAVOURABLE RESPONSES FROM THEM WOULD BE HELPFUL TO AUSTRALIAN MINISTERS.

MR. MORGAN

CROSEC GROUPS 75A SENT AT 1106Z/2 DGP

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT AT 1107Z/2 PLS

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO 900 2 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 900 OF 2 JUNE.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, RABAT, ALGIERS, ADDIS ABABA, TUNIS, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KHARTOUM, AND SAVING TO TEHRAN, ANKARA, JERUSALEM.
YOUR TELEGRAMS NO.S 509 AND 510: GULF OF AQABA.
I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTY OF EXPLAINING H.M.G.'S POINT OF VIEW IN THE PRESENT STATE OF ARAB FEELING, BUT I HOPE THAT MY CAREFULLY WORDED STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT WILL HELP YOU TO COUNTER THE BELIEF THAT H.M.G.'S STAND IS ONE OF SUPPORTING ISRAEL.
2. AS REGARDS THE POINTS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 2:-
(I) THE ARAB ARGUMENT THAT ELATH WAS OCCUPIED BY THE ISRAELIS AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE EGYPTIAN / ISRAEL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS IRRELAVANT SINCE IT WAS NEVER PART OF EGYPT OR IN THE POSSESSION OF EGYPTIAN FORCES. THE ARABS HAVE A POINT IN THAT THE ISRAELIS EXPELLED TRANSJORDANIAN FORCES AND OCCUPIED ELATH IN BREACH OF THE TRUCE THEN EXISTING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND TRANSJORDAN IN MARCH 1949. BUT UNDER THE 1947 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTITION PROPOSAL ELATH AND THE NEGEV WENT TO THE JEWISH STATE, AND THE ISRAEL/JORDAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF APRIL 1949 CONFIRMED ISRAEL IN POSSESSION OF IT. THE AGREEMENT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARMISTICE LINES SHALL NOT PREJUDICE A FINAL SETTLEMENT: PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENT AND THE MAPS ANNEXED TO IT GIVE ISRAEL A SOUND LEGAL BASIS FOR POSSESSION OF THE PORT. UNLIKE E.G.JERUSALEM, ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO POSSESSION OF ELATH HAS NOT BEEN DISPUTED BY ANYONE BUT THE ARAB STATES SINCE THEN.
(II) AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM OUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO.115, THERE IS AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT STAKE IN THE QUESTION OF THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.
MOREOVER, WHATEVER THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF QUOTE THE SUEZ AGGRESSION UNQUOTE, IT WAS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM SINAI THAT ISRAEL SHOULD ENJOY FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS, AND MANY GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING OUR OWN, CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BY

 / AFFIRMING

AFFIRMING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE. THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION RESULTS FROM THE UNILATERAL ACTION OF THE UAR GOVERNMENT IN UPSETTING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE STOOD FOR 10 YEARS AND ASSURED PEACE IN THE GULF AREA.

(111) I WAS CAREFUL TO SAY IN MY STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT THAT H.M.G. CONDEMN ATTACKS ACROSS THE FRONTIER IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE ATTACK ON SAMMU.

3. OVER AND ABOVE ALL THIS, HOWEVER, THE ACTIONS OF THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT, WHATEVER THEIR MOTIVATION (SEE GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO.116) HAVE BROUGHT THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE BRINK OF A WAR WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR JORDAN AND THE LIMITS OF WHICH COULD NOT BE FORESEEN. IN SUCH A SITUATION IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK MEANS OF PREVENTING A CATASTROPHE. WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PURSUING A CYNICAL POLICY IN EXPLOITING THE SITUATION TO WIN ARAB SUPPORT FOR THEMSELVES AND THAT THEY ARE HAVING CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN IDENTIFYING WESTERN EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE PEACE WITH SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. WITH THE THREAT OF WAR THAT EXISTS WE CANNOT BE SIMILARLY IRRESPONSIBLE. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OURSELVES AND OTHERS ARE USING OUR INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS BUT THE DANGER IS VERY SERIOUS AND THE MEASURES WE ARE TAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO FIND SOME WAY OF AVERTING A CATASTROPHE ARE NO MORE PRO-ISRAEL THAN THEY ARE PRO-ARAB AND PRO-HUMANITY. OBVIOUSLY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO SAY WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESTRAINED: BUT THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO RESTRAIN THEM MUST DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF PRESENT DIFFICULTIES OVER THE GULF OF AQABA.

SOSRA SENT 2015Z 2 JUNE, 1967

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EASTERN DEPT

Copy for Prime Minister Wilson.

26A

TOP SECRET

Ismel, Pt 3.

file ont 13/6

CANADIAN EMBASSY AMBASSADE DU CANADA

Washington, D.C.,
June 2, 1967.

Dear Mr. President,

Prime Minister Pearson has asked me to transmit to you as quickly as possible the enclosed memorandum concerning a point relating to the Middle East situation which came up in your conversation with him this morning. He has also asked me to convey the following observations:

"In putting forward for consideration these views on the best tactics to be followed by Israel, it should be emphasized that I am concerned only with the avoidance of a situation from which Israel would suffer so greatly; that is, a situation of war in which, even if victorious, Israel would suffer horrible results.

"I would also emphasize that these suggestions are not Canadian policy, but are ideas that we think should be considered. It is only for this purpose that they are put forward; all the more tentatively because the course suggested may involve an exhibition of patience and restraint by Israel and its public opinion which is more than they could possibly be expected to show.

Nevertheless, I repeat, it is a point of view that should be examined in the interest of Israel itself."

Mr. Pearson would be grateful if you could pass the extra copy of this letter and the enclosure to Prime Minister Wilson if he is still with you.

Yours sincerely,

A. E. Ritchie,
Ambassador

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

In a conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson this morning, reference was made by the Prime Minister to the thesis that the absence of open hostilities might work in Israel's favour in its current confrontation with the U.A.R. This thesis, which impressed the Prime Minister even though he realized its difficulties, was supported by some reports he had seen. The Prime Minister felt that careful consideration should be given to these reports in finding the right course to be followed by Israel and the Western Powers, in the interests of a just and peaceful settlement and with a view to avoiding a war which would inevitably be different from that of 1956.

These reports point out that in the last ten days Nasser, while taking great risks, has achieved a good deal, perhaps even more than he expected, in rallying the Arab States around him in support of his stand against Israel. However, in the long run and if hostilities could be avoided in the immediate future, Nasser's gains may not be as significant as they appear; indeed there are some signs that he may have miscalculated.

There is some reason for believing that Nasser's underlying strategy has been to provoke the Israelis into a quick military reaction which could be clearly shown to be "aggression" and which could be successfully met by an Arab counterattack that would place the U.A.R. and their supporters in a favourable position in the United Nations.

That the Israelis had not reacted as expected may well have made the Egyptians uneasy and may have caught them by surprise.It in fact, Nasser was anticipating a quick Israeli reaction followed by a concerted and successful Arab rebuff, then a lack of any such reaction could pose serious problems for the U.A.R.

It is suggested in the reports mentioned above that the best course for the Israelis and for the prospect of a reasonable settlement now would be for the Israelis to sit tight, and refuse to be provoked into any action which could be clearly shown to be "aggression"; provided -and this proviso is of course a large one -- that they were able,economically and psychologically,to stand the strain of a waiting period, it might be to their advantage to continue to exercise restraint.

...2

The adverse effect upon the Arabs of such tactics could be telling. Over a period of time this would have a serious effect upon the already shaky Egyptian economy. Equally important, it could dampen the present enthusiasm of the Arab public for a Holy War and the fervour of the armed forces for glory and victory. When the latter had nothing more glorious to conquer than sand, summer heat and flies, their morale would probably sag badly. By the same token, with the passage of time, the unity of the various Arab countries quickly would become more apparent than real and they would start quarrelling and scheming against one another once again.

Since Nasser's strategy now seems to be to place the Israelis in the position of appearing to be aggressors and is based upon his assessment of probable Israeli reactions to provocation, the best course for Israel might be to turn the tables on him. Nasser would thus find himself in the position of having to use military force to achieve his aims in a clearly aggressive manner and which would make it difficult for the Soviet Union and other non-Arab friendly countries to support him in any form. Presumably aggression by the U.A.R. against Israel -- if the aggression were obvious -- would bring an immediate request for Security Council action which, in the circumstances, the Soviet Union would find it awkward to veto. It would also bring Nasser into immediate confrontation with the West but in a way which would not be likely to win unqualified support from world opinion.

While a trial by strength over the Strait of Aqaba might succeed for a short time, it can hardly be considered a permanent solution and, given Nasser's present strong position, it could fail, and on an issue which to some nations is not as clear cut as it is to us. It may be therefore that Israel and its friends might -- in the interest of Israel itself -- not take steps that would challenge the U.A.R.'s stand on the Gulf of Aqaba with force at this particular moment but to look into other practical possibilities which would be acceptable.

There are certain elements in this situation of which something might be made. The most important of these is that neither the U.A.R. nor the other Arab states have denounced the original armistice agreements; suggestions for an expanded role for the UNTSO have not been rejected out of hand. Secondly, Nasser has apparently not explicitly banned all Israel-bound ships from the Gulf of Aqaba and has not yet defined strategic materials that may be prohibited. He has apparently implied some readiness to have the case studied by the International Court. Finally, he is in financial difficulties.

In any case the passage of time would seem to present Israel and the West with a considerable better range of options in seeking an acceptable solution than they now enjoy.

CYPHER/CAT A

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS.

TEL.NO. 78 2 JUNE 1967 (V. NEAD)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO ABIDJAN TELEGRAM NO 78 OF 1 JUNE . AND TO CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS. REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV.
GULF OF AQABA

MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED THAT H.M. REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO JOIN IN CANVASSING THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR A DECLARATION TO ASSERT THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE FOR SHIPPING INTO AND THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA. THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED DECLARATION IS CONTAINED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL).

2. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS INITIATIVE WITH THE U.S., NETHERLANDS, CANADIAN, ITALIAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS. YOU SHOULD CONCERT WITH YOUR U.S. AND THOSE OF YOUR OTHER COLLEAGUES REPRESENTING THESE COUNTRIES WHO ARE AUTHORISED TO CO-OPERATE WITH YOU, AN APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED TO ASK FOR THEIR EARLY ADHERENCE TO THIS DECLARATION.

3. IN MAKING THIS APPROACH YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE:

(I) THE CURRENT CRISIS IS ALREADY THE WORST SINCE 1956. THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE DECLARATION IS TO HELP REMOVE THE DANGERS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

(II) IN OUR VIEW, THE STRAITS OF TIRAN ARE AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY BOTH BY CUSTOMARY USAGE AND THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR OWN VIEWS AND BELIEVE THAT A DECLARATION SHOULD BE ISSUED BY AS MANY POWERS AS POSSIBLE BOTH ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE AQABA PROBLEM. THE DECLARATION COMMITS GOVERNMENTS SUBSCRIBING TO IT TO NO MORE THAN ADHERENCE TO THE TWO PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN IT.

(III) WE HOPE A SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE UNITED NATIONS. WE THINK THE ISSUE OF SUCH A DECLARATION WITH SUCH WIDE SUPPORT WILL GREATLY HELP U.N. EFFORTS. IF THE U.N. FAILS, WE DO NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION OUTSIDE THE U.N.

(IV) WE HOPE THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT WISH TO CHANGE THE SUGGESTED

.../TEXT...

TEXT OF THE DECLARATION IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEXITY OF GETTING ADHERENCE FROM SO MANY NATIONS.

4. YOUR U.S. COLLEAGUE WILL HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL GIVE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT. WE SHOULD GREATLY PREFER TO AVOID ASSOCIATION WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THIS MATTER AND YOU SHOULD TRY NOT TO GIVE ANY IMPRESSION THAT YOUR APPROACH HAS BEEN CONCERTED WITH THEM.

5. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE U.S. THAT H.M. REPRESENTATIVES AT OSLO, COPENHAGEN, STOCKHOLM, ACCRA, NAIROBI, HELSINKI, BRUSSELS, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON, SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN THE APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED. AT ATHENS, PANAMA, MONROVIA, TOKYO, LISBON, ANKARA, TEHRAN, BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, MANILA, REYKJAVIK, ADDIS ABABA, ABIDJAN, TANANARIVE, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BONN AND DUBLIN, YOUR U.S. COLLEAGUE SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN THE APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. ALL H.M. REPRESENTATIVES HAVE DISCRETION TO VARY THE EXACT MODALITIES OF THE APPROACH AS THEY THINK BEST."

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 0510Z/3 JUNE

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS.

TEL.NO. 79 2 JUNE 1967 (V)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO ABIDJAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 2 JUNE AND TO CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS.

GULF OF AQABA:

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT DECLARATION:-

THE GOVERNMENTS OF MARITIME NATIONS SUBSCRIBING TO THIS DECLARATION EXPRESS THEIR GRAVE CONCERN AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH ARE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR COUNTRIES, AS MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTED TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER, ARE CONVINCED THAT SCRUPULOUS RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IS INDISPENSIBLE.

IN REGARD TO SHIPPING THROUGH THE WATERWAYS THAT SERVE PORTS OF THE GULF OF AQABA, OUR GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRM THE VIEW THAT THE GULF IS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY INTO AND THROUGH WHICH THE VESSELS OF ALL NATIONS HAVE A RIGHT OF PASSAGE. OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL ASSERT THIS RIGHT ON BEHALF OF ALL SHIPPING SAILING UNDER THEIR FLAGS, AND OUR GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO JOIN WITH OTHERS IN SEEKING GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT.

THE VIEWS WE EXPRESS IN THIS DECLARATION FORMED THE BASIS ON

/WHICH

F.O. AND C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 79 TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS.

WHICH A SETTLEMENT OF THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT WAS ACHIEVED IN EARLY 1957 - A SETTLEMENT THAT HAS GOVERNED THE ACTIONS OF NATIONS FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS.

THESE VIEWS WILL GUIDE OUR POLICIES AND ACTION IN SEEKING TO ASSURE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NEAR EAST.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 1835Z/2 JUNE

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT.A.

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.DEL. NATO PARIS

TELNO. 1097 2 JUNE, 1967 (E.M. Rose)

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO UKDEL NATO TELEGRAM NO. 1097 OF 2 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 225 (OF 1 JUNE): MIDDLE EAST.

I ACCEPT YOUR VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT TRY TO USE NATO TO CANVASS SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSED MARITIME DECLARATION STILL LESS FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING. BUT I AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD, IN CONCERT WITH YOUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, INFORM THE COUNCIL THAT H.M. GOVERNMENT ARE APPROACHING MARITIME COUNTRIES AND URGING THEM TO SUBSCRIBE TO A DECLARATION TO ASSERT THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE FOR SHIPPING INTO AND THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE CONSIDER THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT UNILATERAL ACTION BY ISRAEL. FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS ARE RULED OUT, AT ANY RATE FOR THE TIME BEING: AND ALTHOUGH WE SHALL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS, WE DOUBT IF THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE PROBLEM. YOU SHOULD DRAW GENERALLY ON MY SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 31 MAY (VERBATIM 226).
2. YOU MAY INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL PRIVATELY, AND FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION, THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS ARE APPROACHING VARIOUS COUNTRIES ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT IF REQUIRED TO THE PROPOSED MARITIME DECLARATION. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT YOU WILL NOT BE DISCUSSING THIS IN THE COUNCIL WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES.
3. I WILL REPLY SEPARATELY TO PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REF. ON YOUR PARA 4 SEE MY TEL NO. 5715 TO WASHINGTON.

SOSFA SENT 1413Z 2 JUNE

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N.E.A.D.
EASTERN DEPT.
W.O.C.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 454 2 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 454 of 2 June
Repeated for information to UKMis New York, Washington and Paris and Saving to Moscow, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Amman, Damascus and Cairo.

UKMis New York telegram No. 1184: Middle East/Security Council.

Forecast in paragraph 4 has proved correct. I was telephoned this afternoon by Lourie speaking on Mr. Eban's instructions.

2. Israel Government take strongest possible objection to proposed comprehensive resolution on general grounds advanced by Rafael. They think that to widen the debate is to play straight into the hands of the Arabs and their Soviet backers.

3. In addition, Lourie said he understood there was an attempt in the resolution to create a link between the opening of the Straits and a return to the Armistice Agreement. There was also mention of a state of non-belligerence pending the visit of some personality to the Middle East and mention of a United Nations presence after Egypt had agreed not to claim belligerent rights.

4. I said I was not able to argue about the term of the resolution since I had not seen it (I am still missing UKMis New York telegrams Nos. 1169, 1170 and 1171). I would however pass on the Israeli Government's comments urgently to you.

5. Since I do not know the details of the resolution I hope I am not out of order in saying that I hope it is not along the lines which may arouse Israeli suspicions - see my telegram No. 446. With respect, I would also question the assumption in paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 2423 to UKMis New York. Israeli assumption on which their agreement to hold off in Washington was based is that we have to go through the motions of approaching the Security Council in order to show how utterly ineffective it is. Once this stage has been got through we could get on with practical steps to open the Straits. It is not therefore the ineffectiveness of the Council that is likely to push them to action. It is if we are seen to be trying to tackle the situation mainly through the United Nations and not by our own efforts.

/6. See

6. See also paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 449 regarding likely attitude of Israel Government now that it has been expanded.

7. Reports in "Dvar" (Government paper) from London are designed to suggest weakening in Her Majesty's Government's resolve and say that Mr. Wilson is now speaking of a month or two's preparation in the Security Council. The United States and Britain want other countries to join in planning to open the Straits while other countries want a lead from Britain and America and question why they should get burnt, when Israel herself is inactive. If Israel does not break this "magic circle" by taking bold action, United States/ United Kingdom hesitations could continue for weeks.

Foreign Office please pass to UKMis New York 85, Washington 94, Paris 28 and Saving to Moscow 2, Ottawa 1, Copenhagen 1, Amman 9, Damascus 4 and Cairo 5.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1515Z/2 June 1967

Recd 1945Z/2 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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No 10
Downing St

SECRET COPY NO:

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO OTTAWA

TELNO. 1685 2 JUNE 1967 (PS.)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO OTTAWA TELEGRAM NO 1685 OF 2 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

FOR HALLS FROM LE CHEMINANT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 748.

WE HAVE WELCOMED PROPOSAL FOR ANGLO-U.S. OIL TALKS AND ARE IN TOUCH WITH U.S. ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THEM. WE ARE ENGAGED IN A RAPID REVIEW AND PROPOSE TO SEND A TEAM OF OFFICIALS TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK.

CROSEC SENT 1034/2 JUNE

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (C.O.)

PPPPP

Nº10 Downing St. 29

COPY NO.....

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 5858 2 JUNE 1967 (PS)

D E D I P
SECRET
FOR HALLS FROM LE CHEMINANT.

FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM MRS. WILLIAMS.

HAD LUNCH WITH SIR ISAAC WOLFSON TODAY. ASKED ME TO PASS URGENT MESSAGE ON. HE HAD BEEN ON TELEPHONE YESTERDAY TO FRIEND IN WASHINGTON. FRIEND HAD SAID THAT HE HAD A MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT AND COULD WOLFSON TRANSMIT.
MESSAGE WAS TO EFFECT THAT PRESIDENT HOPED BRITAIN WOULD TAKE INITIATIVE WITH REGARD TO THE MARITIME FORCE FOR AQABA. IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMERICANS TO DO THIS, THOUGH THEY WOULD ADD SUPPORT, BUT THAT INITIATIVE MUST COME FROM BRITAIN AND BE SEEN TO DO SO. I AM SORRY TO BOTHER YOU WITH THIS, BUT I PROMISED TO PASS IT ON SO HERE IT IS. THE OTHER SUGGESTION WAS THAT AMERICA SHOULD GURANTEE ANY ECONOMIC LOSS SUFFERED BY ISRAEL THROUGH CLOSURE OF ELATH, SINCE EGYPT WOULD THEN SEE ISRAELIS GAINING NOT LOSING BY PRESSURE.

ALL THIS IS OBVIOUS, BUT A PROMISE IS A PROMISE, SO I PASS IT ON. AT LEAST WE KNOW THERE HAS BEEN AMERICAN BRIEFING ON FIRST POINT OF JEWISH COMMUNITY TO THIS EFFECT.

SOSFA SENT 2142Z 2 JUNE 196/

PRISEC (LIMITED) F.O.

S E C R E T

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WONFO 02903

-PP- FO 89703

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1897 3 JUNE 1967

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

WHILE THE REST OF US WERE WAITING IN THE CABINET ROOM YESTERDAY WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT WERE TALKING ALONE, WE HAD A DESULTORY INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH VARIOUS AMERICANS WHO WERE FROM TIME TO TIME PRESENT INCLUDING DEAN RUSK, MCNAMARA FOWLER AND BRUCE. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO REACH ANY CONCLUSIONS AND THE CONVERSATION WAS ENTIRELY INFORMAL AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE MOST INTERESTING POINTS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED.

MIDDLE EAST.

2. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO TRY TO REACH A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS BUT NO-ONE BELIEVED THIS TO BE LIKELY THOUGH IT WAS GENERALLY FELT THAT EVEN SO THE U N SHOULD IN SOME WAY REMAIN CHARGED WITH THE PROBLEM OR AT LEAST CERTAIN ASPECTS OF IT. WHAT WE SHOULD AIM FOR WHETHER THROUGH THE U N OR OUTSIDE IT, WOULD BE A BREATHING SPACE BASED ON THE DE FACTO POSITION BUT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ACQUIESCE IN THIS FOR LONG.

3. THE ISRAELIS CERTAINLY BELIEVED THAT FOR UP TO ABOUT ANOTHER TEN DAYS THEY COULD TAKE THE MILITARY INITIATIVE AND WIN A DECISIVE VICTORY. THE U S APPRECIATION AGREED WITH THIS THOUGH APPARENTLY SOME EXPERTS THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD RETAIN THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR UP TO ANOTHER THREE WEEKS DEPENDING ON

3. THE ISRAELIS CERTAINLY BELIEVED THAT FOR UP TO ABOUT ANOTHER TEN DAYS THEY COULD TAKE THE MILITARY INITIATIVE AND WIN A DECISIVE VICTORY. THE U S APPRECIATION AGREED WITH THIS THOUGH APPARENTLY SOME EXPERTS THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD RETAIN THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR UP TO ANOTHER THREE WEEKS DEPENDING ON THEIR CAPABILITY TO DESTROY THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE IN THE FIRST DAY OR TWO AND FOLLOW UP WITH AN ARMOURED THRUST ACROSS SINAI. WE ON OUR SIDE SAID THAT WE WERE RATHER LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ISRAELI PROSPECTS BUT DID NOT FUNDAMENTALLY DISAGREE WITH THE U S ASSESSMENT. THERE WAS A GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE CONFLICT WOULD BE A BLOODY ONE.

4. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ALTHOUGH THE GULF OF AQABA WAS ESSIBLE THROUGH THREE STRAITS AT ITS SOUTHERN END, ANY ATTEMP

/TO

USE THE TWO SMALLER STRAITS OVER A PROLONGED PERIOD WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR NAVIGATIONAL REASONS.

5. THE AMERICANS WERE DISPOSED TO THINK THAT THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE ARISING FROM THE EXTENT OF ISRAELI MOBILISATION SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. AT A ROUGH ESTIMATE THEIR PRESENT MOBILISATION WAS COSTING THE ISRAELIS DOLLARS 1 MILLION A DAY DIRECTLY PLUS NO DOUBT OTHER SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC MEASURES. BUT THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY COULD FAIRLY EASILY RAISE DOLLARS 100 MILLION AT ANY TIME TO SUPPORT ISRAEL. THE REAL PRESSURE THEREFORE ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO STRIKE QUICKLY WAS POLITICAL AND A CRITICAL DATE MIGHT BE EARLY NEXT WEEK WHEN THE NEW CABINET WAS TO MEET THE KNESSET.

6. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW THE VARIOUS FORMS OF PLANNING SHOULD BE COORDINATED FROM WHICH IT EMERGED VERY CLEARLY THAT PLANNING ON THE U S SIDE HAD BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE ANY LEAK ABOUT IT BEFORE CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS HAD BEEN COMPLETED WOULD HAVE BEEN FATAL. IT WAS AGREED THAT NO DEFINITE DECISIONS COULD BE TAKEN ABOUT PLANNING UNTIL POLITICAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN OBTAINED FROM BOTH SIDES AND THAT ANY PLANS EMERGING WOULD BE AD REFERENDUM.

7. THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED THAT THE IMPACT OF A POSSIBLE WAR IN SINAI ON THE EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION FORCES IN THE YEMEN WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE VERY GREAT, AT ANY RATE IN LOGISTIC TERMS. THE FORCES IN THE YEMEN WERE COMPARITIVELY SMALL AND THOUGH THEIR SUPPLY ROUTES MIGHT BE INTERRUPTED BY HOSITILITIES THE PRACTICAL EFFECT WITHIN THE YEMEN, AT ANY RATE IN THE SHORT TERM, WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE GREAT.

EAST OF SUEZ, BRITAIN AND THE E E C, ETC.

8. THERE WAS A SHORT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THESE PROBLEMS DURING WHICH THE AMERICANS RESTATED THEIR VIEWS WITHOUT INTRODUCING ANY NEW ELEMENT.

SIR P DEAN GROUPS 550 SENT AT 2122Z RH

NF0003/4

R. C

)- FO 89803

(PHER/CAT A

MMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

ELEGRAM NUMBER 1898 DATED 3 JUNE 1967

ECRET

UR TELEGRAMS NOS. 5806, 5808 AND 5856: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

IN A CONVERSATION WITH EUGENE ROSTOW THIS AFTERNOON HE HAD THE FOLLOWING TO SAY ABOUT THE POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE:

ISRAELI TEST SHIPS.

2. THE MINISTER AT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE HAD INDICATED TO ROSTOW ON A PERSONAL BASIS, WHICH PROBABLY HAD SOME OFFICIAL BACKING, THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WERE THINKING SERIOUSLY OF TRYING TO TAKE CARE OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN ISSUE ON THEIR OWN BY SENDING IN THE GREEK SHIP, NOT THE FENICE, WHICH THEY HAVE NOW BOUGHT AND RENAMED DOLPHIN AND WHICH WAS IN PORT YESTERDAY AT MASAWA. IF THIS PROBE WAS MOUNTED AND THE EGYPTIANS STOPPED THE SHIP ISRAEL WOULD OCCUPY SHARM EL SHEIK AND THEN SEE WHAT HAPPENED. ROSTOW SAID THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT YET DECIDED (OR APPARENTLY EVEN CONSIDERED) WHETHER OR NOT TO TRY AND INFLUENCE THE ISRAELIS AGAINST SUCH A POLICY.

DECLARATION BY THE MARITIME POWERS

3. THE AMERICANS NOW RECOGNISE THAT IT WAS WORTH WHILE TO PHASE OUR APPROACHES. THE PRESIDENT IS ANXIOUS TO GET ON AS FAST AS POSSIBLE AND INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING SENT TO U.S. POSTS TO TRY TO GET THE RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED BY THE END OF 5 JUNE AT THE LATEST. AT WORKING LEVEL THE STATE DEPARTMENT LIST AS DEFINITE OR PROBABLE SIGNATORIES THE U.S., U.K. ISRAEL, ICELAND, BELGIUM, NEW ZEALAND, THE NETHERLANDS, AUSTRALIA, AND AS POSSIBLE SIGNATORIES THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ARGENTINA PORTUGAL, CANADA AND GERMANY.

4. I TOLD ROSTOW AGAIN THAT YOU WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT ISRAEL'S

/ANNOUNCEMENT

ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WOULD SIGN THE DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS. MR. EBAN HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT WHETHER ISRAEL COULD SIGN THE DECLARATION AND THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED "YES". IN GENERAL ROSTOW THOUGHT THAT SINCE THE WHOLE IDEA OF THE DECLARATION AND OUR OTHER POLICIES WAS TO TRY TO PREVENT A WAR IN PART BY RESTRAINING THE ISRAELIES IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO PREVENT THEM SIGNING IT.

5. WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE METHODS OF PROMULGATING THE DECLARATION. ROSTOW DID NOT PRESS A SUGGESTION BY A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL PRESENT THAT IT SHOULD BE LAUNCHED AND SIGNED IN LONDON. HE THOUGHT THE HAGUE WOUL

D BE BETTER. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ISSUE IT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE THE SECRETARIAT WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO HANDLE IT. I SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST METHOD MIGHT BE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT IN ALL THE CAPITALS CONCERNED AND ACTION BY APPROPRIATE NATIONS TO CIRCULATE THE DECLARATION AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT. I WOULD WELCOME INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT.

6. ROSTOW HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC AND TO PRESIDENT TUBMAN OF LIBERIA WHEN THEY ARRIVE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE ALSO HOPED WE COULD AGREE TO APPROACHES TO COSTA RICA, COLUMBIA AND CHILE (SEE MY TEL NO 1899) APPROACHES TO POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORS TO A MARITIME FORCE.

7. SINCE THE CONVERSATIONS RECORDED IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1819 AND RELATED TELEGRAMS, THE UNITED STATES, ACCORDING TO ROSTOW, HAVE TENDED TO ASSIMILATE THE QUESTIONS OF APPROACHES TO POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORS TO A MARITIME FORCE AND APPROACHES TO POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS IN MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING. ROSTOW MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU SAW ADVANTAGE IN ALLOWING COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A FORCE (YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 924 TO THE HAGUE). NOW THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION HE WAS CLEARLY A LITTLE UNEASY ABOUT IT AND THOUGHT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MIGHT BE EVEN MORE SO. THE AMERICANS CLEARLY ENVISAGE APPROACHING COUNTRIES ABOUT PLANNING

/AND

AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO A FORCE AS ONE AND THE SAME THING. SO FAR THE PRESIDENT HAS SPOKEN TO MR. PEARSON AND MR. HOLT ABOUT A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION AND THE DUTCH APPEAR VIRTUALLY TO HAVE VOLUNTEERED ONE. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS, HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET MADE OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES ABOUT CONTRIBUTIONS TO A FORCE OR CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

8. ROSTOW SAID THE U.S. WOULD DEFINITELY BE READY FOR TALKS ON WEDNESDAY, 7 JUNE. I PUT TO HIM THE POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 5808. HE AGREED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOW TAKE ACTION IN ROME, OTTAWA, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON. HE ALSO AGREED TO SUPPORT ANY APPROACHES THE DUTCH AND OURSELVES MAKE IN SCANDINAVIA AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN ARGENTINA, BRUSSELS AND JAPAN. AT ONE POINT HE SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD BE DECIDED AT THE MILITARY TALKS NEXT WEEK WHEN TO INVITE OTHER COUNTRIES (PRESUMABLY ATTACHES ALREADY STATIONED IN WASHINGTON RATHER THAN REPRESENTATIVES FROM CAPITALS) BUT I IMAGINE THAT YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF NEXT WEEK'S ROUND OF ANGLO-US MILITARY TALKS BEFORE INVITING IN ANYONE ELSE.

NATO.

9. I MADE IT CLEAR TO ROSTOW THAT YOU THOUGHT THE PRESENT INFORMAL AND RESTRICTED CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS WHAT WAS WANTED FOR THE TIME BEITASFHTPFZICH

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2. +-4-? :97,5483'.

10. ROSTOW SHOWED ME A TELEGRAM OF GENER

9. I MADE IT CLEAR TO ROSTOW THAT YOU THOUGHT THE PRESENT INFORMAL AND RESTRICTED CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS WHAT WAS WANTED FOR THE TIME BEING AND THAT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF USEFUL DISCUSSION ABOUT LONGER TERM QUESTIONS AT THE MOMENT. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS.

APPROACH TO ARAB COUNTRIES.

10. ROSTOW SHOWED ME A TELEGRAM OF GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO U.S. POSTS IN ARAB COUNTRIES. THE MAIN POINTS OF THIS WERE THAT U.S. POLICY WAS BASED ON TWO GENERAL PRINCIPLES: THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA (C.F. U.S. SUPPORT FOR LEBANON IN 1958, SAUDI ARABIA IN 1962/63 AND LIBYA) AND THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. U.S. OBJECTIVES WERE THE PREVENTION OF WAR, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA AND A WISH TO HONOUR THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

SIR P. DEAN GRPS 900 SENT...0300Z/4 JW

292

R. C

WONF0005/4

-OO- FOREIGN OFFICE

CYPHER/CAT 'A'

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1900 3 JUNE 1967

GUARD.

SECRET.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: UAR/U.S. RELATIONS.

EUGENE ROSTOW TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE (AND ASKED THAT NO NOTES SHOULD BE TAKEN) THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT ZAKARIA MOHIEDDIN, ONE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENTS IN THE U.A.R., MIGHT VISIT WASHINGTON IN THE NEXT TWO DAYS OR SO.

2. A LETTER TO PRESIDENT NASSER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD BEEN DRAFTED JUST BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND DESPATCHED JUST AFTERWARDS. PRESIDENT NASSER HAD REPLIED WITH A LETTER, POLITE IN TONE, BUT DESCRIBING IN FULL ALL THE GRIEVANCES WHICH THE U.A.R. FELT IT HAD AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. A REPLY FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS BEING DRAFTED BUT IT WOULD NOT BE SENT UNTIL IT WAS SEEN WHETHER MOHIEDDIN WOULD COME OR NOT. IF HE DID THE VISIT WOULD BE TOP SECRET AND WOULD INCLUDE CALLS ON MR. RUSK AND THE PRESIDENT.

3. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE WAS TOLD OF MOHIEDDIN'S POSSIBLE VISIT BEFORE HE RETURNED TO TEL AVIV FOR CONSULTATIONS.

SIR P. DEAN GRS..160A SENT AT 0309Z/4 JW

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM

CYPHER/CAT-A-

CONFIDENTIAL

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON T 160c/67

TELEGRAM NUMBER 5897 3 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 5897 OF 3 JUNE AND TO UKMISSION NEW YORK.

Tell George I very much agree. 1tw

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY.

I HAVE SEEN HUGH CARADON'S PROPOSAL IN N.Y. TELEGRAM NO 1195 THAT, WHEN YOU SEE U THANT, YOU SHOULD SOUND HIM OUT ABOUT A POSSIBLE VISIT TO CAIRO AND TEL AVIV BY HIMSELF OR HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. I FEEL MOST STRONGLY THAT YOU SHOULD NOT MAKE THIS SUGGESTION TO HIM AT THIS TIME. AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME THIS COULD BE A MOST VALUABLE INITIATIVE. BUT THE FIRST ESSENTIAL NOW MUST BE TO GET AGREEMENT TO OUR DECLARATION BY THE MARITIME POWERS. IF WE WERE TO TAKE A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT INITIATIVE OF THIS KIND, IT WOULD I AM SURE BE SEIZED ON BY THE UNGODLY TO HAMPER ALL OUR EFFORTS. IT WOULD ALSO GIVE WAVERERS AN EXCUSE NOT TO SIGN THE DECLARATION ON THE GROUND THAT THEY HAD TO WAIT UNTIL THEY HAD SEEN THE RESULTS OF THIS NEW EXERCISE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

SOSFA GROUPS 140A SENT AT 1235/03 YCC KKKK
CHANCERY RESTRICTED
Chancery Action
5L3:CNO:fmk

PLUS
Prime Minister's Office (2)
Sir Burke Trend
Mr. T. Lloyd-Hughes
Mr. Urwick
Mr. Everett
Col. Dodd
Mr. Eagers
Mr Draper
Mr. Walker
Mr. Owen

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 5899 3 JUNE, 1967 (NEAD)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 5899 OF 3 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEWYORK PARIS MOSCOW AND SAVING TO CAIRO TEL AVIV.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1818 (NOT REPEATED TO CAIRO) : U.A.R. ECONOMIC SITUATION.

WE AGREE WITH MR. RUSK THAT THE U.A.R.'S ECONOMIC SITUATION IS GRAVE, AS IT HAS BEEN FOR OVER A YEAR. OUR PRESENT ASSESSMENT IS AS FOLLOWS.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CENTRAL BANK'S FOREIGN CURRENCY HOLDINGS AMOUNT TO NO MORE THAN £13 MILLION EGYPTIAN - EQUIVALENT TO ONLY SIX WEEKS' REVENUE FROM THE CANAL - PLUS GOLD WORTH £40 MILLION EGYPTIAN AS MONETARY BACKING WHICH COULD IF NECESSARY BE REALISED. IN OUR OWN BILATERAL DEALINGS, WE RECEIVED LAST MONTH A FIRST INSTALMENT OF OVER £200,000 DUE TO US IN MID-APRIL UNDER THE COMMERCIAL DEBT RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT CONCLUDED IN FEBRUARY. BUT THE EGYPTIANS ARE STILL IN DEFAULT ON A PAYMENT OF OVER £300,000 DUE IN JANUARY FOR AN OLD LOAN. WE CONCLUDE FROM OUR OWN EXPERIENCE AND THE EGYPTIAN FAILURE TO MEET THEIR I.M.F. REPAYMENT OBLIGATIONS THAT THE U.A.R. IS SCRAPING THE BARREL FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY.

3. THERE ARE ALSO THE PERENNIAL DIFFICULTIES OVER FOOD SUPPLIES. SPEARES' LETTER TO EVERETT VK 6/2 OF 11 MAY ENCLOSED A PROVISIONAL STUDY OF THIS PROBLEM FOR CONSIDERATION WITH THE AMERICANS. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE U.A.R. HAS STILL TO FIND IN 1967 ALMOST TWO MILLION TONS OVER AND ABOVE THE ESTIMATED 1.6 MILLION TONS DOMESTIC HARVEST WHICH IS GATHERED THIS MONTH AND NEXT.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.A.R.'S CHANCES OF FINANCIAL AID FROM KUWAIT AND POSSIBLY LIBYA MUST HAVE BEEN IMPROVED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE U.A.R. MUST ALSO CALCULATE (WE WOULD THINK RIGHTLY) THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL GIVE HER WHATEVER SHORT-TERM ASSISTANCE IS NECESSARY TO RIDE OUT THE PRESENT CRISIS. AND THE RUSSIANS MAY HOPE TO OBTAIN EVENTUAL REPAYMENT, E.G. WHEN REVENUE ARISES FROM THE RECENT VERY PROMISING OIL STRIKES IN THE U.A.R.

5. WE DOUBT IF THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO ALLOW THEIR PURSUIT OF THE PRESENT CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL IN THE SHORT RUN

/TO BE

TO BE INFLUENCED BY ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. THEY CAN PROBABLY AFFORD TO MAINTAIN THEIR TROOPS DEPLOYED IN SINAI LONGER THAN THE ISRAELIS CAN AFFORD TO REMAIN MOBILIZED. WE THINK THEREFORE IT WOULD BE RISKY TO ASSUME THAT THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT WILL NOT (REPEAT NOT) IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES CLOSE THE CANAL TO SOME OR ALL BRITISH AND AMERICAN SHIPPING. IN ADDITION THE U.A.R. WOULD OF COURSE LOSE SOME CANAL REVENUES BY INSTIGATING INTERFERENCE WITH MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLIES, BUT WE DOUBT IF THIS WOULD DETER THEM IF THEY JUDGED IT POLITICALLY NECESSARY.

SOSFA

SENT 1958Z 3 JUNE

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N.E.A.D.

Subject

N°10 Downing St.

COPY NO. .....

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. 2

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1201 3 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1201 OF 3 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING FOR FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM PRIME MINISTER.

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 5897 TO WASHINGTON.
I VERY MUCH AGREE.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1826Z/03 JUNE 1967
RECD 1826Z/03 JUNE 1967

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10, DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

ERW

File

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 200 3 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 200 of 3 June.
Repeated for information to: U.K. Mission New York, Washington, Cairo and Saving to: Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Baghdad, Bahrain, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, BHC Aden (Personal), Benghazi

Middle East Situation.

I discussed this with the new Prime Minister last night.

2. He said that the Arabs had waited for juctice for twenty years. The Western Powers had asked them to remain patient too long. The United Nations had been ineffective. The time had now come for a confrontation. His Government would send military forces to the Middle East next week and there would be thousands of volunteers to follow. He wanted a peaceful solution but he was not in favour of a United Nations force to maintain the status quo. The only acceptable settlement would be the original United Nations partition and the resettlement of refugees. Some Arab Governments might object even to this but he would be prepared to work for it. I quoted your speech in Parliament on 31 May and said that Her Majesty's Government did not intend to take sides or pass judgment. We believed that war would be an utter disaster for all and that a peaceful solution must be found by every means open to us. We should do our utmost in the United Nations to achieve this. However, we had strong views on the freedom of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, denial of which would have most serious implications. I quoted the Black Sea and Baltic and other examples where it is vital to maintain the principle and referred to the Geneva Convention. He said that there would be no objection to shipping carrying non-warlike cargoes to Eilat but in a "state of belligerency" the Arab nations had every right to intercept war materials. I pointed out that the United Nations position was that the Armistice Agreements were still in force and this must be the foundation for United Nations efforts for a peaceful settlement. He said this was unrealistic and that a state of belligerency already existed.

3. He said he was glad to have had the talk and to know that Her Majesty's Government would not take sides. He was sure that Britain and the Sudan "working together" could do much to find a solution.

4. I fear that Mahgoub's position is scarcely distinguishable from Cairo's and that we shall not in fact find him receptive to our line.

Foreign Office pass U.K.Mission New York 5, Washington 9, Cairo 21 and Saving to Amman 1, Beirut 5, Damascus 1, Jedda 2, Baghdad 1, Bahrain 2, Tripoli 1, Tunis 1, Rabat 1, BHC Aden (Personal) 1 and Benghazi 1.

Sir R. Fowler

Sent 0944Z 3 June
Recd. 1752Z 3 June

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other Posts]

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Eastern Dept.

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Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 202 3 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 202 of 3 June
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Cairo, and Saving to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, Baghdad, Bahrain, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, H.C. Aden and Tel Aviv.

My telegram No. 200. Middle East Situation.

The Prime Minister summoned the Heads of all non-Arab and non-African Missions to a meeting this morning at the Foreign Ministry. He made a short statement to the following effect.

2. The Sudan has enjoyed friendly relations with your countries. Now the Arab nation faces a crisis. Those who stand with us in this crisis will continue to be our friends, those who do not will no longer be our friends.

3. Two points were not precise. It was not clear whether he wished our Governments to know that those who were not with the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel would be regarded as against them or whether he was issuing a warning against support for Israel. It was also not clear whether he was implying a break in relations or merely an end to friendly relations.

4. In view of my private conversation with him last night when he reacted favourably to my assurance that Her Majesty's Government's policy was to avoid taking sides or pronouncing judgements I think it would be reasonable to apply this interpretation to what he said this morning. I think it quite likely, however, that he would consider a declaration in which we played a leading role in favour of full right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran as positive support for Israel.

5. The Prime Minister also emphasised at this morning's meeting his view that the Israelis had never honoured any United Nations resolution and that United Nations action, to be acceptable, would have to go back to the 1948 Resolution.

6. An hour before his meeting he signed an agreement with the United States Ambassador for an 11 million loan for sorghum.

KHARTOUM TELEGRAM NO. 202 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 6, Washington 10, Cairo 22, and Saving to Amman 2, Beirut 6, Damascus 2, Jedda 3, Baghdad 2, Bahrain 3, Tripoli 2, Tunis 2, Rabat 2, H.C. Aden 1 and Tel Aviv 1.

Sir R. Fowler

Sent 1510Z/3 June
Received 1818Z/3 June

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

PPPPP

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 184 3 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.184 of 3 June, Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Oslo and Stockholm.

Your telegram No.78 to Abidjan: Gulf of Aqaba.

Denmark is as usual closed down for the Constitution Day weekend and Ministers are inaccessible, but I have tracked down Fischer, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Seidenfaden, his political deputy, at their weekend retreats, handed over a copy of the draft declaration and spoken as instructed, drawing also on the arguments in your telegram to New York No.2459.

2. Fischer said that he would bring the declaration to the attention of Mr. Krag as soon as possible - Mr. Krag would thereafter have to consult the Cabinet and then would let me have a formal reply. Fischer's initial reactions were, however, not encouraging. My approach had been expected and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had therefore been able to formulate a preliminary departmental view. Dr. Fischer said that the Ministry did not disagree in principle with the substance of our draft declaration - indeed Mr. Krag had said in a public speech on 29 May that "Denmark adhered to its previous view that the Straits of Tiran are a free waterway". They might have some difficulty about the second sentence of paragraph 2 of the draft since this would immediately lead on to the question of what Denmark would need to do to assert its right of innocent passage: It should be taken as pretty certain that no Danish Government would agree to fight its way through the Straits of Tiran on behalf of Danish shipping. But basically, they agreed with us, both on the situation in international law in general, and in the Straits of Tiran in particular.

3. Whether or not Denmark would subscribe at this juncture to the draft declaration was based on their judgment of what the effect of the draft declaration would be on the present situation at the Security Council in New York. Their preliminary view was that it would be bound to have an adverse effect. As they saw it, the next 3 or 4 days were crucial to the question of whether or not war would break out in the Middle East. All energies had to be bent on lowering the temperature and gaining a breathing space. Once the danger of war was passed, then would be the time, when temperatures had cooled, perhaps to make a declaration and seek to uphold the rule of law. But inevitably a declaration at this time would be interpreted by the Arabs as evidence the Maritime nations were siding with Israel against the Arabs. Denmark thought this would be unhelpful in any case and, as occupants of the Presidency of the Security Council, they had an additional obligation not to take sides. Only if it could be demonstrated to them that a declaration of this nature

/was

was necessary within the next 48 hours to restrain Israel from taking the law into its own hands, would they perhaps feel that the advantages of the declaration at this point of time outweighed its disadvantages. While hard information was difficult to get, it was not at present the Danish view that an immediate declaration of this sort was necessary to restrain Israel, though they recognized that this activity on the part of the Maritime powers was in itself a restraining factor.

4. Summing up, Dr. Fischer said that while Denmark, with the reservation noted in paragraph 2, might subscribe to the declaration in principle now, and might be prepared to subscribe to it in practice in say ten days time, when the danger of war was past and we were picking up the pieces, he did not think that they would subscribe to it now. He understood that a similar view was being taken by France, Canada and Norway and probably also by Sweden.

5. The above is the distillation of an hour's strenuous arguing. Since Fischer's line corresponds with official briefing in this morning's Press following a meeting yesterday of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Danish Parliament, it must I fear, be taken as foreshadowing Mr. Krag's answer. The most we can expect from the Danes is subscription to some declaration when the dangers of war are past and when we have been able to collect a substantial number of other respectable signatures.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to UKMIS New York 7, Washington 11 and routine to Ottawa 1, Paris 12, Rome 7, The Hague 8, Moscow 4, Tel Aviv 1, Oslo 19 and Stockholm 23.

Mr. Wright

Sent 1844Z/3 June
Recd 1906Z/3 June

[Repetition to Moscow and Tel Aviv referred for Departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts].

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CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 954

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

3 JUNE 1967

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CYPHER

RESTRICTED

ADDSD TO F O TELNO 954 OF 3 JUNE REPTD FOR INFMN TO TEL AVIV

CAIRO WASHINGTON PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MIDDLE EAST

THE SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS SQUARELY IN SUPPORT OF THE ARABS IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL. COMMENTARIES EMPHASISE THIS THEME, AND MESSAGES OF APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION FROM ARAB GOVERNMENTS OR ORGANISATIONS ARE BEING PRINTED.

2. AT THE SAME TIME BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ARE FIRMLY IDENTIFIED NOT ONLY AS SUPPORTING ISRAEL, BUT AS INCITING HER TO ACT IN A PROVOCATIVE WAY. HOWEVER THE TONE OF THE REPORTING AND COMMENT IS STILL IN NO WAY ALARMIST. THE PRESS IS NOT DISCUSSING THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS NOR IS IT SPECULATING ON HOW THE SITUATION MAY DEVELOP.

F O PASS TEL AVIV 21 CAIRO 25 WASHINGTON 155 PARIS 37 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 34

HARRISON

DESP AT 1310/03

RECD AT 1435/03

Nº 10 Downing St. 31

Subject!

COPY NO. .....

SECRET PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T150/67

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1202 3 JUNE 1967

SECRET
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1202 OF 3 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

FOLLOWING FOR FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM PRIME MINISTER.

I WILL GIVE YOU A FULL RUN-DOWN OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW MORNING. BUT THE MAIN POINTS WHICH EMERGED WERE AS FOLLOWS:-
MIDDLE EAST.
A. WE AGREED ONCE AGAIN THAT WHATEVER ACTION IS TAKEN MUST BE MULTILATERAL. L.B.J. CLEARLY FEELS THIS AS STRONGLY AS WE DO AND IS UNDER VERY STRONG CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE ON THIS.
B. THE TIMETABLE TO WHICH THE AMERICANS SEEM TO BE WORKING ENVISAGES THAT WE WILL ALLOW UP TO TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY TO LET IT BE SEEN THAT NOTHING IS GOING TO COME OUT OF THE UNITED NATIONS: THAT THEREAFTER WE WILL PUBLISH THE MARITIME DECLARATION: AND THAT IT MAY NOT THEREFORE BE UNTIL THE END OF THE WEEK THAT THE QUESTION OF ENFORCING IT WILL ARISE. THE AMERICANS THINK THAT THE ISRAELIS CAN AFFORD TO WAIT MILITARILY AT LEAST AS LONG AS THIS IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO THEM POLITICALLY. BUT THE PRESIDENT TAKES A MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEW IN GENERAL THAN MOST OF HIS ADVISERS. HE IS CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL GO IT ALONE IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO OR THAT, EVEN IF THEY DON'T, WE SHALL VERY QUICKLY REACH THE POINT AT WHICH EVERYTHING WILL BE SEEN TO TURN ON WHETHER THE SUBSCRIBERS TO THE INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION ARE PREPARED TO PUT TEETH INTO IT.
C. L.B.J.'S ANXIETIES ABOUT THE TIMETABLE ARE REINFORCED BY HIS NEED FOR MORE TIME IN WHICH TO GET CONGRESS INTO LINE. HE SPOKE TO ME AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS ON THE HILL.
D. ON THIS BASIS WE AGREED THAT CONTINGENCY MILITARY PLANNING SHOULD CONTINUE TO GO AHEAD ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS: AND THE EMBASSY WILL TRY TO FIND OUT FROM THE AMERICANS BEFORE BATOSIK RETURNS TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK WHAT SORT OF DETAILED CONTINGENCY PLANNING THE AMERICANS HAVE IN MIND. THEY HAVE CLEARLY DONE

/MORE

S E C R E T

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1202 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

MORE OF THIS THAN THEY HAVE DISCLOSED TO US SO FAR. THE AMERICANS ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS OIL CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH US AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS, WHICH ARE ALREADY IN HAND, SHOULD CLEARLY GO AHEAD.

2. IN GENERAL MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE AS YET FAR FROM CLEAR IN THEIR OWN MINDS ABOUT THEIR POLICY, BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY. L.B.J. IS STILL ASK:NG VERY PERTINENT QUESTIONS TO WHICH NEITHER RUSK NOR MCNAMARA SEEMED TO HAVE VERY CLEAR OR CONVINCING ANSWERS: AND THE PRESIDENT IS CLEARLY WORRIED BY THIS. AS A RESULT THERE IS A DISTINCT TENDENCY TO TRY TO PUSH US INTO THE LEAD. THE HEADLINE IN YESTERDAY'S TIMES SUMS THIS UP ADMIRABLY, BUT I HOPE BY CONSTANT REPETITION I MADE IT SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO HIM THAT WE CANNOT COMMIT OURSELVES TO A MERELY ANGLO-AMERICAN VENTURE AND THAT IF ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN IT HAS GOT TO BE ON A GENUINELY AND SUFFIC-IENTLY INTERNATIONAL BASIS.

3. FOR THE REST, I WILL TELL YOU TOMORROW WHAT PASSED ON VIETNAM AND EAST OF SUEZ GENERALLY. MY PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF L.B.J. THIS TIME WAS BETTER THAN YOURS AT YOUR LAST VISIT. HE SEEMED IN GOOD PHYSICAL SHAPE AND, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, VERY MUCH IN COMMAND OF THE SITUATION: ON VIETNAM HE WAS MUCH MORE RELAXED AND SEEMED TO BE CLEARER ABOUT WHERE HE IS GOING. I HAD A SLIGHTLY MORE REASSURING FEELING THAT HE HAD HIS HAWKS UNDER REASONABLE CONTROL.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1847Z/03 JUNE 1967
RECD 1847Z/03 JUNE 1967

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28

Mr Garner
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Lt C O'Neill

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TEL NO. 468

TO FOREIGNOFFICE

OF 4TH JUNE

CONFL.

ADDSD F.O. 458 G/A AFI MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, AN IN WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO. 730: ISRAEL ECCONOMY.

REDUCANT & RECOVERY CONTRACT
D.E.I. ~~123/1/03/~~ 81-00497-2-6-1-44BDT.

COMMERCIAL SECRETARY SPOKE TO DIRECTOR GENERAL, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, DIRECTOR, 7 845=594 03, ELAL, MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND GOVERNOR BANK OF ISRAEL ON 1 JUNE IMMEDIATELY AFTER INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MEETING ON MEASURES NECESSARY TO PREVENT DISTORTIONS AND BOTTLENECKS IN THE ECONOMY WHILE RETAINING A HIGH STATE OF MILITARY READINESS (MY TELNO. 436). PERIOD ENVISAGED WAS THREE MONTHS. IF SITUATION CONTINUES FURTHER PLANNING WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF MEASURES TO CARRY ON ECONOMY IN FUTURE (REPEATING TELNO 75743

2. FOLLOWING FACTS EMERGED:

(A) THERE WERE AN AVERAGE OF FOUR MONTHS SUPPLIES OF ESSENTIAL FOODSTUFFS AND RAW MATERIALS EITHER IN THE COUNTRY OR ON THEIR WAY AND OVER THREE MONTHS SUPPLY OF OIL.

(B) THERE WAS A RESERVE OF UNEMPLOYED LABOUR OF ABOUT

COUNTRY OK IN THEIR WAY AND OVER THREE MONTHS SUPPLEY OF OIL.

(B) THERE WAS AN UNEMPLOYED LABOUR RESERVE OF ABOUT 65,000, MOST OF WHOM WERE UNSKILLED. THE SKILLED MANPOWER WHICH THE MILITARY MUST DISGORGE TO GET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BACK TO NORMAL AMOUNTED TO ASTONISHLY LOW FIGURE OF ABOUT 2,500 KEY MEN. UNFORTUNATELY, A HIGH PROPORTION OF THESE MEN ALSO HAD A HIGH MILITARY PRIORITY. A MANPOWER COUNCIL COUNCIL TO SOLVE SUCH PROBLEMS HAS BEEN SET UP. MINISTER OF LABOUR HAS BEEN GIVEN POWER TO DIRECT LABOUR, BAN STRIKES AND VARY TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT+.

(C) THE MAIN MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT SITUATION WERE SPECIALISED FORMS OF TRANSPORT (CROSS TRUCKS AND TRANSPORTERS) AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

(D) GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED FOR A 15% INCREASE IN IMPORTS, PLANTS TO RAISE LEVEL OF STOCKS AND AS A DEFLATIONARY MOVE. HOWEVER, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS MIGHT BE GREATER THAN EXPECTED AND WOULD HAVE PRIORITY. THE BILL MIGHT THEREFORE BE MUCH HIGHER BUT WOULD NOT BE A WORRY.

(E) EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION WAS A PROBLEM AND WOULD HAVE TO BE RATIONALISED TO PREVENT PANIC BUYING.

(F)

MAJOR PROBLEM WAS INFLATION: LARGER WAGE BILL, GREATER WAGE BILL, GREATER DEMANDS ON RESERVES BY MILITARY AND HENCE THEIR NON-PRODUCTIVE UTILISATION: THIS WOULD BE BY ADDITIONAL IMPORTS, ADMINISTRATIVE PRICE CONTROLS, MORE EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION AND WAGE RESTRAINT. A JOINT COMMITTEE OF INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES WAS BEING ESTABLISHED TO TACKLE BOTTLENECKS. THE POSITION COULD BE HELD WITHOUT DIFFICULTY FOR THREE MONTHS BUT IF SITUATION WENT ON LONGER WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER MEASURES . ONE MENTIONED WAS RATIONING.

3. YOUR PARAGRAPH 3. DIRECTOR OF COMMERCE STATED THAT DURING PAST FORTNIGHT 60% OF THE EMPLOYED MALE LABOUR FORCE ELIGIBLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE (I.E. EXCLUDING ARABS, OVER 49'S AND PHYSICALLY UNFIT) HAD BEEN CALLED UP AND FOR TWO VERY SHORT PERIODS THIS FIGURE HAD RISEN TO 80%. HE NOW EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD LEVEL OFF AT BETWEEN 45% AND 50% BEING RETAINED BY THE MILITARY. THOSE WHO RETURNED

TWO VERY SHORT PERIODS THIS FIGURE HAS RISEN TO 60%. WE NOW EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD LEVEL OFF AT BETWEEN 45% AND 50% BEING RETAINED BY THE MILITARY AND THOSE WHO RETURNED TO CIVILIAN OCCUPATION TO BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT A HIGH STATE OF READINESS. IN HIS VIEW, THE ONLY FACTOR WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY AND QUICKLY DAMAGE MORALE WOULD BE ESCALATING PRICE INCREASES, [illegible] AND FOR ISRAEL TO MEET ITS EXPORT COMMITMENTS. ON GOLD, DIAMONDS COULD BE QUITE A PROBLEM IF THE SUPPLIERS PLACE AN OVER HIGH RATING ON ISRAEL'S PRESENT INSECURITY.

4. FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SEE M.I.F.T. F O PASS MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AS MYTELS NOS.27, 89 AND 99

HADOW

SENT 1325/4TH JUNE

RECVD 1321/4TH JUNE

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 25 4 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 525 of 4 June. Repeated for information to: U.K. Mission New York, Washington, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Kuwait, Moscow, Paris, Beirut and Saving to: Jerusalem

Arab/Israel

King Hussein this afternoon addressed assembled Heads of non-Arab diplomatic missions.

2. His Majesty's said the present critical situation resulted from the decision to create the State of Israel. He traced history of the area since 1948 when the Arabs were divided among themselves and too weak to resist injustice. Israeli expansionism had thus continued unchecked: Israel had seized Eilat (which had never been hers) by force of arms: in 1956 she had occupied Sinai with help from outside the area: and later she had directed the waters of the Jordan in defiance of international law. Samu raid in November 1966 had been designed by Israel to upset morale of Jordan and provoke her downfall.

3. More recently Israeli preparations for hostilities on the Syrian front had compelled the U.A.R. to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF and to re-occupy Sharm el Sheikh. From 1948 to 1956 Egypt had exercised the same rights in the Gulf of Aqaba as she did today. The Arabs had been patient about the withdrawal of these rights, as they had been about the failure to honour their claim under the partition plans, to a Mediterranean port and to give the refugees their rights. The Arabs wanted only peace and security but Israeli long-term plans made this impossible.

4. Although the Arabs were now united as never before it was not part of their plan to create an explosion now. Sooner or later there would be a collision with Israel taking the first step. His Majesty warned against falling into the Israeli trap (by which he seemed to mean lending credence and support to the Israeli case) and said "Our friends who are interested in the area must decide where their interests lie and what to do to remedy their own position. Those who stand by us we shall never forget. Those who stand on the fence and try to solve the problem we are grateful to. Those who stand with Israel are our enemies and they can forget any friendship they ever had here". His Majesty added that it was the duty of the world Powers not to become involved: "Leave us alone with the Israelis".

5. King Hussein who spoke friendly and earnestly asked us to communicate what he had said to our Governments. He paid tribute to those who were already supporting Jordan, including the Soviet Union, and congratulated my French colleague on the stand taken by France. His Majesty had nothing to say to my American colleague or to me.

/6.

6. The King later gave a Press conference at which I understand he expressed disappointment and displeasure at what he sees as the pro-Israeli bias in British (and American) Policy. (See my telegram No. 509 not to all.)

Foreign Office pass Immediate to U.K.Mission New York 34, Washington 80, Tel Aviv 75, Priority to Baghdad 56, Damascus 79, Jedda 60, Kuwait 31, Moscow M45 [sic] and Paris 13.

Mr. Adams

Sent 1730Z 4 June
Recd. 1852Z 4 June

[Repetition to Baghdad, Damascus, Moscow referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other Posts]

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 469 4 June 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 469 of 4 June, Repeated for information to Moscow, UKMIS New York and Washington.

My immediate preceding telegram: Military and Political Considerations.

I am sure that full mobilisation was never resorted to in last fortnight. Estimate in my telegram No. 358 is, I realise, exceedingly vague, but I consider there were never more than 200,000 men on war footing at any one moment.

2. The somewhat more dramatic Israeli appreciations in my telegrams Nos. 322, paragraph 5, 323 and 372, paragraph 5, were on assumptions valid at the time that the Israeli Forces were poised for attack and were living on actual campaign footing, which could not be maintained for too long.

3. The military posture has now changed. Israel Chief of Staff on 31 May told the Army -

(i) they must be patient and show staying power in maintaining present state of preparedness since the danger was far from past, and

(ii) Israel was in the midst of a politico-military campaign: Israeli military preparedness underwrote diplomatic activities and enhanced their chance of success.

4. As pointed out in other telegrams, appointment of Dayan would indicate a more cautious approach towards military adventure. He and the Army are all too aware of the military disadvantages which Israel has accepted. Appointment of General Bar Lev to assist General Rabin brings in a level headed professional soldier rather than the more excitable Weizmann.

5. The conclusion is that the days of the firebrand in the Israel Defence Forces is over. They are now preparing for the long haul but at the same time must be ready for decisive action should some unforeseen incident make this inevitable. In estimating how long the I.D.F. can retain Forces in being, especially on the frontier with Egypt, following factors should be taken into account:

(a) Logistic problem is not a critical factor:

(b) Communications are well established and administration and resupply are now a routine matter:

(c) Transport is well maintained with no evidence of strain:

(d) Considerable stockpiling has taken place and before present reserves (four months?) in Israel are depleted they can be replaced from outside.

/6. I should

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6. I should have thought Dayan's policy must now be to cut down numbers actually serving in Forces to about 100,000. On present estimates morale of these should remain indefinitely at a very high level. They will keep their cutting edge and fighting spirit and efficiency will be maintained. He will be in favour of a longish pause and a 'détente'. Only thus can I.D.F. regain its initial advantages of surprise and ability to remobilise quickly. He will be starting to make plans, depending on Arab inability to maintain the same posture for too long, to be ready for a situation under which Israel could put in a powerful blow while making the Arabs appear to have struck first. I would not put it past his ingenuity to think up something: but I do not think he would estimate that such a situation can be brought about in under at least three months. Meanwhile, he must maintain a military posture which will (a) deter Arabs and (b) make credible Israeli threats to go it alone, should Israel Government wish to make our flesh creep and thereby spur us and the Americans on to a concrete action to get the Straits of Tiran open.

Foreign Office pass Moscow 28, UKMIS New York 90 and Washington 100.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1230Z 4 June

Recd 1439Z 4 June

[Repetition to Moscow referred for Departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 340 4 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 340 of 4 June
Repeated for information to:- Washington, Cairo, Khartoum, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Bahrain, Kuwait, Baghdad and JIG Cyprus and Saving to Benghazi, TPS Malta, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis and Tel Aviv.

Middle East Crisis.

The enormous increase in Nasser's prestige since beginning of Israel/UAR confrontation has had the effect in Libya of giving fresh and for the United Kingdom very damaging weight to UAR propaganda. In the course of 3 June we received anguished representations from a number of prominent Tripolitanians who have always been noteworthy for their friendship to the United Kingdom to say that for the first time since Suez popular resentment was focussing on the United Kingdom and to urge with all their strength that we should take a less prominent part in such matters as the Gulf of Tiran leaving the running to the United States from whom some support for Israel seems to be expected. They spoke with admiration of the aloof policy of General de Gaulle (although they are well aware of the French part in arming Israel from which the General's equivocal statements have successfully distracted attention) and wished the United Kingdom could play a less prominent role. They drew my attention with greatest earnestness to the impassioned and almost religious fervour felt throughout Libya by all sections and shades of opinion for the Arab cause led by Nasser against the Israelis. This sentiment was so strong that if exacerbated neither the Government nor the King could indefinitely protect our interests in Libya. They mentioned in particular that the Prime Minister's recent travels to Canada and United States had given the impression to the Arabs that he was taking the leadership in attempting to mount an anti-Arab and pro-Israeli coalition. Our Libyan friends would like to counter Egyptian propaganda against us but can find nothing in B.B.C. news to help them. Your speech of 31 May was useful but has been overtaken.

2. Libya and no doubt other Arabs do not know or care about maritime questions and Her Majesty's Government's assumption of her historic role of leadership of the Maritime Nations in defence of freedom of the seas is seen in Libya at least in the present circumstances as nothing more than wholehearted support of Israel against the Arabs.

/It is

It is the more deeply resented as coming from the United Kingdom which in Libya is so respected and trusted.

3. Our commercial and oil interests in Libya are now as great as anywhere in the Arab World and are rapidly growing. Defence sales alone might amount to £100 million. All this will be at risk unless we can give the Libyans some arguments with which to justify their continued pro-British policy. I fear our recent activity has only served in Libya to enable Egyptian propaganda to erode our position and interests.

4. As seen from here there is now an urgent need if we are to avoid damage to our interests in Libya for Her Majesty's Government to make some conciliatory gesture to the Arabs which suitably publicised by the B.B.C. could help our Arab friends. In recent days they have looked in vain and with dismay at Her Majesty's Government's apparent and increasing support as they see it for Israel.

5. A statement of our support for the integrity of all countries in the area and our unqualified opposition to any eventual aggression as much Israeli as Arab would be helpful also emphasise of our support for United Nations procedures which has already evoked the official welcome of the Libyan Government regarding Lord Caradon's statement.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 27, Cairo 19, Khartoum 3, Beirut 10, Damascus 10, Amman 9, Jedda 4, Bahrain 1, Kuwait 2, Baghdad 7 and unnumbered MOD for JIG Cyprus.

Mr. Sarell

Sent 1420 4 June, 1967
Recd 1555Z 4 June, 1967

[Repetition to Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Amman and Baghdad referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

[Sent to D.C.C.]

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EN [redacted]AIR

WELLINGTON TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 282 4 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.282 of 4 June.
Repeated for information to Canberra, U.K. Mission New York, and Washington.

Middle East: My telegram 280.

Following statement was issued to the Press by the Prime Minister's office on 3 June.

Begins.

"In response to an approach today from the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and The Netherlands, inviting New Zealand to subscribe to a declaration of Maritime Powers on the Gulf of Aqaba, New Zealand has decided to join in this international effort to ease the Middle East crisis" the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Keith Holyoake, said today.

"New Zealand's position on this question is absolutely clear and I have stated it on several occasions recently. The declaration is in line with New Zealand policy because it reaffirms the view that the Gulf is an international waterway into and through which vessels of all nations have a right of passage" said Mr. Holyoake. "Recognition of thiswas a basic element of the settlement reached in 1957 which for ten years had governed the actions of nations. As a small State with a special interest in the rights of other small nations to live free from external threat and to enjoy freedom of trade, New Zealand felt that it must subscribe to an important declaration of this kind, even though there was no practical involvement of New Zealand registered shipping in the Red Sea area," said Mr. Holyoake. He had received no approach concerning action to test the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and, of course, there was no question of New Zealand participation in any such action. Mr. Holyoake hoped that the declaration would provide a basis for further efforts in the United Nations to moderate the crisis. "The more I consider the grave dangers which have arisen since the withdrawal of the United Nations emergency force, the more convinced I am of the need for a continued United Nations peace-keeping presence in the area" said Mr. Holyoake, "the Security Council has a primary responsibility to act now to maintain international peace and security". Ends.

C.O. pass U.K. Mission New York 11 and Washington 26 (both routine)
Sir I. Maclennan Sent 0130Z 4 June
Recd.0128Z 4 June

[Repeated as requested]

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GROUPS 125ØA

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 12Ø9 DATED 4 JUNE, 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

FOR U.N. DEPARTMENT: FIRST THING ON MONDAY.

MY TELEGRAM NO 12Ø8: U.N.E.F.

THE SECRETARIAT HAVE ISSUED BACKGROUND NOTES ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF. FOLLOWING EXTRACTS MAY BE RELEVANT TO YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2485.

1. (UNDERLINE) THE QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION.

THE DECISION ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF WAS BASED ON BOTH LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF AN OVERRIDING NATURE.

BRIEFLY, THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE THAT SINCE UNEF WAS INTRODUCED ON THE TERRITORY OF EGYPT ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AND BY AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN SECRETARY-GENERAL DAG HAMMARSKJOLD AND PRESIDENT NASSER, THAT CONSENT WAS AT ANY TIME BASIC TO ITS PRESENCE ON THE TERRITORY OF EGYPT. WHEN THAT CONSENT WAS WITHDRAWN -- AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLICS RIGHT TO DO THIS COULD NOT BE QUESTIONED -- THE BASIS FOR UNEFS PRESENCE CEASED TO EXIST.

AS A PURELY PRACTICAL MATTER AND APART FROM LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS, ALL THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES DEPEND NOT ONLY ON THE CONSENT, BUT ON THE ACTIVE CO-OPERATION, OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE CANNOT BE EXERCISED WITHOUT THAT CONSENT AND CO-OPERATION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OF COURSE, HAS AUTHORITY UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER TO TAKE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES.

/2. (UNDERLINE)

2. (UNDERLINE) THE QUESTION OF ADEQUATE CONSULTATION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO ADEQUATE CONSULTATION WITH THE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONCERNED OR WITH THE MEMBERS BEFORE THE DECISION WAS TAKEN TO WITHDRAW THE FORCE. AS STATED ABOVE, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS, AND IS, FIRMLY OF THE OPINION THAT THE DECISION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE, ON REQUEST OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT, RESTED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON UNEF. SECRETARY-GENERAL HAMMARSKJOLD TOOK THE FOLLOWING POSITION IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE FROM SHARM-EL-SHEIKH ON 26 FEBRUARY, 1957:

(QUOTE) AN INDICATED PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INFORM THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, WHICH WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATTER SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ASSEMBLY (UNQUOTE) (DOCUMENT A/3563/ANNEXES I.B.2).

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONSULTED THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE BEFORE REPLYING TO THE LETTER OF 18 MAY 1967 FROM THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC REQUESTING WITHDRAWAL. THIS CONSULTATION TOOK PLACE WITHIN A FEW HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC REQUEST, AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE WAS INFORMED OF THE DECISION WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD IN MIND TO CONVEY IN HIS REPLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. AS INDICATED IN THE REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 26 MAY (DOCUMENT S/7906, PARAGRAPH 4):

(QUOTE) THE COMMITTEE DID NOT MOVE, AS WAS ITS RIGHT TO DO UNDER THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 9 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1001 (ES-I) TO REQUEST THE CONVENING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE SITUATION WHICH HAD ARISEN. (UNQUOTE)

BEFORE CONSULTING THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON UNEF, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ALSO CONSULTED THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES PROVIDING THE CONTINGENTS OF UNEF AND HAD INFORMED THEM OF HIS INTENTIONS. THIS WAS WHAT WAS REQUIRED OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

/IT

IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN ONLY AFTER CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS POSITION IS NOT ONLY INCORRECT BUT ALSO INAPPLICABLE AND UNREALISTIC. IN RESOLUTION 1000 (ES-I) THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ESTABLISHED A UNITED NATIONS COMMAND FOR AN EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL FORCE. ON THE BASIS OF THAT RESOLUTION THE FORCE WAS QUICKLY RECRUITED AND ITS FORWARD ELEMENTS FLOWN TO THE STAGING AREA AT NAPLES. THUS, THOUGH ESTABLISHED, IT HAD TO AWAIT THE PERMISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT TO ENTER EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. THAT PERMISSION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AS A RESULT OF DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BY SECRETARY-GENERAL HAMMARSKJOLD AND PRESIDENT NASSER OF EGYPT. THERE IS NO OFFICIAL UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENT ON THE BASIS OF WHICH ANY CASE COULD BE MADE THAT THERE WAS ANY LIMITATION ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT TO RESCIND THAT CONSENT OR WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC HAD IN ANY WAY SURRENDERED ITS RIGHT TO ASK FOR AND OBTAIN AT ANY TIME THE REMOVAL OF UNEF FROM ITS TERRITORY.

AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE POINT IN ANY CASE IN TAKING SUCH AN ISSUE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNLESS THAT BODY COULD BE EXPECTED EXPEDITIOUSLY TO REACH A SUBSTANTIVE DECISION. IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT DECISION OTHER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF COULD HAVE BEEN REACHED BY THE ASSEMBLY ONCE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CONSENT FOR THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNEF WAS WITHDRAWN.

3. (UNDERLINE) THE ISSUE OF REFUSING OR DELAYING RESPONSE TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC REQUEST

CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO THE PRESENCE AND OPERATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING MACHINERY IS A BASIS PREREQUISITE OF ALL UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS. SECRETARY-GENERAL HAMMARSKJOLD IN DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF UNEF IN HIS REPORT (DOCUMENT A/3302) OF 6 NOVEMBER 1956 TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY STATED:

(QUOTE) THE FORCE IF ESTABLISHED WOULD BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT CONSENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED IS

/REQUIRED

REQUIRED UNDER GENERALLY RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL LAW ... WHILE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS ENABLED TO ESTABLISH THE FORCE WITH THE CONSENT OF THOSE PARTIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE UNITS TO THE FORCE, IT COULD NOT REQUEST THE FORCE TO BE STATIONED OR OPERATE ON THE TERRITORY OF A GIVEN COUNTRY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THAT COUNTRY. (UNQUOTE)

4. (UNDERLINE) THE (QUOTE) GOOD FAITH (UNQUOTE) ACCORD

IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED THAT THE SO-CALLED (QUOTE) GOOD FAITH (UNQUOTE) ACCORD (SEE DOCUMENT A/6669 OF 18 MAY 1967, PARAGRAPH7) IMPLIED THAT EGYPTS ACCEPTANCE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1000 (ES-1) OF 5 NOVEMBER 1956 WOULD OBLIGE EGYPT TO CONTINUE TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF UNEF UNTIL THE TASK OF THE FORCE WAS COMPLETED. SUCH A VIEW, WHICH READS MORE INTO THE (QUOTE) GOOD FAITH (UNQUOTE) UNDERSTANDING THAN IS JUSTIFIED, ALSO IGNORES THE FACT THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED IN MID-NOVEMBER 1956 AND THEREFORE COULD RELATE ONLY TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1000 (ES-1) OF 5 NOVEMBER 1956 WHICH DEFINED THE TASK OF UNEF IN VERY GENERAL TERMS AS BEING (QUOTE) TO SECURE AND SUPERVISE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (UNQUOTE). AT THAT EARLY STAGE THE PUR POSE OF THE FORCE IN REALITY WAS TO REPLACE THE WITHDRAWING FORCES OF FRANCE, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND TO BE, IN FACT, THE CONDITION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE FORCES. HOSTILITIES CEASED, AUTOMATICALLY IN FACT, ONCE UNEF WAS DEPLOYED AND THUS ITS TASK AT THAT TIME WAS COMPLETED. IT WAS NOT UNTIL ITS RESOLUTION OF 2 FEBRUARY 1957 THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BROADENED THE FUNCTION OF UNEF IN ITS RESOLUTION 1125 (XI) BY STATING THAT:

(QUOTE) THE SCRUPULUOUS MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REQUIRES THE PLACING OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER MEASURES AS PROPOSED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERALS REPORT ... (UNQUOTE)

THAT BROADER TASK, CLEARLY, IS NOT COMPLETED, AND IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT PRESENT WHEN IT WILL OR CAN BE COMPLETED. THE ARMISTICE HAS ALREADY ENDURED FOR OVER EIGHTEEN YEARS. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE TASK ENVISAGED OR DEFINED FOR UNEF WHEN SECRETARY-GENERAL HAMMARSKJOLD AND PRESIDENT NASSER REACHED THE (QUOTE) GOOD FAITH (UNQUOTE) UNDERSTANDING.

LORD CARADON
SENT 2132Z/04 JSJ

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Mr Pallser

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1214 4 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1214 OF 4 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD CARADON.
MIDDLE EAST.

I AM TO SEE SEYDOUX (FRANCE) LATER AND I SHALL MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND DENMARK THIS EVENING. I SHALL REPORT ON THOSE MEETINGS BUT REFLECTING ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATIONS WITH U THANT AND TABOR YESTERDAY I THOUGHT I MIGHT NOW PUT DOWN THESE PERSONAL THOUGHTS. IN DOING SO I VERY WELL REALISE THAT I CAN ONLY SEE A PART OF THE GAME FROM HERE.

2. THERE ARE TWO VIEWS OF WHAT WE SHOULD BE DOING HERE AT THE UNITED NATIONS. ONE, THE ISRAELI VIEW, IS THAT WE SHOULD MAKE A QUICK SHOW OF REFERENCE TO THE U.N. MERELY TO SHOW HOW INEFFECTIVE IT IS AND THEN LEAVE THE FIELD CLEAR FOR ACTION OUTSIDE THE U.N. THE SECOND IS THAT WE SHOULD IN FACT MAKE A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO USE THE U.N. TO THE MAXIMUM AND TO THE END, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE PERMANENT MEMBERS AT PRESENT SEEM INSUPERABLE AND IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CUMBERSOME METHODS OF THE U.N. MUST TAKE A LONG TIME.

3. WHILE I WELL REALISE THAT OUTSIDE FACTORS MAY BE DECISIVE, I NATURALLY SUPPORT THE SECOND VIEW. IN DOING SO I AM SPECIALLY INFLUENCED BY THE REALISATION THAT IF WE ACT OUTSIDE THE U.N. THE U.N. IS CAPABLE OF GREATLY INCREASING OUR DIFFICULTIES BY CONDEMNING OUR ACTION BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITIES. THE U.N. MAY BE A POOR INSTRUMENT BUT IT IS A DANGEROUS ENEMY. IT ALSO SEEMS TO ME THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS IN THE INTERVAL WE SHALL IN THE END HAVE TO SEEK A U.N. SOLUTION.

/4.

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4. IN ANY EVENT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHALL GET THE WORST OF ALL WORLDS IF WE SAY THAT WE WISH TO WORK THROUGH THE U.N. BUT IN FACT REFUSE TO DO SO.

5. IF WE ARE TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST U.N. ACTION THREE THINGS SEEM TO ME DESIRABLE NOW.

6. FIRST WE SHOULD NOT PURSUE THE EFFORT TO GET A HOLDING RESOLUTION, AT LEAST IN THE FORM OF THE UNITED STATES TEXT. EVEN IF WE GOT NINE VOTES FOR THAT (MOST UNLIKELY NOW) WE SHOULD HAVE DIVIDED THE COUNCIL AND INVITED A SOVIET VETO. WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS BUT ADDED TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF DOING SO. MY RECOMMENDATION THEREFOREE WOULD BE THAT WHEN WE RESUME IN THE COUNCIL WE SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT AGREED ON THE WORDING OF ANY INTERIM RESOLUTION THERE HAS BEEN FROM PRACTICALLY EVERY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL A WELCOME FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT AND SUPPORT FOR HIS APPEAL FOR A BREATHING SPELL. THE TIME HAS THEREFORE COME TO ABANDON PRELIMINARIES AND PROCEED TO CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM BEFORE US. WE MIGHT TABLE OUR COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION BUT THERE MIGHT BE OTHER WAYS OF ACHIEVING THE SAME AIM AFTER DISCUSSION WITH DELEGATIONS WHICH HAVE THE SAME PURPOSES AS OURS.

7. THE SECOND LINE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THE IDEA WHICH U THANT DISCUSSED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY OF SENDING AN EMISSARY FROM THE U.N. TO THE NEAR EAST. THERE MIGHT BE TWO EMISSARIES, ONE A WORLD STATESMAN (FOR INSTANCE THE PRIME MINISTER OF SWEDEN) TO NEGOTIATE IN THE CAPITALS INVOLVED AND SECONDLY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO BE STATIONED PERMANENTLY IN GAZA.

8. THE THIRD PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO EXPLORE BY EVERY MEANS WE CAN THE POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT ACTION BY THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH AND RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE

/SOVIET

SOVIET UNION MAY BE MORE READY TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, MAYBE THROUGH THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

9. THESE WOULD NORMALLY BE THE AIMS OF U.N. ACTIVITY - FULL DISCUSSION OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AN EFFORT AT CONCILIATION ON THE SPOT, AND AN ENDEAVOUR TO ACHIEVE FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 1951Z/ 4 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 1952Z/ 4 JUNE 1967

PRISEC (F.O.)

ADVANCE COPY SENT.

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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1215 DATED 4 JUNE, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1215 OF 4 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, OTTAWA
COPENHAGEN, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1195

MIDDLE EAST.

SEYDOUX (FRANCE) -ASKED TO SEE ME TODAY TO PUT A NEW PROPOSAL TO ME. HE SAID THAT HE SAW NO PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT ON A RESOLUTION OR EVEN ENOUGH VOTES TO PASS ONE. SO HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD SEEK A CONSENSUS DOING THREE THINGS

(I) ENDORSEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT
(II) AN APPEAL TO ALL CONCERNED TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND
(III) A REQUEST TO THE COUNCIL TO CONTINUE ITS URGENT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT PROPOSING EXACT WORDS BUT ONLY A GENERAL IDEA.

2. SEYDOUX ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT HE THOUGHT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A PROPOSAL. THE ADVANTAGE HE SUGGESTED WOULD BE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT AS A WHOLE WOULD BE ON THE RECORD AND SUPPORTED, FOUR POWER AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED AND THE COUNCIL COULD PROCEED WITHOUT BEING DIVIDED FROM THE START.

3. SEYDOUX IS TO DISCUSS HIS PROPOSAL WITH TABOR LATER THIS EVENING AND WILL THEN NO DOUBT APPROACH THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS.

4. I TOLD SEYDOUX THAT ALTHOUGH I WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME FOUR POWER AGREEMENT AND A CONSENSUS ACCEPTABLE TO THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE I COULD NOT REPEAT NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL HE HAD MADE AND I SAW

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NO PROSPECT OF MY GOVERNMENT AGREEING SINCE, APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID IN A CONSENSUS OR RESOLUTION WHICH COULD BE HELD TO JUSTIFY THE BLOCKADE.

5. WHEN I LATER DISCUSSED THIS WITH GOLDBERG, TABOR AND THE CANADIANS WE WERE ALL STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT NO CONSENSUS COULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL.

6. NO DOUBT IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS SEYDOUX WILL PROPOSE THE WORDING OF A CONSENSUS. MEANWHILE I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET ME HAVE YOUR COMMENTS IF POSSIBLE BY 10 A M NEW YORK TIME TOMORROW (MONDAY)

7. I MIGHT ADD THAT SEYDOUX SAID THAT FOLLOWING A CONSENSUS OF THE KIND HE PROPOSED HE WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF SENDING A UNITED NATIONS EMISSARY TO THE MIDDLE EAST CAPITALS CONCERNED (PERHAPS PRECEDED BY A UNITED NATIONS OFFICIAL SUCH AS SPINELLI TO PREPARE THE WAY)

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS TO PARIS NO 111, MOSCOW NO 106, COPENHAGEN NO 42, TEL AVIV NO 116 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO 27, DAMASCUS NO 32 AND CAIRO NO 39.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0354Z 5 JUNE
RECD AT 0354Z 5 JUNE

SENT 050336 Z
SENT 050354Z
RCVD 050354Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER:CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1216 4 JUNE
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1216 OF 4 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, TEL AVIV AND RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1207.

MIDDLE EAST.

AT A MEETING THIS EVENING ATTENDED BY GOLDBERG, TABOR AND CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES TABOR GAVE US AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONFUSED AND COMPLICATED DISCUSSIONS AT THE MEETING OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL YESTERDAY (SATURDAY) EVENING. THERE WAS A GENERAL SLIDE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE INDIAN APPROACH.

2. A NEW INDIAN DRAFT WAS PUT FORWARD (SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) AND A NIGERIAN DRAFT (SEE SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

3. BOTH GOLDBERG AND TABOR WERE INCLINED TO THINK (THOUGH WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS) THAT THE NIGERIAN DRAFT COULD BE ACCEPTABLE ON TWO CONDITIONS. FIRST THAT THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE DROPPED AND REPLACED BY A STRAIGHT ENDORSEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL RETAINING THE ''WITHOUT PREJUDICE'' CLAUSE). AND SECOND THAT A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS FOLLOWS : ''CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES TO GIVE FULL COOPERATION TOWARDS A REDUCTION OF TENSION AND IN PURSUIT OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS''.

4. FAILING THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PREPARED A NEW TEXT (IN MY THIRD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) WHICH THEY BELIEVED THEY COULD GET THE BRAZILIANS TO TABLE.

...../5. THE

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5. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN EXERTING INTENSE PRESSURE ON THE BRAZILIANS AND THE ETHIOPIANS TO AGREE TO ONE TEXT OR THE OTHER (SEE PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 ABOVE). GOLDBERG WAS FAIRLY SURE THAT THE BRAZILIANS COULD BE PERSUADED AND HE HOPED TO PERSUADE THE ETHIOPIANS TOO (THE ETHIOPIANS HAD IN ANY EVENT UNDERTAKEN NOT TO SUPPORT THE INDIAN RESOLUTION). IF BOTH THE BRAZILIANS AND THE ETHIOPIANS COME UP TO SCRATCH THEY WOULD MAKE UP THE NECESSARY VOTES. GOLDBERG DOUBTS IF THE RUSSIANS WOULD VETO. (I THINK THIS OPTIMISTIC AT LEAST AS REGARDS THE TEXT IN PARA 4).

6. I SAID THAT MY PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT I CANNOT AGREE TO ANY RESOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT MAKE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. BUT I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO GO ALONG WITH THE AMERICANS CANADIANS AND DANES IN SUPPORT OF EITHER OF THE PROPOSALS IN PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 ABOVE. THE ESSENTIAL POINTS WE ALL FEEL ARE THAT THERE MUST BE AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRAINT CLAUSE AS NOW PROVIDED IN THE NIGERIAN DRAFT.

7. TABOR IS MEETING THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AGAIN AT 11.30 A.M. TOMORROW AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR REPLY BY THEN.

8. IN OUR EXPLANATION OF VOTE I SHOULD OF COURSE MAKE QUITE CLEAR OUR POSITION ON ''BELLIGERENCE'' AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2423, QUOTING THE RELEVANT PASSAGE FROM YOUR SPEECH IN THE HOUSE ON MAY 31.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 107, PARIS NO. 112, COPENHAGEN NO. 43, TEL AVIV NO. 117, AND RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 27 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 28, DAMASCUS NO. 33 AND CAIRO NO. 40.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0327Z 5 JUNE

RECD 0327Z 5 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAI DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER:CAT 'A'

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1217 4 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1217 OF 4 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, TEL AVIV AND RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAVING TO AMMAN, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REVISED INDIAN RESOLUTION (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1216 PARA. 2) FLOATED TO THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS YESTERDAY.

QUOTE

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING BEEN SEIZED OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

HAVING NOTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TWO REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN S/7896 AND S/7906,

CONCERNED AT THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION,

CONSIDERING THAT ANY RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITION OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED,

1) URGES ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE UTMOST RESTRAINT WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING ACTIONS WHICH WOULD INCREASE TENSION.

2) URGES FURTHER ALL MEMBER STATES TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY STEPS WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION.

3) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS CONTACTS AND TO FURTHER EXPLORE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED, SUITABLE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCTION OF THE TENSION IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE USE OF THE APPROPRIATE UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY, AND TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

...../4) DECIDES

4) DECIDES THAT THE COUNCIL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THIS ITEM AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

UNQUOTE.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 108, PARIS NO. 113, COPENHAGEN NO. 44, TEL AVIV NO. 118, AND RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 28, AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 29, CAIRO NO. 41 AND DAMASCUS NO. 34.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0318Z 5 JUNE

RECD AT 0335Z 5 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV DEFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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CYPHER:CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1218 4JUNE
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1218 OF 4 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS,
OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, TEL AVIV AND RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAVING
TO AMMAN, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1216 : PARA. 2.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NIGERIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION FLOATED TO THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS YESTERDAY.

QUOTE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING BEEN SEIZED OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

HAVING NOTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TWO REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN DOCUMENTS NO. S/7896 AND S/7906,

CONCERNED AT THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION,

1. URGES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITION OF THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE, ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, AND ALL STATES, TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS CONTACTS AND TO FURTHER EXPLORE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED, ALL COURSES OF ACTION WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF THE TENSION IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE USE OF THE APPROPRIATE UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY, AND TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN TWO WEEKS:

3. DECIDES THAT THE COUNCIL REMAINS ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THIS ITEM AS A MATTER OR URGENCY. UNQOTE.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO.109, PARIS NO. 114, COPENHAGEN NO. 45, TEL AVIV NO.119 AND RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 29 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 30, CAIRO NO. 42 AND DAMAGSCUS NO.35.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0342Z 5 JUNE
RECD. 0342Z 5 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1219 DATED 4 JUNE, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1219 OF 4 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, TEL AVIV, RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAVING TO AMMAN, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1216 PARAGRAPH 4 : MIDDLE EAST

FOLLOWING IS TEXT WHICH UNITED STATES MISSION HOPE THE BRAZILIANS WILL AGREE TO TABLE. IT HAS BEEN SHOWN ONLY TO THEM, THE DANES, CANADIANS AND OURSELVES, AND THE UNITED STATES DO NOT WISH THEIR AUTHORSHIP TO BE REVEALED.

'THE SECURITY COUNCIL'

'HAVING BEEN SEIZED' OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

'HAVING NOTED' THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TWO REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN S/7896 AND S/7906,

'CONCERNED ' AT THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION

'CONSCIOUS' OF THE NEED FOR A BREATHING SPELL TO ALLOW TENSIONS TO SUBSIDE,

1. 'ENDORSES' AS A FIRST STEP THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ALL OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED,

2. 'REQUESTS' THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FURTHER TO EXPLORE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED, THE OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS IN HIS REPORT AND ALL OTHER COURSES OF ACTION WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF THE TENSION IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE UTILIZATION OF THE APPROPRIATE UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY,

3. 'CALLS UPON' THE MEMBER STATES TO GIVE THEIR FULL COOPERATION AND TO PURSUE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERESTS OF SEEKING REASONABLE, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS,

4. 'REQUESTS' FURTHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A

...../REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1219 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE,

5. 'DECIDES' TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CONTINUOUS REVIEW AS A MATTER OF THE UTMOST CONCERN.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS TO MOSCOW NO 110, PARIS NO 115, COPENHAGEN NO 46, TEL AVIV NO 120, RIO DE JANEIRO NO 30 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO 31, CAIRO NO 43 AND DAMASCUS NO 36.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0410Z 5 JUNE
REC'D AT 0410Z 5 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

(23)

Middle East (Policy) 32
PF 3

3 pts
Overtaken, but worth a glance.

WONFO 002/05

--00-- F.O. 90405

CYPHER/CAT.A.

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1904 DATED 04 JUNE 1967

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO 1904 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UK DEL NATO

YOUR TEL 5948: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

I HAVE CONVEYED THE POINTS IN YOUR TEL UNDER REF TO ROSTOW THIS MORNING, AND CALLED ON HIM THIS AFTERNOON.

ISRAELI TEST SHIP.

2. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE US WOULD CERTAINLY LET US KNOW AS SOON AS THEY HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT ISRAEL WAS PLANNING A PROBE. HE SAID THAT THE US HAD PUT THEMSELVES IN A TOUGH POSITION ON THIS. THEY WERE LOCKED IN ON THE ''NAKED LEGAL PRINCIPLE'' THAT THE STRAITS WERE AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. IN 1957 THEY HAD MADE THE COMMITMENT THAT IF THE WORST CAME TO THE WORST AND AN ISRAELI SHIP WAS STOPPED, THEY WOULD SAY ISRAEL HAD THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. I EMPHASISED THAT YOUR WHOLE CONCEPT WAS FOR AN ESCORTED PROBE WHEN ALL OTHER MEANS FAILED. ROSTOW, WHO HAS NEVER COMMITTED HIMSELF TO THE IDEA OF AN ESCORTED PROBE, AGREED THAT THESE WERE IDEAS WHICH SHOULD BE THRASHED OUT AT NEXT WEEKS CONTINGENCY TALKS. BUT I AM AFRAID HE WAS CLEARLY DISINCLINED TO CONSIDER ACTIVELY DISCOURAGING AN INDEPENDENT ISRAELI PROBE IF ISRAEL DECIDED ON ONE. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI PROBE

TO CONSIDER ACTIVELY DISCOURAGING AN INDEPENDENT ISRAELI PROBE IF ISRAEL DECIDED ON ONE. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI PROBE IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WANT TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE UAR, BUT IT WOULD PROBABLY DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHETHER ROSTOWS' SUPERIORS WOULD DECIDE TO ADVISE THE ISRAELIS AGAINST SUCH A MOVE. IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE ACTION AFTER AN ISRAELI DECISION AS DOLPHIN WILL TAKE 72 HRS FROM MASSAWA TO THE STRAITS.

MARITIME DECLARATION.

3. ROSTOW IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE PROPOSED BELGIAN ADDITION (YOUR TEL 5905). WHICH HE CONSIDERS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ENCOURAGING DOUBTERS SUCH AS THE ITALIANS. HE ALSO AGREES THAT WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO MEET THE GERMANS. BUT BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR SPEED HE DOES NOT THINK WE CAN AFFORD TO WASTE THE TIME IN SECURING GOVERNMENTS' AGREEMENT TO A REDRAFT. HE THEREFORE THINKS THAT WE SHOULD AIM FOR PARALLEL BUT NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL DECLARATIONS IN CAPITALS AND SIMULTANEOUS DESPATCHES OF THE VARIOUS TEXTS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR CIRCULATION AS SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS. ACCORDING TO ROSTOW, DEAN RUSK HAS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD NOT MATTER IF COUNTRIES SIGNED SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT TEXTS.
I COULD NOT GET FROM ROSTOW A CLEAR IDEA OF HOW HE SAW THIS WORKING OUT SINCE THE DECLARATION AS AT PRESENT DRAFTED WOULD NEED A GOOD DEAL OF EDITING IF IT WAS TO BE OTHER THAN A JOINT DECLARATION.

4. ROSTOW SAID THAT HE HAD PRESSED THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR HARD THIS AFTERNOON FOR CLARIFICATION OF ITALY'S ATTITUDE, AND HAD POINTED OUT THAT ITALY WOULD SIGN THE DECLARATION AS A MEMBER OF THE UN AND THAT THE DECLARATION WOULD BE DEPOSITED AT THE UN. ROSTOW EMPHASISED ITALY'S RESPONSIBILITY AS A EUROPEAN POWER. AVERILL HARRIMAN IS BEING SENT TO ROME TO BRING FURTHER PRESSURE TO BEAR.

5. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE HAD ANY RESPONSE FROM GHANA AND KENYA.

ACTION AT UN.

6. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE US HAD HEARD THAT THERE WAS A MOVE AT THE UN TO SMOTHER THE WHOLE ISSUE. THIS WOULD ONLY BE GOOD IF THE STRAITS WERE OPEN OR OPENING. THE ISRAELIS WERE CLEARLY INCLINING TO DO IT THEMSELVES. TIME WAS VERY SHORT IN WHICH TO GET THE STRAITS OPEN, EITHER THROUGH AGREEMENT WITH THE UAR OR BY NAVAL

STRAITS OPEN, EITHER THROUGH AGREEMENT WITH THE UAR OR BY NAVAL ACTION.

FO PASS TO UKDEL NATO 190.

CORRECTIONS:

PAGE 1 PARA 2. WORD AFTER AFRAID HE WAS CLEARLY DISINCLINED ✓

PAGE 2 PARA 6.

WORD AFTER WERE CLEARLY INCLINING ✓

SIR P. DEANE GPS 400 SENT.....0135Z/05

JSJ

SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS ON MIDDLE EAST RECEIVED OVERNIGHT JUNE 3/4 AFTER PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTURE FROM NEW YORK

WASHINGTON 1898

Minister at Israeli Embassy has indicated to Rostow that Israeli Government thinking seriously of trying to take care of Straits of Tiran on their own by sending in a Greek ship which they have bought and renamed "Dolphin". If this probe was mounted and Egyptians stopped the ship Israel would occupy Sharm El Sheik and then see what happened.

Telegram also reports that U.S. list as definite or probable signatories to the Declaration; the U.S., the U.K., Israel, Iceland, Belgium, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Australia and possible signatories, Germany Argentina, Portugal, Canada.

Rostow thought the Hague would be best location for signing.

WASHINGTON 1900

Rostow has reported that there is a possibility that Zakaria Mohieddin the Vice-President of the U.A.R. might visit Washington in the next two days or so.

ROME 496

Italian Cabinet have decided that not able to subscribe to Declaration at least for the time being except in the United Nations context. They argue that the Declaration as proposed would devalue the United Nations.

COPENHAGAN 148

Prime Minister and Cabinet have yet to meet but from conversation with P.U.S. at Ministry of Foreign Affairs it appears that Danes will not subscribe to Declaration now in practice. The most we can expect is a subscription to some Declaration when the dangers of war are passed and when a substantial number of other respectable signatures have been collected.

WELLINGTON 282

New Zealand have subscribed to the Declaration.

MOSCOW 954

Soviet Press continues squarely in support of Arabs. Britain and U.S. argued to be inciting Israel to act in a provocative way, but tone of reporting is not alarmist.

KHARTOUM 202

Prime Minister stated to all Heads of Mission that countries who stay with them would continue to be their friends. Those who do not would no longer be their friends.

No TELAVIV 461

Report of briefing by Israel Intelligence Branch. Nothing fundamental has changed. Nasser must find solution to crisis if he wishes to avoid a direct collision with Israel. Impression given was realisation of the worsened military situation Israelis now face and appreciation that in the end that they might well have to go it alone.

No NEW YORK 1203

Report of Security Council Meeting.

No RIO DE JANEIRO 256

Brazil attitude on U.S. resolution and the Declaration is vague and unpromising.

WASHINGTON 1987

Reports conversation outside Cabinet Room while Prime Minister and President were talking alone.